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The thesis explores whether, prior to the nineteenth century regime of legislative 
intervention which anglicised the law relating to contracts of sale for goods, the  
Scots common law underlying contracts of sale developed in a unitary fashion. Did 
the same principles apply regardless of whether the subject of the sale was corporeal 
moveable, corporeal immoveable or incorporeal? This question is analysed through a 
case study of the common law contractual implied warranty of soundness, and its 
application to the three types of property mentioned above. While this study does not 
provide a definitive answer on its own, it does give us a preliminary indication as to 
whether the law was unified or not.  
 The thesis relies primarily on Scots case law and academic writings, employing 
historical and doctrinal methodologies. The study is supplemented by comparative 
law from France, Germany, South Africa and England. Roman law, and the works 
certain Ius Commune writers, are also referenced.  
 The thesis can be divided into four parts. The first part explores whether 
academic texts on the contract of sale dating prior to the legislative intervention 
took a unified approach in their discussion. This establishes whether scholars from 
this period viewed the contract of sale as unified; and aids the analysis in subsequent 
chapters. The second part examines the warranty’s substantive framework in the 
context of its development, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through case 
law featuring corporeal moveable property. The third part looks at the warranty’s use 
in contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property. Here, I establish that: 1) there 
was no consensus as to whether or not the warranty applied to this type of property; 
and 2) the warranty was not utilised by buyers of this type of property in practice.  
I identify a combination of factors which prevented buyers of latently defective 
corporeal immoveable property from invoking the warranty. The final part of the 
thesis examines the warranty’s actual and theoretical application to contracts of sale 
for incorporeal property. It establishes that the warranty would be relevant to some, 
but not all, types of incorporeal property.  
  xii 
 The thesis concludes that the manner in which historical sources approached 
the application of the implied warranty to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable 
property, suggests that the common law underlying contracts of sale was not as 
unified as previously thought. The conclusion notes that the topic of a unified Scots 
common law of sale requires further exploration, with particular reference to the 
implied warranty of title and the rule regarding the passing of risk.  
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Lay Summary 
 
This thesis examines whether, prior to the passing of legislation which anglicised the 
law underlying contracts of sale for goods, the same set of principles underpinned all 
Scots contracts of sale. It studies this question through an analysis of the Scots 
common law implied guarantee of quality. It starts by setting out the warranty’s 
substantive framework, which was developed exclusively through case law involving 
corporeal moveable property (i.e. goods). It then explores the warranty’s application 
to corporeal immoveable property (such as lands) and incorporeal property (for 
example: shares, claims, computer software, etc.). The thesis relies primarily on 
Scots case law and academic writings. The guarantee’s history in Roman law and the 
Ius Commune; and comparative law from South Africa, France, Germany and 
England are also examined. The thesis concludes that the Scots common law 
underlying contracts of sale may not have been as unified as previously thought.   
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Chapter I - Introduction  
 
 
A. The Project 
 
Until the mid- to late- nineteenth century, all Scots contracts of sale were regulated 
by the common law. A regime of legislative intervention, beginning with the 
Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856 and culminating in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893, anglicised the law regulating contracts of sale for goods.1 From 
then on, the law regulating Scots contracts of sale has definitely been fragmented: 
those featuring corporeal moveables are regulated by a statue inspired by English 
law;2 and those dealing with corporeal immoveables and incorporeals continue to be 
regulated by the Scots common law.  
 Of the era preceding the legislative intervention, a former law commissioner 
once said:  
 
 It is well known that the law of sale in Scotland developed as a unified  
 subject, with little regard to the distinction between [immoveable] and  
 moveable property. And in consequence of this unity, which lasted until the 
 anglicisation of the rules of moveable property by the Acts of 1856 and 1893, 
 principles developed in connection with one type of property were generally 
 assumed to be of equal application to the other.3 
 
What he means is that, prior to the legislative intervention, the same set of common 
law principles regulated all contracts of sale, regardless of whether the property 
involved was corporeal moveable, corporeal immoveable or incorporeal. Such a 
position would deepen our understanding of the current Scots law in regard to 
contracts of sale for corporeal immoveables and incorporeals. These are still 
regulated by the Scots common law, and our understanding of the law relating to 
incorporeal property in particular, would be enhanced.  
                                                
1 For details of what led to this, see: Rodger, A., “The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian 
2 Now the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
3 Reid, K. G. C., ‘Warrandice in the Sale of Land’ in D. J. Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing 
Miscellany: 164. 
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 However, the existence of a unified Scots common law underlying all 
contracts of sale cannot be assumed. Academics and jurists alike have disagreed on 
whether certain common law principles developed exclusively in relation to contracts 
of sale for one type of property, had equal application to other types of property. 
Examples of such principles are the implied guarantee of quality (referred to as “the 
implied warranty of soundness” in this thesis),4 the implied guarantee of title, and the 
rule regarding the passing of risk. Thus, the assertion that the Scots common law 
underlying contracts of sale was unified requires close examination.  
 This is what the following thesis seeks to do. Due to limitations of time and 
space, the thesis examines this question in the context of a single principle: the 
implied warranty of soundness. While this study will not provide a definite answer 
on its own, it will give us a preliminary indication of whether, prior to nineteenth 
century legislative intervention, the Scots common law underlying contracts of sale 
was unified.  
 
1. The Implied Warranty of Soundness 
 
The common law implied warranty of soundness imposed a contractual obligation on 
the seller to guarantee that the thing sold was free of latent qualitative defects at the 
time of the sale. The warranty was developed exclusively in the context of corporeal 
moveable property. It is thought to have fallen into disuse following the passing of 
the 1856 and 1893 Acts, which anglicised the law underlying contracts of sale for 
corporeal moveable property. Whether the warranty applied, and continues to apply, 
to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable and incorporeal property, is unclear. In 
regard to corporeal immoveable property, some believe that the warranty does 
apply,5 while others argue that it does not.6 The warranty’s application to incorporeal 
property has not been studied thus far.  
                                                
4 For an explanation as to why, see page 24f.  
5 Black, R. “Practice and Precept in Scots Law” (1982) 27 Juridical Review 31; Edward, D. A. O. 
“Latent Defect in Heritable Property” (1963) 3 The Conveyancing Review 144; Reid, K. G. C., 
‘Warrandice in the Sale of Land’ in D. J. Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany: 164-165. 
6 Aberdeen Development Co. v. Mackie, Ramsay & Taylor, 1977 S.L.T. 177 (Lord Maxwell); 
Halliday, J. M. “The Scope of Warrandice in Conveyances of Land” (1983) 28 Juridical Review 1; 
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 If the warranty is found to apply and be of use to all contracts of sale, 
regardless of the type of property involved, this would indicate that the common law 
underlying Scots contracts of sale was unified. It would also suggest that principles 
developed in relation to one type of property could be of use to other types of 
property. If the warranty is found to not apply to some contracts of sale, this would 
provide a preliminary indication that the Scots common law underlying contracts of 
sale was not unified. 
 
B. Methodology  
 
In Scots law, a sale transaction contains two distinct stages: the contract and the 
conveyance. Personal rights are acquired at the conclusion of the contract, while the 
real right of ownership is acquired at the conclusion of the conveyancing stage. This 
thesis focuses solely on the contract stage of the sale transaction.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, there are three classes of property: corporeal 
moveable property, corporeal immoveable property, and incorporeal property.7 The 
further division of incorporeal property into incorporeal moveable property and 
incorporeal immoveable property is immaterial here as it is relevant only to the law 
of diligence and succession.8  
 The thesis relies primarily on relevant Scots case law and academic writings. 
It employs historical, doctrinal and comparative methodologies. Comparative law is 
used mainly as a tool to inform the study of the Scots implied warranty of soundness. 
 As a mixed legal system, Scots law draws on both the civilian and common 
law traditions. The jurisdictions chosen for the comparative study - Germany, 
France, England and South Africa - reflect this balance. France and Germany are 
civilian systems. Like Scotland, South Africa has a mixed legal system. England, a 
common law system, has influenced the Scots legal landscape. It should be noted that 
                                                                                                                                     
Cusine, D. J. “Warrandice and Latent Defects in Heritage” (1983) 28 Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland 228. 
7 For a discussion on the distinction between these three types of property, see: Miller, D. L. C., 
Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd ed: §1.03ff. 
8 Reid, K. G. C., “Rights and Things” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §11. 
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limitations of language and an inability to access case reports for some jurisdictions, 
have necessitated a reliance on secondary sources written in the English language.  
The thesis also considers the warranty’s origins in Roman law; and the works of ius 
commune writers such as Grotius, Van Leeuwen, Voet and Pothier. 
 The thesis can be divided into four main parts. The first part (Chapter II) 
looks at academic texts on the contract of sale from the pre-codification period. This 
is the period when the Scots common law regulated all contracts of sale. This period 
was ended by the nineteenth century legislative intervention which anglicised the law 
underlying contracts of sale for corporeal moveable property. The purpose of this 
chapter is to identify whether these texts took a unified approach to the contract of 
sale, and aid the discussion in subsequent chapters. The second part (Chapter III), 
studies the warranty’s origins and development in Scots law in the context of 
contracts of sale for corporeal moveable property. The goal in this chapter is to better 
understand the substantive framework within which the warranty functions.  
 The third part (Chapter IV) looks at the warranty’s use in the context of 
corporeal immoveable property. It explores academic texts and case law relevant to 
the topic. It also identifies several factors which may have prevented buyers of 
latently defective corporeal immoveable property from utilising the warranty.  
 The fourth part (Chapter V) considers the warranty’s practical and theoretical 
application to contracts of sale for incorporeal property. It starts by undertaking a 
literature review of academic discussions on this topic. Since much of the literature 
relates to claims, the chapter then examines the warrandice implied in sales of 
claims. The chapter also looks at whether contracts of sale for incorporeal property 
would benefit from the warranty. This part of the analysis focuses on five specific 
types of incorporeal property: shares, patents in biotechnology, computer software, 
copyright and goodwill.  
 
C. Original Contributions 
 
There are several original contributions in this thesis. It studies a question which has 
never been properly considered: whether the Scots common law underlying contracts 
of sale was unified, with the same set of principles applying regardless of the type of 
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property involved. As mentioned earlier, a unified common law in this area would 
greatly aid our understanding of the contract of sale in relation to corporeal 
immoveable and incorporeal property in Scots law. The law regarding incorporeal 
property in particular, is currently under-researched and would benefit from more 
clarification.  
 The thesis’ second contribution is in relation to the implied warranty of 
soundness. In the past, several texts have studied the warranty. Prominent examples 
are Hume’s Lectures,9 Mungo Brown’s Treatise,10 and an article by Sutherland.11 
However, none of these texts have been as comprehensive as this thesis intends to be.  
The discussions in Hume and Brown date to the 1820s, and do not take account of 
the warranty’s later development. Sutherland’s treatment is brief. This thesis contains 
the most comprehensive study of the warranty’s origins and its substantive 
framework to date. 
 The thesis also seeks to settle a contemporary debate as to whether the 
warranty applied to corporeal immovable property. Though several notable 
academics have engaged in this debate, none have conducted a thorough 
investigation into the question. The thesis fills this gap. The answer to this question 
will clarify our contemporary understanding of the contract of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property. This is because the Scots common law still regulates such 
contracts of sale; and any implied warranty which applied to contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable property in the past, would still be the default law today.  
 The same is true of our contemporary understanding of the contract of sale 
for incorporeal property. As the literature review in Chapter V will demonstrate, we 
possess very little information relating directly to the contract of sale for incorporeal 
property. In studying the warranty’s application to this type of property, the thesis 
adds to our knowledge and understanding of this under-researched, but increasingly 
important, area of law.  
 It should be noted that the topic of a unified Scots common law of sale will 
require further investigation, with particular reference to the implied guarantee of 
                                                
9 Hume, Lectures: II.40ff. 
10 Brown, Treatise: 235. 
11 Sutherland, E. E. ‘Remedying an Evil? Warrandice of Quality at Common Law in Scotland’ (1987) 
32 Juridical Review 24. 
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title and the rule regarding the passing of risk. While this is beyond the scope of the 
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Chapter II - Did Academic Discussions Treat the 
Scots Common Law Underlying Contracts of Sale as 





A starting point in determining whether the same set of common law principles 
underpinned all contracts of sale is to look at the approach taken by academic 
discussions on the contract of sale. Were they unified, with one discussion serving 
contracts of sale for corporeal moveables, corporeal immoveables and incorporeals? 
Or was the discussion split between separate sections, with each section dealing with 
the contract of sale and its application to a different type of property?  
 The purpose of this study is two-fold. It will give us an idea of whether or not 
the contract of sale was viewed as unified under the common law. The information 
gleaned will also aid the analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 With this aim in mind, the current chapter will examine notable academic 
discussions on the Scots contract of sale.12 The discussions examined pre-date the 
legislative intervention that anglicised the law underlying contracts of sale for 
corporeal moveable property. This is because the law thereafter could not possibly 
have been unified: transactions featuring corporeal immoveables and incorporeals 
were still regulated by the common law, but those involving corporeal moveables 
were regulated by legislation.  
  
B. Early Texts 
 
                                                
12 Note that several texts have been excluded from the analysis in this chapter for different reasons.  
Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence contains only a very brief discussion of the contract of sale 
in general terms, and was, as a result, excluded from this study. Sinclair’s Practicks has been left out 
because it does not discuss the contract of sale. Mackenzie’s Institutions has been left out because its 
discussion on the contract of sale is brief and perfunctory, and thus unhelpful to this analysis. Lord 
Kames’ Principles of Equity has been excluded because it does not contain a dedicated discussion on 
the contract of sale.  
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Early discussions on the contract of sale are brief and undeveloped. As such, these 
discussions are of limited use to this analysis. Regiam Majestatem contains a very 
basic discussion on the contract of sale.13 In general, no distinction is made in the 
text between corporeal moveable, corporeal immoveable and incorporeal property. 
The principle of warrandice is explained in relation to immoveable property; 
however, the text then specifies that the same rules apply to moveable property.14 
 The chapter on sale in Balfour’s Practicks15 lists both general principles, and 
facts that apply very specifically to one type of property. An example of the former is 
the duty of warrandice, which is said to apply to both moveables and immoveables.16 
An example of the latter is the statement that a buyer of the patronage of a kirk must 
be infeft in the land “annexit” to it in order for his purchase to be profitable.17 The 
discussion in Balfour’s Practicks highlights the undeveloped nature of the contract of 
sale at the point at which Balfour is writing. Likewise, Hope’s Practicks18 contains a 
brief discussion of the contract of sale, with no distinction made between different 




Stair’s Institutions contains one substantive discussion on the contract of sale.19 This 
discussion, which relates to all three types of property, appears to take a unified 
approach to the contract of sale. The text contains references to each type of 
property. For example, corporeal moveables are mentioned in the context of the 
implied warranty of soundness, reversion and risk. Corporeal immoveables are 
specifically mentioned in relation to the topics of reversion, warrandice and risk. A 
                                                
13 Regiam Majestatem: III.10ff. 
14 Ibid: III.11. 
15 Balfour, Practicks: 209ff. 
16 Ibid: 210. 
17 Ibid: 210. 
18 Hope, Major Practicks.: II.4. 
19 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.10.63ff; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.14.  
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case featuring incorporeal property is also cited.20 This discussion lays out one set of 




William Forbes’ A Great Body of the Law of Scotland contains a discussion on the 
contract of sale.21 This discussion is unified. It deals primarily with corporeal 
moveable and corporeal immoveable property. However, incorporeals are also 
mentioned.22 The discussion introduces a single set of principles, which presumably 




The discussion of the contract of sale in Bankton’s Institute is contained in a single 
chapter.23 The treatment is unified. The chapter discusses the basic principles in a 
contract of sale, such as: price,24 what can be the subject of a sale,25 who is allowed 
to buy and sell26 and the implied warrandice of title.27 The chapter uses many 
examples drawn from the sale of corporeal moveable property. However, both 
corporeal immoveable property and incorporeal property are also discussed in the 
chapter.  Corporeal immoveable property is discussed in relation to the requirement 
of writing,28 reversion,29 the civil law principle of addictio in diem,30 sale by 
creditors31 and absolute warrandice.32 Incorporeal property is mentioned in relation 
                                                
20 Lawder v. Goodwife of Whitekirk, 15 February 1637, M. 1692. Cited at Stair, Institutions (1st ed): 
I.10.68 and Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.14.1. 
21 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 825. 
22 See, for example - Ibid: MS GEN 1247, fos. 827 (the sale of a hope or expectation). 
23 Bankton, Institute: I.19. 
24 Ibid: I.19.3. 
25 Ibid: I.19.8.  
26 Ibid: I.19.7.  
27 Ibid: I.19.4, 24-25, 8 (this last is from the section comparing Scots law to English law).  
28 Ibid: I.19.1.  
29 Ibid: I.19.29.  
30 Ibid: I.19.33.  
31 Ibid: I.19.34. 
32 Ibid: I.19.8 (in the section comparing Scots law to English law). 
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to the sale of the hope or expectation of something,33 patents and copyright,34 and the 
illegality of selling shares of imaginary stock.35 
 At only two points in the discussion does the text indicate that the application 
of a specific principle differs according to the type of property involved. The first is 
that contracts of sale are perfected by consent, except for those relating to 
immoveable property, which require writing.36 The second is that the implied 
warranty of soundness only applies to contracts of sale for goods: 
 
By [Scots law], in sale of goods and lands, where no warrandice is 
exprest, absolute warrandice is implied, viz. That the seller has good 
right to the same, and shall warrant the purchaser against all 
evictions…and further, as to goods, that they labour under no latent 
insufficiency…37 
 
Thus, in general, Bankton’s discussion of the contract of sale is unified. The one 
discussion applies to corporeal moveables, corporeal immoveables and incorporeal, 
unless otherwise specified. 
 Bankton’s Institute has another section on sale, entitled “Decrees of Roup and 
Sale”38. However, this deals only with the sale of a debtor’s land in a bankruptcy. 




The first edition of Erskine’s Institute (1773) contains one substantive discussion on 
the contract of sale.39 Much of the text focuses on corporeal moveables. However, a 
case featuring corporeal immoveable property40 is cited in the discussion on price; 
and lands are mention in the discussion on reversions.41 Incorporeal property is 
                                                
33 Ibid: I.19.8. 
34 Ibid: I.19.11-12. 
35 Ibid: I.19.9.  
36 Ibid: I.19.1.  
37 Ibid: I.19.8 (This is from the section comparing Scots law to English law) (emphasis own). For an 
analysis of this text, see page 106f.  
38 Bankton, Institute: III.2.102ff. 
39 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.  
40 Earl of Montrose v. Scott, March 13 1639, M. 14,155. 
41 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.12.  
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mentioned once, in the context of the expectation of something being a valid subject 
for sale.42 The text makes a distinction in the application of a principle to different 
types of property once. This is that contracts of sale for moveables are perfected by 
consent, while contracts of sale for immoveables require writing.43 Thus, the 
discussion on the contract of sale appears to be unified, with the same principles 
applying to all types of property unless otherwise specified.  
 This pattern remains largely unchanged in subsequent editions. The 1871 
edition contains an expanded discussion of the contract of sale,44 with references 
made to all three types of property. The text also takes account of the changes 




Hume’s Lectures represents the content delivered by Baron David Hume to his 
students in the 1821-22 academic session.45 The discussion on the contract of sale46 
is one of the thoroughest we possess. The structure and content of this discussion 
indicates that it is unified.  
 Structurally, this is the only discussion on the contract of sale in Hume’s 
Lectures. In terms of content, this discussion contains references to all three types of 
property. Examples relating to both corporeal moveable property and corporeal 
immoveable property are used throughout the text. Incorporeal property, though 
mentioned much less, is also covered. An example is drawn from the assignation of a 
lease,47 a case involving a bond is cited48 and the buying of shares in imaginary 
companies is said to be illegal.49  
 Hume rarely limits the application of a principle to one type of property or 
indicates that different rules apply to different kinds of property. Indeed, at points he 
                                                
42 Ibid: III.3.3. 
43 Ibid: III.3. The requirement in relation to immoveables is further discussed at III.2.2. 
44	  Erskine, Institute (8th ed.): III.3.	  
45 Paton, G. C. H., ‘Preface’	  in Baron D. Hume, Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822: Vol I, (ed) 
G. C. H. Paton: v.	  
46 Hume, Lectures: II.3-55. 
47 Ibid: II.11.  
48 Ibid: II.26. 
49 Ibid: II.26. 
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emphasises that, though a certain principle is predominantly used in relation to one 
type of property, it nevertheless applies equally to both moveables and immoveables. 
For example, in his discussion of the implied warranty of soundness, he states:  
 
I have taken the whole of these illustrations from the sale of moveable 
subjects; but this is only because it is chiefly in that department that 
examples of latent faults and vices happen, and by no means with any 
view of limiting the doctrine to the moveable class of things. The truth 
is that tenements of land are not often visited by such latent vices and 
diseases as may afterwards break out and destroy the use of the 
subject. But put a proper case, and the same principle will rule.50 
 
Similarly, at the end of his discussion of the implied warrandice of title, he writes: 
 
 With respect to moveable corpora, which require no written titles, and carry a 
 presumptive title in favour of a possessor, objections to the seller’s right are 
 of course much less frequent and more difficult to be substantiated; yet still, if 
 the buyer show that a claim has been made, or is about to be made, to the  
 property by some third party with a probability of its success…I incline to 
 think that before delivery he has the right to throw up the bargain.51  
 
 Only twice does Hume indicate that a principle varies depending on the type 
of property involved. The first instance is when he states that contracts of sale for 
“immoveable subjects” must be in writing, while contracts of sale for “moveable 
corpora” can be verbal.52 The second is that while the implied warrandice of title 
applies to both moveables and immoveables, what it entails differs depending on the 
type of property involved.53 The implication is that, unless otherwise stated, the 
principles detailed in this discussion apply regardless of the type of property 
involved.  
 
H.  Brown 
 
                                                
50 Ibid: II.42-43. For an analysis of this text, see page 113f.	  
51 Ibid: II.40.	  
52 Ibid: II.18ff.  
53 Ibid: II.38ff.  
 
  13 
Mungo Brown’s A Treatise on the Law of Sale takes a unified approach to the 
contract of sale. He deals primarily with corporeal moveable and corporeal 
immoveable property; however incorporeal property is also mentioned.54  Brown 
does not discuss one set of principles in relation to corporeal moveables, and another 
set in relation to corporeal immoveables. The treatment is unified, with case law 
drawn from both types of property being discussed.  
 When a principle applies solely to one type of property, this is highlighted. 
For example, he explains that a verbal contract is not binding in relation to a sale of 
immoveable property.55 There are points where Brown draws almost exclusively 
from case law relating to one type of property in illustrating a principle. For example, 
the cases discussed in relation to the warranty of soundness are all drawn from sales 
of corporeal moveable property;56 and the cases used in the discussion of the 
warrandice against eviction almost all deal with corporeal immoveable property.57 
However, the principle’s application is not restricted to one type of property in either 




 1. Principles 
 
The first edition of Bell’s Principles (1829) contains only one discussion of the 
contract of sale,58 located in the part of the book dealing with contractual rights.59 In 
addition to corporeal moveables, the text references corporeal immoveables.60 
Incorporeal property is mentioned once.61 Only one set of principles is discussed in 
this text, indicating a unified approach. The text highlights the few exceptions to this 
unified approach. Thus, verbal sale contracts are said to be valid, except where the 
                                                
54 For example, see: Brown, Treatise: 11, 249, 267. 
55 Ibid: 54. 
56 Ibid: 285ff. 
57 Ibid: 240ff. 
58 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 41ff. 
59 Part I.  
60 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 42 (the requirement of writing), 46 (sound title); 43.2, footnote 2 (cites 
E. Montrose v. Scott, 13 March 1639, M. 14155). 
61 See footnote 1002.   
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sale concerns lands, ships or goods bonded for duties.62 The seller is said to be under 
an implied warranty to give good title. While this applies universally, the 
requirement is said to be much more absolute in sales of land.63 
 The structure of the discussion changes in the second edition (1830). In 
addition to the chapter on the contract of sale in the usual location, Part II of the book 
(which deals with real rights in property) has had a new section added to it: “Some 
Doctrines of the Law of Sale Peculiarly Applicable to Land”.64 This latter section 
covers the requirement of writing, seller’s title, burdens and incumbrances, extent of 
the right, and warrandice in sales of land.  
 This new section does not signal an end to the unified approach in the 
previous edition. Many of the topics covered in the new section are those highlighted 
by writers like Mungo Brown, Bankton and Hume as being uniquely applicable to 
contracts of sale for land. General principles such as price, risk and delivery are still 
only discussed in the first chapter on the contract of sale. Furthermore, corporeal 
immoveables continue to be mentioned in the first chapter.65  
 There is not much change between the second, third (1833) and fourth 
editions (1839). The fourth edition was the last prepared by Bell himself. A fifth 
edition, edited by Patrick Shaw, was published in 1860. This edition does not deviate 
from the pattern set in the previous editions. While the first chapter is now entitled 
“Of the Contract of Sale of Goods” and the second chapter is entitled “Of the Sale of 
Land”, the content in each chapter remains the same. Land is still mentioned at least 
once in the first chapter.66 Furthermore, the discussions of basic doctrines of sale 
such as price, risk and delivery are still only contained within this first chapter: the 
chapter on the sale of lands does not mention them. These doctrines are integral to 
contracts of sale regardless of the type of property being transacted for. Their 
absence in the chapter on sale of land suggests that at least some of the discussion in 
the chapter on sale of goods also applies to land. Furthermore, the content of the 
                                                
62 Bell, Principles (1st ed): §	  42. This is repeated in Bell, Principles (2nd ed.): §	  89; Bell, Principles 
(3rd ed.): §	  89; and Bell, Principles (4th ed.): §	  89, and “copyright”	  is also added to the list in the 
latter two editions. 	  
63 Bell, Principles (1st ed): §	  46.	  
64 Bell, Principles (2nd ed): § 889ff 
65 Bell, Principles (2nd ed): § 89 (the requirement of writing); § 114 (the obligation to give sound 
title). 
66 Bell, Principles (5th ed.): § 89 (the requirement of writing). 
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chapter on sale of lands has not changed from the previous editions. The same 
subjects are covered, but in more detail.  
 The discussion on the contract of sale in Bell’s Principles takes a unified 
approach to the contract of sale. Though there are two chapters on the contract of 
sale from the second edition onwards, the first chapter continues to contain a 
generalised discussion which refers to corporeal moveables, corporeal immoveables 
and incorporeals. The second chapter merely contains a discussion of additional 
topics which are exclusive to the sale of lands.  
 
 2. Commentaries 
 
A discussion specific to the contract of sale first appears in the third edition of Bell’s 
Commentaries. In both the third and fourth editions, this discussion is limited to 
corporeal moveable property.67 In the fifth edition, the section68 contains at least one 
case relating to corporeal immoveable property.69 However, the chapter still deals 
exclusively with corporeal moveable property. For example, the fact that contracts of 
sale for corporeal immoveable property require writing is not mentioned. Incorporeal 
property is not mentioned in any of these editions. 
 Bell’s Commentaries only discusses the contract of sale in relation to 
corporeal moveable property. There is no discussion of principles underlying a 
contract of sale in relation to either corporeal immoveable or incorporeal property.70  
 
 3. Inquiries 
 
Bell’s Inquiries into the Contract of Sale for Goods and Merchandise deals primarily 
with corporeal moveable property. Corporeal immoveable property is not discussed 
in the text. Incorporeal property is mentioned only fleetingly.71 
                                                
67 Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed.): 283ff; Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (4th ed.): 346ff; 
68 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (5th ed.): 434ff. 
69 E.g. Earl of Montrose v. Scott, March 13 1639, M. 14,155 is cited at Bell, Commentaries Vol I (5th 
ed): 437. 
70 There is a discussion on the sale of lands, but this is only in relation to bankruptcy law.  
71 For more information, see page 190. 
 




More’s Lectures on the Law of Scotland, published posthumously in 1864 and edited 
by John McLaren, contains a chapter on the contract of sale.72 The discussion in this 
chapter is unified. The chapter presents one set of principles, drawing illustrations 
from corporeal moveables, corporeal immoveables and incorporeals. When, on 
occasion, the application of a principle varies between different types of property, 
this is indicated. Thus, More states that possession presumes ownership when it 
comes to corporeal moveables; however, a written title is required in regard to 
immoveable property.73  
 
K. Conveyancing Texts 
 
Of the major conveyancing texts, only Russell’s Theory of Conveyancing, Menzies’ 
Conveyancing According to the Law of Scotland, Craigie’s Heritable Conveyancing, 
Burns’ Handbook of Conveyancing, Bell’s Treatise, Napier’s Conveyancing and 
Bell’s Lectures on Conveyancing were published on or prior to the anglicisation of 
contracts of sale for corporeal moveables.74 Though these contain a discussion on the 
contract of sale,75 the focus is almost exclusively on lands. Contracts of sale for 
corporeal moveable and incorporeal property76 are not mentioned.  
 
L. Conclusions 
                                                
72 More, Lectures, Vol I: 132ff. 
73 Ibid: 144. 
74 In keeping with the scope of this chapter, conveyancing texts published after 1893 have been left 
out. However, they will be referred to in subsequent chapters, where necessary. Note that the first 
edition of Craigie’s Moveable Rights, published in 1888, does not have a discussion on the contract of 
sale.  
75 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 827ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (3rd ed): 879ff (the fourth edition 
was published after the passing of the Sale of Goods Act 1893); Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 56ff; 
Craigie, Heritable Rights (1st ed): 33ff; Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 334ff; Russell, Conveyancing 
(2nd ed): 334ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 647ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd 
ed): 695ff; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed): 127ff; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 
141ff; Napier, Conveyancing: 469ff. 
76 See page 193f for further discussion. 
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The conveyancing texts and Bell’s Commentaries and Inquiries do not take a unified 
approach in their discussions of the contract of sale. The conveyancing texts focus on 
the sale of lands. Bell’s Commentaries and Inquiries focus on corporeal moveables.  
 The remaining texts do take a unified approach to their discussion of the 
contract of sale. Hume is the only writer to make this explicit. However, a unified 
approach is also indicated by the content of the discussions in Stair, Forbes, Erskine, 
Bankton, More, Brown and Bell. These texts tend to contain one general discussion 
on the contract of sale, in which all three types of property are mentioned. The 
discussions lay out one set of principles, which presumably apply to all types of 
property.  
 Where a principle varies in its application to different types of property, this 
is highlighted. This approach only starts becoming apparent with Banktons’ Institute, 
but is then followed in the subsequent works. The occasional variation in a 
principle’s application to different types of property does not necessarily indicate that 
the Scots common law underlying contracts of sale was not unified. Such differences 
are to be expected due to the inherent differences between corporeal moveables, 
corporeal immoveables and incorporeals.  
 The texts deal primarily with corporeal moveable and corporeal immoveable 
property. While references to incorporeal property exist in every text, they are 
fleeting. This makes it difficult to determine how much of the content in the texts 
applies to incorporeal property.  
 On balance, most of the academic discussions on the contract of sale from the 
period prior to the nineteenth century legislative intervention, take a unified 
approach. This means that, as a general rule, many of the authors may have seen the 
Scots common law underlying contracts of sale as unified, at least in relation to 
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Chapter III - Emerging Principles: The Implied 






The Scots common law implied warranty of soundness in contracts of sale was 
developed exclusively in the context of case law featuring corporeal moveable 
property. It is believed to have become of limited use following the passing of the 
Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856, section 5 of which introduced the 
English principle of caveat emptor to qualitative defects in contracts of sale for 
specific goods.77 The warranty is thought to have fallen into complete disuse with the 
passing of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which took over the regulation of contracts of 
sale for corporeal moveables. The provisions on quality in section 14 of this Act 
reflected English law rather than the indigenous Scots common law.  
 This chapter looks at the origins and substantive framework of the implied 
warranty of soundness. Since all the known case law in this area deals with corporeal 
moveable property, the chapter focuses solely on the warranty’s operation within the 
context of the sale of corporeal moveable property. The warranty’s relationship to 
corporeal immoveable and incorporeal property will be explored in subsequent 
chapters.  
 Under the Scots common law, the sale of corporeal moveable property 
comprised two stages: 1) a contract of sale; and 2) delivery. Personal rights and 
obligations arose on conclusion of the contract, while the real right of ownership was 
                                                
77 For further information, see Sutherland, E. E., ‘Remedying an Evil? Warrandice of Quality at 
Common Law in Scotland’ (1987) 32 Juridical Review: 32ff; Gow, J. J., The Mercantile and 
Industrial Law of Scotland: 162. 	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transferred upon delivery.78 In corporeal moveable property, delivery is the 
equivalent of the execution, delivery and registration of the disposition in corporeal 
immoveable property; and the completion of the assignation followed by 
intimation/possession/registration in incorporeal property. Unlike with corporeal 
immoveables and incorporeals, there is no written conveyance for corporeal 
moveable property.79 Under both the Scots common law and the Sale of Goods Act 
which replaced it, a contract of sale for corporeal moveable property does not require 
writing: a verbal agreement is sufficient.80 This chapter - and indeed, the thesis as a 
whole - deals only with the contract of sale. 
 
B. The Origins of An Implied Warranty of Soundness 
 
1. Background: Roman Law Origins  
 
The history of the Scots law implied warranty of soundness begins in Roman law. 
Originally, Roman law did not recognise an implied liability for defects in things 
sold.81 During the Republic,82 the curule aediles, who had jurisdiction over the 
market-place,83 sought to “check the wiles of vendors and to give relief to purchasers 
circumvented by their vendors”.84 They issued edicts regulating market-place sales of 
slaves and later, beasts of burden.85 These edicts required sellers to disclose certain 
latent faults to the buyer. Where the seller failed to do so, the buyer was able to seek 
relief via the actio redhibitoria or the actio quanti minoris.  
                                                
78 This position was altered by the Sale of Goods Act, under which ownership now passes when the 
parties intend it to pass. See: s 17(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979.	  
79 With the exception of ships, which are species of corporeal moveable property that do require a 
written conveyance. See: Bell, Principles (4th ed.): § 89. 
80 Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): III.3.1; s 4(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979.	  
81	  This early Romanist position is detailed in Moyle, J. B., The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law with 
References to the Laws of England, Scotland and France: 189ff.	  
82 Jolowicz and Nicholas: 293-294. 
83 Zimmermann, Obligations: 311; Jolowicz and Nicholas: 293; Kaser, Roman Private Law: 181; Lee, 
Roman Law (4th ed): § 480; Thomas, Textbook on Roman Law: 287.  
84 D.21.1.1.2. 
85 D.21.1.1.1; D.21.1.38. See: Zimmermann, Obligations: 311, 319; Jolowicz and Nicholas: 293; 
Kaser, Roman Private Law: 181; Lee, Roman Law (4th ed): § 480; Thomas, Textbook on Roman Law: 
287.  
 
  20 
 The edicts did not apply to patent faults.86 The seller’s knowledge of the 
defect was immaterial.87 Sellers were able to expressly exclude liability for specific 
or all defects, unless doing so was fraudulent.88  
 It is unclear exactly how and when the aedilitian principles were extended to 
outside the market-place and to sales of all things. Originally, the actio empti89 was 
only available for latent defects where there was an element of dolus in the seller’s 
behaviour.90 Two classical texts91 indicate that liability under the actio empti may 
have begun to extend to cover sellers who were unaware of the defect in the thing at 
an early point in time. However, the exact significance of these texts is unclear.92 The 
version of the aedilitian edict found in Justinian’s Digest contains two texts 
extending its application to all sales.93 These are regarded as being interpolations, 
and are thus “evidence for the law of Justinian’s day only”.94 The aedilitian 
principles, as embodied in Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis, were adopted by the ius 
commune and passed throughout into Scots law.95  
 
2. The Warranty’s Origins in Scots law 
 
The early stages of the warranty’s development in Scots law occurred between the 
late seventeenth century and 1761. This part of the warranty’s history is confusing. 
What follows is the author’s attempt to navigate through this early history.  
 The earliest academic sources on Scots law do not mention an implied 
warranty quality in contracts of sale. Regiam Majestatem alludes only to the seller's 
liability under an express warranty of quality.96 Balfour's Practicks, Hope's Major 
                                                
86 D.21.1.14.10; D.21.1.1.6. 
87 D.21.1.1.2. 
88 D.21.1.48.8. 
89 The action on the contract of sale under Roman law. 	  
90 Zimmermann, Obligations: 319. 
91 D.19.1.6.4; D.19.1.13pr.  
92 See: de Zulueta, Roman Law of Sale: 49-50; Zimmermann, Obligations: 320-322; Honoré, “History 
of the Aedilitian Actions”: 140-144. 
93 D.21.1.1.1; D.21.1.63. 
94 Jolowicz and Nicholas: 294; See also: Lee, Roman Law (4th ed): § 481; de Zulueta, Roman Law of 
Sale: 49. 
95 For illustrations of this, see footnotes 130, 132, 133 and pages 74, 88, 109f. 	  
96 Regiam Majestatem: III.10.9.	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Practicks and Craig's Jus Feudale do not mention any warranty of quality, either 
express or implied.97   
 Forwarding to the seventeenth century, the case law regarding this issue is 
confusing, due in part to the sparse synopses provided by Morison and the difficulty 
in tracking down session papers dated to the seventeenth century and earlier. Of the 
eleven relevant cases dated to the seventeenth century, four concern an express 
warranty,98 and two (one as early as 1668) feature arguments that Scots law followed 
the civilian pattern of offering an implied warranty against latent vitiosity.99 
However, the majority100 lack enough information to conclusively determine if the 
claims made were based on an express warranty or an implied obligation. Of the two 
cases featuring arguments for the implied warranty, Alston was unsuccessful because 
the buyer had not proved that everyone else who had bought from that parcel of seed 
found it insufficient; and Seaton was unsuccessful because there was an express 
warranty given which did not require that the "bear" be “sufficient to be malt”. It is 
perhaps significant that the short case reports for Alston and Seaton do not record any 
arguments that the implied warranty did not apply to Scots law.  
 The second edition of Stair’s Institutions contains three passages on 
qualitative latent defects: one each in the titles on sale (I.14.1), contractual 
obligations (I.10.15) and reparation (I.9.10). The passage in the title on sale states 
that a seller who is ignorant of the defect is not liable for it. Liability for latent 
defects fell on the seller where he had expressly warranted the subject against defects 
(in which case his knowledge or lack thereof was immaterial) or where he knew of 
the defect but failed to make the buyer aware of it. Confusingly, the passage ends 
with the statement that “our custom alloweth the making up of latent insufficiency” 
and references to I.10.15 and I.9.10.101 According to I.10.15, “[t]his agreeth with our 
                                                
97 Balfour, Practicks; Craig, Jus Feudale; Hope, Major Practicks.	  
98 Laird Aiton v. James Fairie, 29 Jan 1668, M. 14230; Paton v. Lockhart, 7 July 1675, M.14232; 
Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay, 28 Jan 1680, M.14234; Kinnaird v. M’Dougal, 5 July 1694, 
Brown’s Supplement 4: 184.	  
99 Alston v. Orr, 1 July 1668, M.14231; Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay, 28 Jan 1680, M.14234.	  
100 Brown v. Nicolson, 9 Jan 1629, 8940; Hoggersworth v. Hamilton, 6 Jan 1665, M.14230; Wallwood 
v. Gray, 16 Feb 1681, M.14235; Baird v. Charteris, 2 Dec 1686, M.14235; Watson and Cheisly v. 
Stewart, 5 Jan 1694, Brown's Supplement 4: 116; Mitchell v. Bisset, 22 Feb 1694, M.14236.	  
101 Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.14.1. This same passage is found in the first edition, see: Stair, 
Institutions (1st ed): I.10.63.  
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custom, by which only a latent insufficiency of the goods and ware, at the time of the 
sale…is sufficient to abate or take down the price”.102 This statement appears to 
contradict I.14.1. However, I.9.10 sheds light on the matter. This passage discusses 
Roman law’s use of the “actio redhibitoria et quanti minoris” and ends with the 
following statement: “But the sophistication of ware, or concealing of the 
insufficiency thereof, was held fraudulent and reparable action redhibitoria, aut 
quanti minoris”.103 This, taken with the statement in I.14.1, suggests that the 
references to our custom allowing remedies for latent defects refers only to instances 
where the seller is guilty of fraud. This position is further backed up by a statement 
in Stair’s discussion on the warrandice in claims, where he states that “warrandice 
relates to the point of right, and not to the matter of fact; (unless the sufficiency of a 
thing be warranted, which will not extend to any visible or notour defect)”.104 
 The 1712 case of Morison and Glen v. Forrester, “where the Lords found the 
upholding the horse not proved, and so assoilzied from the repetition of price”,105 
suggests that Scots law had not yet recognised an implied warranty of soundness in 
contracts of sale. The first definitive acknowledgement of the existence of an implied 
warranty regarding quality occurs somewhere between 1714 and 1739, during which 
William Forbes penned A Great Body of the Law of Scotland. In it, he states that a 
warranty against latent insufficiency exists even where the seller had been unaware 
of the defect.106 A reading of Bankton (1751-53) reveals that he too regarded the 
warranty as an obligation implied into contracts of sale.107 In the first edition of his 
Principles of Equity (1760), Lord Kames begrudgingly admits that the implied 
warranty of soundness is recognised in Scots law.108  
 The first judicial recognition of the implied warranty does not occur until the 
1761 case of Ralston v. Robertson. There, the seller was, in the absence of an express 
                                                
102 Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.10.15; This same passage is found in the first edition, see: Stair, 
Institutions (1st ed): I.10.15.	  
103 Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.9.10; This same passage is found in the first edition, see: Stair, 
Institutions (1st ed): I.9.10. 	  
104 Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.3.46 (emphasis own). See Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): IV.45.3-4 for 
'notour' as a form of proof. 
105 23 Jan 1712, M. 14236 at 14237.	  
106 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832. 	  
107 Bankton, Institute: I.19.2.	  
108 Lord Kames, H. Home, Principles of Equity, 1st ed: 89f.	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warranty, found liable for the price of a latently defective horse because, “when a 
man sells a horse for full value, there is an implied warrandice, both of soundness 
and title, nor is there any necessity to prove the knowledge of the seller”.109  
 An understanding of why the warranty was developed can be gained from 
various sources. According to Hume, “[it] is the true nature and bona fides of the 
bargain of parties, that the subject is bought and sold to a certain use and 
employment, which if it does not answer, the seller has not implemented his part of 
the contract, and must take back his commodity”.110 Thus, there was a sentiment that 
mere delivery was not enough: the seller’s obligation required him to give the buyer 
an article, the use of which was not hindered by a latent defect that the latter had 
been unaware of. Where he failed to do so, it was thought inappropriate for him to 
“reap the advantage of any apparent value which the thing sold seemed to have [but 
in reality, did not possess]”,111 since it was presumed that the buyer would not have 
bought the thing had he been aware of the defect “which rendered it useless to him as 
to the design for which he wanted [it]”.112  
 It is easy to see why the Scots common law would seek to protect the buyer’s 
right to obtain an article which is of use to him. To quote Lord Ellenborough: “[t]he 
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill”.113 If a buyer 
had no remedy against hidden defects which existed at the time the contract was 
entered into, trade would be discouraged. Buyers would be more reluctant to engage 
in sale transactions. This is demonstrated in the decision in Baird v. Pagan, where 
the buyer was given a remedy where ale bought for export was spoilt as a result of 
not being properly prepared for the foreign climate, because “if the brewer be not 
answerable for the sufficiency of ale sold by him for the American market, that 
branch of commerce cannot be carried out”.114 The lack of an implied warranty could 
also prejudice the buyer by inducing sellers to conceal known defects.  
 The warranty does not intend to give the buyer an unfair advantage over the 
seller. Instead, it seeks to make both parties more evenly matched so that neither has 
                                                
109 16 June 1761, M. 14238 at 14240.	  
110 Hume, Lectures: II.40-41.	  
111 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832.	  
112 Bankton, Institute: I.19.2.	  
113 Gardiner v. Gray (1815) 4 Camp. 144; Benjamin, Treatise on Sale (2nd ed): 540. 	  
114 Baird v. Pagan 14 Dec 1765, M. 14240 (Kames’	  report).	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an upper hand when entering into the transaction. Prior to delivery, the seller is better 
placed to know of any faults in the thing. As a result, the buyer must place a certain 
level of reliance on the seller, trusting that he is offering a commodity which can 
perform its normal functions. It is this necessary dependency which the warranty 
seeks to address. In such circumstances, the seller is thought to be in a much better 
position to assume the risk of any faults which may render the thing useless, 
regardless of whether or not he was aware of them.115 As Ulpian states in relation to 
the aedilitian edict: “the vendor could have made himself conversant with these 
matters”.116  
 However, the warranty is not oblivious to the seller’s interests: it operates 
within very narrow confines - which will be discussed later - to ensure that he is not 
put at an unfair disadvantage as a result of it. The seller is also able to exclude its 
application by warning the buyer of any faults prior to purchase117 or by expressly 
selling the thing “with all faults”.118 
 
C. The Implied Warranty of Soundness: Substantive Content 
 
 1. A Note Regarding Definitions 
 
No single word can accurately describe the situations which fell within the ambit of 
the implied warranty of soundness. Allusions to it have been couched in terms such 
as: the implied warranty of soundness;119 the guarantee of quality;120 the seller’s 
obligation to warrant the sufficiency of the goods sold;121 the seller’s obligation “to 
supply a good article without defect”;122 and “the implied warrandice...that the thing 
                                                
115 Ralston v. Robertson 16 June, 1761, M. 14238; Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832; 
Hume, Lectures: II.43; Brown, Treatise: 304; Dickson v. Kincaid  (1808) F.C. 58.	  
116 D. 21.1.1.2.	  
117 Brand v. Wight, 18 February 1813, Hume 697; Hume, Lectures: II.44.	  
118 Brown, Treatise: 298-299; Hume, Lectures: II.45. Illustrated in Parker and Finnie v. E and R 
Paterson, 7 March 1816, Hume 707. 	  
119 Ralston v. Robb 9 July 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6; Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 
14238.	  
120 Paterson v. Dickson (1850) 12 D. 502.	  
121 Baird v. Aitken, 13 February, 1788, M. 14243.	  
122 Whealler v. Methuen, (1843) 5 D. 402 at 406 (Lord Justice-Clerk).	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sold shall be of the kind described”.123 The implied warranty cannot be reduced to a 
one-word description encompassing every complaint which fell within its scope.  
 In the interests of consistency, this thesis will refer to it as “the implied 
warranty of soundness”. Nevertheless, it is better to steer away from the limitations 
conjured up by any single word. “Soundness” in this context encompasses many 
things. Though it may have derived from this initially, it does not just refer to 
physical defects or ailments. Likewise, the terms “defect”, “quality” and 
“insufficiency” (all of which are used in this thesis) must be wrestled away from any 
preconceived notions as to their meanings. To gain an accurate idea of what the 
common law implied warranty was utilised for, we must make a study of the case 
law relating to it. An accurate conceptualisation of the warranty must rely on the 
situations it applied to, rather than the words used to describe it. Thus, the following 
section will use case law and academic writings to detail the range of situations 
covered by the implied warranty of soundness. 
 Some ambiguity exists as to the distinction between an implied term and an 
express term in the case law relating to the warranty of soundness. In contract law,  
express terms are contractual terms which have been expressly agreed by the parties. 
Implied terms are contractual terms which have not been expressly agreed by the 
parties. The warranty of soundness was/is an implied term in law124. In the absence 
of any express provisions, it applied (at the very least) to contracts of sale for 
corporeal moveable property. However, some of the case law which proceeded on 
the basis of the implied warranty should arguably have been based on the breach of 
an express term. This will be explored later in this chapter.  
 
 2. The Situations That Gave Rise to Liability Under the 
 Warranty 
 
                                                
123 Dickson and Company v. Kincaid (1808) F.C. 57 at 57.	  
124 An implied term in law is a term which is “generally implied in particular categories of contracts”. 
Quote taken from: MacQueen, H. L. and Thomson, J. M., Contract Law in Scotland, 3rd ed: §	  3.30. 
See Morton & Co. v. Muir Bros & Co (1907) S. C. 1211 at 1224 (Lord M’Laren) for further 
information. 	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The warranty applied to a variety of different situations. Though the original scope 
was narrower and considered only defects which led to a deteriorated or inferior 
product, this was rapidly expanded to include more unconventional complaints. The 
following section draws primarily on case law in attempting to lay out a complete list 
of complaints which gave rise to liability under the implied warranty.  
 Before examining the circumstances of liability, it is important to note some 
basic facts regarding it. The warranty was an obligation implied by the common law 
into all contracts of sale for corporeal moveable property. While the Roman 
aedilitian edict extended to “slump sales”,125 the Scots law warranty did not. In 
Stewart v. M’Nicol, the buyer bought twenty-seven queys,126 two of which were 
defective.127 The implied warranty was excluded on the basis that: 
 
[t]he several animals are ordinarily of very different values; and the 
parties do not…put a precise estimation on any one, nor can the buyer 
reasonably entertain the same expectation, as when he buys a single 
horse or cow, that his commodity is wholly sound and in good 
condition.128 
 
Due to the lack of further case law on this issue, it is unclear whether the same rule 
would apply to a slump sale of articles which are identical.129 
 The warranty applied irrespective of whether the seller had known of the 
defect or not.130 However, where the seller had knowingly sold a defective product 
without making the buyer aware of its shortcomings, his liability was greater.131 
The warranty only applied to any defects which had existed at the time the contract 
was entered into.132 Any defects which came into existence after the sale, were a risk 
                                                
125 D.21.1.36; D.21.1.64. A slump sale is the sale of several articles for a lump sum. The term “slump 
sale”	  is used here because it was referred to in Stewart v. M’Nicol. 	  
126 i.e. heifers.	  
127 Stewart v. M’Nicol, 31 May 1814, Hume 701. 	  
128 Ibid at 701.	  
129 Such as, for example, 30 Steadtler Norris 122 HB Pencils. 	  
130 Ralston v. Robertson 16 June, 1761, M. 14238; Ewart v. Hamilton, 25 February 1791, Hume 667; 
Duthie v. Carnegie, 21 January 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 162; Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, 
fos. 832; Hume, Lectures: II.42-43; Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 283; This same position is 
taken by Roman law, Voet, Pothier, and the current French and South African law - see: D.21.1.1.2; 
Voet: XXI.1.9; Pothier, Treatise: §	  213-214; Article 1643, Code Napoléon (1804 and current 
versions); Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 124.	  
131 See page 76ff. 	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undertaken by the buyer. Finally, the warranty only applied to latent defects of which 
the buyer had not been informed, and did not and could not be expected to have 
known about.133 
 
(a) Where the Defect Hinders the Use of the Thing 
 
The warranty extended to qualitative latent defects which hindered the use of the 
thing sold.134 In this context, “unfit for use” signifies three different concepts: 1) 
unfitness for all uses; 2) unfitness for ordinary uses; and 3) unfitness for a specified 
purpose. Any one of these types of ‘unfitness for use’ will activate the warranty.  
 
 (i) Where the Defect Renders the Thing Completely 
 Useless 
 
The warranty applied to defects which rendered the thing bought completely useless. 
This is, of course, a logical application, considering the warranty was formulated out 
of recognition for the fact that “people only buy a thing for its use”.135 The principle 
is evident in Ralston v. Robertson, where the buyer successfully argued that: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
132 Ewart v. Hamilton, 25 February 1791, Hume 667; Pollock v. Macadam (1840) 2 D. 1026; Gilmer 
v. Galloway (1830) 8 S 420; Wallwood v. Gray, 16 Feb. 1681, M. 14235; Gordon v. Scott and 
Hutchison, 1791, Brown’s Supplement 5, 585; Wright v. Blackwood (1833) 11 S. 722, 5 The Scottish 
Jurist 438 (there may have been an express warranty of soundness in this case); Hendrie v. Stewart 
(1842) 4 D. 1417 at 1421-1423 (Lord Justice-Clerk); Brown v. Boreland (1848) 10 D. 1460; Fulton v. 
Watt (1850) 22 The Scottish Jurist 648; Brown, Treatise: 297; This position is in agreement with 
Voet, Pothier and modern French and South African law - see: Voet: XXI.1.8; Pothier, Treatise: §	  
205, 212; Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 115; Sebeko v Soll 1949 3 SA 337 (T).	  
133 Earl of Wemyss v. Lady Seton, 16 December 1802, Hume 682; Pollock v. Macadam (1840) 2 D. 
1026; Gilmer v. Galloway (1830) 8 S 420; Wright v. Blackwood (1833) 11 S. 722, 5 The Scottish 
Jurist 438; Brown v. Boreland (1848) 10 D. 1460 at 1464 (Lord Jeffrey); Bankton, Institute: I.19.2; 
Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832; Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): III.3.10; Hume, Lectures: 
44; Brown, Treatise: 296; Bell, Principles (1st ed.): §	  44; Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 284; 
Bell, Inquiries: 51; This position echoes that taken by the Dutch Ius Commune writers, Pothier, and 
modern French, South African and German law - see: Voet: XXI.1.8, 11; Van Leeuwen, 
Commentaries: IV.18.10-11; Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, Vol I: III.15.7; Pothier, Treatise: §	  
205, 208, 210; Article 1642, Code Napoléon (1804 and current versions); Kerr, Law of Sale and 
Lease: 136- 137; §	  442 BGB.	  
134 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 831; Bankton, Institute: I.19.2.	  
135 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832; See also: Pothier, Treatise: §	  203.	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[i]t is implied in the very nature of every bargain of this kind, that the 
thing bought is to be free of faults, especially of such faults as occur in 
the present case, which render the thing sold altogether useless, and 
which no man would have purchased if he had known of the faults 
attending it.136  
 
 
Hume affirms this principle, declaring that contracts of sale contained a warrandice 
that the thing was fit for the uses for which it had been sold, “for it is of little 
moment to the buyer that he gets possession of the covenanted thing or corpus, if it is 
useless or not fit for employment in its kind”.137 
 The paradigm application of this principle is found in Brown v. Laurie,138 
where a horse was sold for a low price because its seller acknowledged that it was 
very old. Upon the facts of this case, one would expect that the seller be safe from 
liability under the implied warranty for several reasons. Firstly, the horse had been 
sold for a very low price, so the level of quality expected from it would not have 
been very high.139 Secondly, he had made the buyer aware of the horse’s old age, so 
the latter had entered into the bargain with all the relevant facts at his disposal. 
Finally, old age is not a conventional “defect” - it is a natural progression in life, 
rather than an illness or behavioral issue. Despite this however, the seller was found 
liable “in repetition of the price upon the implied warrandice”, because the horse was 
“very useless”.140  
 
 (ii) Where the Defect Renders the Thing Unfit for its 
 Ordinary Uses 
 
According to Hume, “it is only for ordinary uses, and for the performance of these in 
a reasonable and ordinary fashion that the seller can be understood to answer”.141 
This is echoed by Brown, who writes that: “the vice or fault complained of...must be 
                                                
136 16 June 1761, M. 14238 at 14239 (emphasis own).	  
137 Hume, Lectures: II.40 (emphasis own).	  
138 16 June 1791, M. 14244.	  
139 For how price determines the level of quality that can be expected, see discussion at page 37ff. 	  
140 16 June 1791, M. 14244.	  
141 Hume, Lectures: II.42.	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such as renders the subject unfit for its proper use”.142 The principle can only be 
found once in the body of relevant case law. This is in the Lord Ordinary’s 
judgement in Ralston v. Robb, where he states that, “... every seller is bound in law 
to warrant that his goods are marketable, fit for the immediate use for which they are 
usually intended”.143  
 While the principle may not appear much in Scots case law, it is also part of 
the substantive content of the warranty in several other jurisdictions. In South 
Africa144 and Germany145 the warranty against latent defects is, at the first instance, a 
warranty against defects that were severe enough to make the thing sold unfit for its 
ordinary uses. The rule’s presence in other jurisdictions that share the same legal 
heritage as Scotland makes it likely that it also formed part of the Scots implied 
warranty.  
 The rule’s lack of mention in the case law does not necessarily indicate a 
want of practical application. Aside from Ralston v. Robb, several cases deal with 
defects that could have fallen within the ambit of this principle. The cases include 
complaints regarding a horse that was racked or slipt in the back,146 seed that failed 
to germinate,147 bad seed,148 lame horses,149 and a horse that was alleged to be a bad 
worker.150 The information provided about these cases - and about cases dated prior 
to the start of the nineteenth century in general - is often very sparse. With the earlier 
cases, the standard practice in detailing the judgements is to give little more 
information than that “the Lords repelled the defences”151 or that the case was found 
for the buyer under the implied warrandice regarding soundness.152 The parties’ 
arguments are often summarised rather than reproduced verbatim. As a result, we 
know very little about the effect these defects had, whether they would have made 
                                                
142 Brown, Treatise: 288.	  
143 9 July 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6 (emphasis own). 	  
144 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v. Roberts Construction Co. Ltd. 1977 3 SA 670 (A) at 683 
(Corbett JA); Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 119-120.	  
145	  §	  434 I 2 Nr. 2 BGB.	  
146 Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 14238.	  
147 Hill v. Pringle (1827) 6 S. 229.	  
148 Baird v. Aitken, 13 February, 1788, M. 14243.	  
149 Lindsay v. Wilson 1771, Brown’s Supplement 5, 585.	  
150 McBey v. Reid (1842) 4 D. 349.	  
151 Baird v. Aitken, 13 February, 1788, M. 14243.	  
152 Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 14238; Lindsay v. Wilson 1771, Brown’s Supplement 5, 
585.	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the products in question unfit for their ordinary purposes, and whether this unfitness 
played a role in the arguments or judgements.  
 Limiting the scope of the warranty to faults which make the thing unfit for its 
ordinary uses is practical. The implied warranty was propounded out of a desire to 
safeguard commerce and a need to address a situation that disadvantaged buyers. It 
laid the burden of latent defects on the seller for two reasons. Firstly, doing so 
addresses situations where a seller may have been in bad faith in regard to a defect or 
insufficiency in his product.  
 Secondly, it is the fairest solution because a buyer has limited exposure to the 
thing prior to delivery, while the seller’s possession of it puts him in a more 
advantageous position to discover defects. If anything, the warranty’s ambition was 
to encourage trade by making the sale transaction as fair as possible to both parties. It 
would be unjust to expect the seller to provide a product that is fit for any necessary 
purpose, whether it be ordinary or unusual. Normally, a seller can only judge the 
suitability of a product in reference to it ordinary uses. As a result, fairness would 
dictate that he only be liable when he sells something which cannot be put to its 
ordinary uses. To hold him liable for the thing’s fitness for purposes outside its 
ordinary uses would put him at a disadvantage and discourage trade. 
 
 (iii) Where the Defect Renders the Thing Unfit For a 
 Particular  Purpose Specified by the Buyer 
 
The warranty was also breached where a subject purchased for a particular purpose 
turned out to be unfit for that purpose. However, this rule applied only where the 
seller had known of the buyer’s particular purpose in purchasing the thing.153 The 
rule was not exclusive to the Scots law warranty. French,154 South African155 and 
                                                
153 Lord Kames, H. Home, Principles of Equity, Vol I, 3rd ed: 267f; Hume, Lectures: II.41; Bell, 
Inquiries: 50-53.	  
154 Article 1641, Code Napoléon (1804 and current versions).	  
155 Reed Bros v. Bosch 1914 TPD 578 at 582-583 (De Villiers JP); Homdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v. 
Roberts Construction Co. Ltd. 1977 3 SA 670 (A) at 683H (Corbett JA); Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v. 
Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd and Another 2002 2 SA 447 (SCA); Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 119-120.	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German156 law recognise a similar principle; and the English common law required 
fitness for purpose where a buyer, “relying on the seller’s skill or judgment, orders 
goods for a particular purpose known to the seller, and the goods are of a description 
which it is in the course of the seller’s business to supply”.157 
 The principle is an extension of the rule that the thing must be fit for its 
ordinary uses. A buyer procures something because he has a use for it. That use may 
be general or fairly specific. Where the thing is unfit for the buyer’s purpose(s), the 
purchase is useless to him. If the warranty only gave relief where the thing was unfit 
for ordinary purposes, a buyer who had purchased something for a specific purpose 
would be at a disadvantage. The principle seeks to address this, but only where the 
seller knew of the specific purpose for which the thing was bought. The principle 
may also be rooted in the belief that “the seller ought not to reap the advantage of 
any apparent value which the thing sold seemed to have but in reality, did not 
possess”.158 
 A subjective test that concerns itself specifically with the buyer’s intentions 
for his purchase is mentioned by Bankton and Forbes, both of whom are writing prior 
to 1761.159 According to Forbes, a seller is liable for an undeclared latent defect 
“which renders [the thing sold] so unfit for the use for which it was bought, that if it 
had been known to the buyer, he would not have bought it”.160 Bankton states that a 
bargain can be annulled if a latent insufficiency hinders the thing’s use, because there 
is a presumption that, “if [the buyer] had known of the [thing’s defect] which 
rendered it useless to him as to the design for which he wanted the same, he would 
not have bought [it]”.161 Erskine’s statement that the warranty applied to cases where 
the latent defect was “of that kind that [the buyer] would not have purchased the 
goods at any rate had he known [of it]”,162 is also suggestive of a subjective test. 
Seemingly incorporating any purpose which the buyer might have had for his 
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  §	  434 I 2 Nr. 2 BGB.	  
157 s 17(2), Sale of Goods Bill 1889; Chalmers, Sale of Goods: 20; Sutherland, “Implied Terms on 
Quality”: 43; Benjamin, Treatise on Sale (2nd ed): 526; Brown v. Edgington (1841) 2 Man. & G. 279; 
133 E.R. 751 (Tindal, C.J.); Bigge v. Parkinson 7 H. & N. 955; 31 L.J., ex. 301.	  
158 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832.	  
159 The year the warranty was first judicially acknowledged. 	  
160 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 831 (emphasis own).	  
161 Bankton, Institute: I.19.2 (emphasis own).	  
162 Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): III.3.10.	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purchase, these early statements suggest a measure beyond that of the thing’s fitness 
for ordinary uses. 
 The principle is utilised in several cases. In Baird v. Pagan,163 the defenders 
had bought ale to export to America, and much of the ale was lost when the bottles 
burst due to the heat of the climate. In the action for payment brought against them, 
they argued that: 
 
...when ale is to be exported to hot climates, it must be prepared with 
great attention...[for which], the purchaser must rely on the brewer 
from whom he buys....[Thus] it is understood that the brewer, who 
sells ale for exportation, shall furnish it of such quality, and pack it in 
such a manner, as will stand the climate to which it is to be sent. 
[Therefore, since the ale in question was] purchased on purpose to be 
exported, of consequence, the seller was bound to deliver ale fit for 
exportation.164 
 
The Lords agreed and found that, “the seller, in respect the ale libelled was bought 
for exportation, is obliged to uphold the same to have been sufficient and fit to be 
exported to the markets in [the Americas]”. This case is the leading authority from 
which later academics derive the principle that the warranty applies to latent defects 
which render the thing unfit for the express purpose for which it had been bought.165  
 The principle was also applied in Campbell v. Mason,166 Beddie v. Milroy167 
and Dundas v. Fairbairn.168 In Campbell, the buyer, an elderly man, wanted a safe, 
quiet horse for his personal use. The seller was informed of this purpose twice, and 
suggested that a particular horse in his possession would suit. The horse was bought 
after being looked at and ridden by two agents; however, it turned out to be 
unmanageable and vicious on occasion. The seller was found liable under the implied 
warranty, because while the horse was sufficient “in the hands of a young and active 
horseman”, he had known that it was purchased for an elderly gentleman’s use and it 
was not sufficient for that purpose.  
                                                
163 14 Dec. 1765, M. 14240.	  
164 Ibid at 14240.	  
165 Lord Kames, H. Home, Principles of Equity, Vol I, 3rd ed: 267f; Hume, Lectures: II.41; Brown, 
Treatise: 288; Bell, Principles (1st ed.): §	  44; Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 284.	  
166 27 January 1801, Hume 678.	  
167 17 January 1812, Hume 695.	  
168 6 July 1797, Hume 677.	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 In Dundas, a pair of horses were bought for the avowed purpose of being 
used as carriage horses. They were trialled prior to purchase; however later trials 
found the horses to be “sound and perhaps capable of being…trained and broken in 
for a carriage”, but also “restive and refractory” and unsuited to drawing a carriage 
for the time-being. The seller was found liable under the implied warranty of 
soundness, because “having sold the…horses for the said specific purpose 
communicated to him by the pursuer…[he was liable for their fitness for that use]”. 
 In Beddie, the seller was twice informed that the buyer wanted a “quiet, 
useful” horse to ride and “to cart”. He assured the buyer that the mare he was selling 
was “canny and serviceable in every respect”. However, the horse proved to be ill-
natured, “not a safe animal for any ordinary rider” and probably unsuited to pulling a 
cart. The sheriff found that in the seller’s possession, the mare had been well-
behaved, agreeable to being ridden at leisure and on familiar roads and “did well in 
the plough and the cart”. However, the seller was found liable under the implied 
warranty, because the horse was vicious when ridden by strangers, particularly when 
pushed, and was thus unfit for the buyer’s “principle purpose” in purchasing her.  
 In all four cases, the seller’s knowledge was crucial. For the principle to 
apply, the seller must have known of the buyer’s purpose in purchasing the subject. 
To make the seller liable for the thing’s fitness for a particular purpose, when he had 
not know of that purpose, would put him at a disadvantage, contravening the 
principles of equity and hindering the commercial interests which the warranty 
sought to protect. The sources suggest that in Scots law, this criteria was only 
fulfilled where the buyer had informed the seller of his purpose in making the 
purchase. In all four cases, the seller had been told of the buyer’s purpose for the 
thing. Hume states that liability in regard to that thing’s fitness for the particular use 
for which it was bought, applies only where the buyer has explicitly declared this 
purpose, and “thus warned the seller of the footing on which the contract was to 
be”.169 For in such circumstances, “certainly [the seller] is...bound to warrant it in 
that particular, though he have not in words undertaken an express obligation to that 
purpose”.170 This interpretation is also supported by Bell, who states that where a 
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particular purpose is “specified”171 or “avowed”172 by the buyer, the commodity must 
be fit for this purpose. In this, the Scottish principle is closest (though by no means 
identical) to the English common law, where, “the seller’s actual knowledge of the 
buyer’s purpose [did] not necessarily mean that the seller warranted the fitness of the 
goods for a particular purpose”.173 For example, in Shepherd v. Pybus,174 a seller 
who undertook to build a barge was not liable for its fitness for the special use for 
which it had been bought - even though he had been aware of this - because the 
written contract made no reference to this.175  
 In contrast, the French and South African systems favour a more liberal 
construction of the seller’s knowledge. In South Africa, which shares Scotland’s 
mixed legal tradition, the seller’s knowledge can have been “gathered from the 
circumstances”.176 Similarly, in civilian France, the seller’s awareness of  a special 
purpose is “a question of fact for the lower court”.177 It is submitted that this 
approach is preferable to the Scots law position. A rule which seeks to place a greater 
level of liability on sellers who know of the buyer’s purpose in purchasing the thing, 
is better served by an objective assessment of that seller’s knowledge, regardless of 
how he came by this knowledge.  
 Kames, in his exposition of Baird v. Pagan, suggests that the principle “holds 
a fortiori where the vender is himself the manufacturer”.178 However, case law 
indicates that the rule was not exclusive to sellers who were manufacturers. In 
Beddie, the seller was a farmer; and in Dundas, the seller was an innkeeper who sold 
a horse which had “but lately come into his possession”. Under the English common 
law - later enshrined in s 14(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 - a seller was liable for 
a thing’s fitness for a specific purpose only where the buyer had relied on “the 
                                                
171 Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 284.	  
172 Bell, Inquiries: 50-53.	  
173 Sutherland, “Implied Terms on Quality”: 44.	  
174 3 M. & G. 868; 133 E. R. 1390. 	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Terms on Quality”: 44.	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seller’s skill and judgement”.179 However, this did not limit liability to sellers who 
had manufactured the product. The judges’ obiter dictum in Brown v. Edgington 
stressed that the principle applied regardless of whether or not the seller was the 
manufacturer180. Thus, the principle was applied in the case of a farmer who had 
bought a pig carcass (which turned out to be unfit for human consumption) from a 
butcher and sold it to another farmer within hours of the initial purchase;181 and in 
the case of a provision dealer who sold defective troop stores.182 It is unclear whether 
Scots law limited the principle’s application to situations where the buyer had placed 
some reliance on the seller’s judgement: the sources do not comment on the matter.  
 In Hume’s discussion of the principle, he states that where the seller knows of 
the buyer’s purpose in purchasing the commodity, “he is as much bound to warrant it 
in that particular, though he have not in words undertaken an express obligation to 
that purpose”.183 Hume draws a line between this principle and an express warranty. 
This line is not as distinct in the case law, however. In Dundas, the buyer had needed 
a pair of carriage horses, and the seller had replied that “he could be answerable for 
one of the horses…but that he could not be so sure about the other, as it had but 
lately come into his possession”.184 In Campbell, the buyer had wanted “a safe and 
quiet riding-horse [for an elderly gentleman]”, and the seller had replied that his 
horse was “a quiet animal” and that “[t]here was not a horse in the world that would 
do better”.185 In Beddie, the buyer had wanted a “quiet animal” for “riding and…to 
cart”, to which the seller had responded that his horse was “canny and serviceable in 
every respect, and particularly in riding”.186 What is the difference between these 
statements and express warranties? In Campbell, the case report’s explanation of the 
judgement highlights that the seller was found liable, even though “he had not so 
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explicitly given a character of the horse”.187 This suggests that in each of these cases, 
the sellers’ statements did not amount to an express guarantee. 
 
 (iv) Fitness for Use: Immediacy 
 
The criteria regarding fitness for use refers to the immediate use of the thing. Thus, a 
commodity which is unfit for immediate use comes within scope of the warranty, 
even if this shortcoming can be cured. This is demonstrated in two cases: one in the 
context of fitness for ordinary uses, and the other relating to fitness for an avowed 
purpose.  
 In Dundas v. Fairbairn, a pair of horses purchased as carriage horses were 
found to be returnable under the warranty. Though the horses were “sound, and 
perhaps capable of being…trained and broke in for a carriage, they were for the time 
at least, nowise serviceable in that way: [t]hey were restive and refractory, and 
utterly refused to work or draw with a carriage”.188 The case report states that a 
compelling reason for finding the seller liable was that, “one who [buys carriage 
horses]…covenants for animals which are to be depended on for immediate service, 
and not for such as may become serviceable with the help of time and training”.189 
 In Ralston v Robb, the seller of a horse afflicted with running thrush was 
deemed liable under the implied warranty, despite the fact that the disease was 
“capable of being cured, and sometimes easily and speedily cured”.190 In his 
judgement, the Lord Ordinary stressed the importance of any product sold being “fit 
for the immediate use for which [it is] usually intended”,191 explaining that because 
the horse was: 
 
...unfit for traveling on the high road, therefore, without pretending to 
understand whether such a horse can be considered as a sound horse, 
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finds that a horse which cannot travel on the high road is not a 
marketable commodity, fit for the purpose for which he is intended.192 
 
On appeal, a majority of the judges agreed that “under the warrandice of the sale, 
whether derived from the payment of the market price of a sound and unblemished 
horse, or from the express stipulation of the parties, the purchaser is entitled to have a 
horse immediately fit for its purpose.193  
 The rule exists because “[a buyer] is not understood in law to go to market 
with the view of purchasing a commodity of which he cannot have the immediate 
use, - which may require a course of medicine, and care to render it fit for its 
purpose”.194 The test is one of proportionality, however. A product is deemed unfit 
for immediate use, where more than “ordinary skill and expense [is required] to 
preserve it in a state of usefulness, or perhaps from utterly perishing”.195 
 
(b) Where the Quality is Not Commensurate with the Agreed 
Price 
 
There is a connection between the price paid for the article and the implied warranty 
of soundness. However, the case law disagrees as to the nature of this connection. 
Some case law suggests that the warranty was implied only where a full price had 
been paid. Other case law indicates that the warranty applied regardless of the price, 
but that the price of the article informed the kind of quality which could be expected.  
 In Ralston v. Robertson (the case in which the implied warranty was first 
judicially recognised), the Bench found that “when a man sells a horse for full value, 
there is an implied warrandice [of soundness]”.196 This is echoed, word for word, a 
decade later in the judgement in Lindsay v. Wilson;197 and a variation of it is found in 
Ralston v. Robb, where the court stated that the warrandice of quality could be 
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“derived from the payment of the market price”.198 The principle that the warranty of 
soundness was only implied where something had been sold for the full market price, 
is mentioned in several more cases,199 including two as late as the 1840s.200  
 However, this principle is also contradicted in several cases. In Brown v. 
Gilbert,201 the seller was found liable for breach of the implied warranty in respect of 
a lame horse, despite pleading that the sale had been by auction, for “a very low 
rate”.202 The horse had been misleadingly advertised as belonging to a gentleman 
who was parting with it for “no fault, further than [he was] going abroad”,203 and this 
may been factored into the decision. In Martin v. Ewart, the seller was found liable 
for breach of the implied warranty in respect of a blind horse, even though the price 
paid “could not be called a sound price”.204 In Brown v. Laurie, a seller who had 
acknowledged that the horse was very old, and therefore sold it at a low price, was 
found liable for breach of the implied warranty because the horse was “very 
useless”.205 These decisions are inconsistent with the cases which claim that the 
warranty was only implied where a full price had been paid.  
 Further case law suggests that, in actual fact, the implied warranty applied 
regardless of the price paid; however, the price paid indicated the kind of quality 
which could be expected of the product. For example, in Baird v. Pagan,206 the 
buyers successfully argued that since the ale was sold for export, it should have been 
fit for the climate of the place it was exported to. They contended that, “the price was 
considerably higher than would have been given for ale for home consumpt; yet, that 
furnished was not of proper quality for exportation, or properly corked and 
packed”.207 Here, price is utilised as something which entitles the buyer to expect a 
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product which possesses a very specific quality. The issue is not that the thing sold 
was of a lesser quality: it is that it lacked a specific quality which the buyer required 
and for which he had paid a higher price. However, while the case was decided in 
favour of the buyer, the short case report makes it difficult to determine how much of 
a role the price agreed on played in that decision. 
 In another case, Hill v. Pringle, the seller was found liable for rye-seed he 
had sold because it was established “that the rye grass seed, which was purchased...at 
a fair and adequate price for good seed, was of bad and insufficient quality”.208 In 
justifying his decision Lord Pitmilly explained that, “the seed was bad, although the 
price paid was that for good seed”.209 In Whealler v. Methuen, the Lord Advocate 
stated that the case concerned “a question of whether the price was applicable to the 
quality of the goods”.210 The Lord Justice-Clerk further stated that the price agreed 
on demonstrated the parties’ understanding: “[f]or when any one sends an order for 
goods, without a word as to their quality, he is entitled to such an article as the price 
entitles him to expect, of good, sound, fair quality”.211 
 A similar sentiment is echoed by the Lord Justice-Clerk in Paterson v. 
Dickson:  
 
I have always held it to be a rule of the law of Scotland, that when an 
article is sold at a good market price, this implies a warranty on the 
seller’s part that it is of good quality, or of the best quality, according 
to the price and the circumstances of the sale.212 
 
In this particular case, the buyer had contracted to buy Ichaboe guano, but had 
received a diluted type of guano. Ichaboe guano was a superior type of guano, and as 
such, its price tag was considerable. The lower quality of the guano delivered to the 
buyer concerned the judges. This is evident in the Lord Justice-Clerk’s statement 
that, in a sale transaction you are entitled to receive “an article corresponding in 
quality to the price you pay for it”.213 Nor was he the only member of the Bench to 
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express such a view: Lord Moncrieff agreed that, “a sale of an article at the highest 
market price implies a warranty that the article is of the best quality”.214  
 Thus, case law demonstrates that the warranty was not just implied when 
something was bought for a full price. The warranty applied regardless of whether 
the price was full or discounted. The seller’s obligation under this warranty was to 
supply an article of the quality implied by the price. This position is supported by 
Hume, who states that though: 
 
[t]he rule does not apply so strictly to those cases where the thing is 
bought much under the known and selling price of a sound commodity 
of that sort at the time.....[this does not mean] that the buyer has to run 
the risk of all vices, and to pay for a subject which is absolutely 
useless. In particular, with respect to all fraudulent contrivances to 
adulterate the commodity...these faults he is not obliged to put up 
with, unless revealed to him, or by reasonable inference held to be 
known to him.215 
  
 A low price, or a price below market value, did not leave the buyer 
completely devoid of the implied warrandice. The test here is one of proportionality: 
the seller’s liability for defects is lowered, but not completely erased. As Addleson J 
explained in a South African case:  
 
A purchaser who buys a cheap article which rapidly deteriorates or 
loses its appearance or usefulness can clearly not complain because a 
superficially similar but more expensive article is not subject to the 
same deterioration. If, for example, he elects to pay a lower price for 
an object made of pewter he cannot complain that it is defective 
merely because it cannot withstand the same wear as a similar object 
made of steel: a cotton blanket cannot be expected to wear as well or 
be as warm as a woollen one though both bear the generic name of 
blanket....All that a purchaser of an article is entitled to expect is that 
the article shall be free from such latent defects as are not to be 
expected in an article of that quality, price and type...216 
 
 Whether the thing is of a corresponding quality to the price agreed on, is a 
subjective matter. It is entirely up to the discretion of the Bench whether a sofa 
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typically valued at £100, yet sold for £60, must be able to bear the weight of five 
people, or just three. Likewise, there is no clear guidance to how durable a shelf 
bought from Ikea must be. In each case, the Bench is required to utilize its 
considerable wisdom to determine the level of quality implied by the price agreed on. 
This system allows each case to be judged on its merits, thus increasing the chances 
of turning up a fair result each time. 
 There is one further way in which price was used to inform quality. In the 
1815 case of Scott v. Hannah and Hibbert,217 the defender had bought a horse with 
an undetected injury to one of the eyes. In the subsequent action for payment, there 
was some argument as to whether the horse was sound. The injury to the eye affected 
the horse’s “sight straight in front, but not…the side sight”. This diminished the 
horse’s value “as a saddle horse for a gentlemen” by twenty to thirty percent; 
however, the horse’s value to a postmaster was unaffected. The sheriff found the 
horse to be sound, taking into account that it had subsequently been sold “by the 
Sheriff’s warrant, a measure that would tend to lower the price”, for a price “within 
£2:13:6” of the original price”.218 Here, the price someone was subsequently willing 
to pay for a horse with a disclosed defect informed whether or not that horse was 
sound. However, Scott is a case which stands alone; and as such its significance 
cannot be determined.  
 
(c) Where the Product Delivered is Not Marketable 
 
In the early nineteenth century, the warranty began to remedy situations where the 
thing sold was deemed ‘unmarketable’. This concept is first mentioned in the Lord 
Ordinary’s decision in Ralston v. Robb: 
 
...a horse which cannot travel on the high road is not a marketable 
commodity, fit for the purpose for which he is intended: Finds, that 
every seller is bound in law to warrant that his goods are marketable, 
fit for the immediate use for which they are usually intended.219 
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This was followed by Parker and Finnie v. E and R Paterson, where the magistrate 
found that an express agreement excluded the “implied warrandice of the fruit being 
in a sound state, and a merchantable commodity”.220  
 The concept is mentioned in Whealler v. Methuen, a case where the pursuer 
had entered into a contract with the defender to buy “well-cured red herrings for 
exportation”, which he then sold to buyers who wanted to sell it on the Swiss market. 
These buyers found that the herring was “very ill-cured, and quite unfit for the 
Switzerland market, for which it was intended”, and refused to take delivery.221 The 
case centered on two concerns: whether the herring was of a quality implied by the 
price, and whether it was marketable. The second of these issues is alluded to several 
times in the report. The pursuer is said to have “led evidence to the effect that the 
herrings were ill-cured and unmarketable”.222 The sworn examinators who inspected 
the herring are reported as having deemed them to be “[neither] lawful nor 
marketable, being ill-prepared, and...more or less refuse”.223 The Lord Justice-Clerk 
instructed the jury to determine whether “the pursuer has proved his case - that the 
herrings furnished by the defender were rejected in a foreign market as unfit to be 
received and sold there”.224  
 In Smart v. Begg, the pursuer alleged that the meal the defender had sold him 
was “of bad and unmarketable quality”;225 and the brandy in Anderson v. Morris was 
described as “not of good marketable quality”.226 The sheriff described the horse in 
Fulton v. Watt as “unsound and unmarketable”.227 In addition to this case law, two 
out of three of Bell’s writings on sale state that where a product is not of 
merchantable quality, it may be rejected under the warranty.228  
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 Five of the cases used the term “marketable quality”, while Parker and Bell 
favour “merchantable quality”. It is difficult to tell whether there is a difference 
between these two terms. ‘Merchantability’ is the term favoured by English law: 
evidence of its use in the context of the quality of the thing bought is prevalent in 
nineteenth century English legal sources.229 The term is even used in the provision 
relating to sale by description in the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which states that, in 
certain circumstances, there is “an implied warranty that the goods shall be of 
merchantable quality”.230  
 It is unclear whether the Scots concept of marketability/merchantability was 
derived from English law. Nor is it certain whether the Scots concept was identical to 
the English one. The second edition of Bell’s Principles appears to draw its 
exposition of this concept from English law. In addition to favouring the term 
“merchantability”, Bell states that merchantability is measured “according to the 
denomination of the commodity”.231 This passage is reminiscent of a 1815 English 
judgement in which Lord Ellenbourgh states: “...[the thing sold] shall be saleable in 
the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract between them”.232 The 
lack of Scottish sources in this area would certainly have made it ripe for a complete 
transplant from English law. On the other hand however, the idea that marketability 
is a central issue in determining whether a product is defective, is not novel. 
Furthermore, Ralston, Whealler, Fulton, Anderson and Smart all favour the term 
‘marketability’ rather than the English ‘merchantability’. It is unclear whether this 
indicates that the Scots law concept was distinct from the English law one.  
 Our knowledge of the concept of marketability/merchantability in the 
contexts of the warranty of soundness, is sparse. ‘Marketability’ is possibly best 
defined as the thing’s fitness for sale on the market. Bell is the only source to provide 
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any guidance on how to determine the marketability of a product. He suggests two 
principles. Firstly, the article’s marketability is measured “according to the 
denomination of the commodity”.233 By this, he most likely means that the product is 
measured against others of its type. For example, the marketability of a mid-range 
Ikea sofa will not be determined in reference to mid-range John Lewis sofas; it is 
determined with reference to other mid-range Ikea sofas. Secondly, marketability is 
measured in relation to whether “it will bring a fair average market price”.234 
 The decision in Ralston v. Robb suggests that a product which was unfit for 
immediate use was regarded as being unmarketable. This is perhaps because a 
reasonable person would not buy such a product on the open market. Here, we see an 
overlap between two separate complaints (fitness for use and marketability), both of 
which gave rise to liability under the warranty in their own right. Similar overlaps are 
witnessed in Baird v. Pagan (fitness for use; price), Hill v. Pringle (fitness for use; 
price) and Paterson v. Dickson (identity; price).235 This is to be expected. The 
elements of ‘price’ and ‘marketability’ can very naturally overlap, both with each 
other and with other complaints recognised by the warranty. This is because 
something which is unfit for use can, as a result, be considered unmarketable or not 
of a quality commensurate with the price paid for it. Similarly, a product which is 
different in type or kind to the one agreed on by the parties, may not be of a quality 
implied by the price. A product’s marketability will often be determined with 
reference to its quality, the price agreed on, and its fitness for use. In fact, this 
connection is so inherent, that a similar sentiment was echoed in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979, where merchantable quality was defined as a thing being “as fit for the 
purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is 
reasonable to expect having regard to any description applied to [it], the price (if 
relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances”.236 
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(d) Where the Product Delivered to the Buyer is Not What He 
Contracted to Purchase 
 
In two cases,237 Dickson and Company v. Kincaid238 and Paterson v. Dickson,239 the 
implied warranty of soundness appears to have been used to remedy situations where 
the thing delivered was of a different identity to what had been contracted for. In 
both cases, there was a contract of sale to buy Type A of X. However, the buyer 
delivered Type B of X. Type B was of an inferior quality to Type A in both cases.  
 This is a strange application of the implied warranty of soundness. The 
warranty addressed latent qualitative defects. Delivery of a product which is different 
in identity to what was contracted for, is not a latent qualitative defect. Such 
situations are more appropriately classified as a breach of an express term, or breach 
of the requirement that the thing sold must correspond to its description.  
 
 (i) Dickson and Company v. Kincaid 
 
Dickson concerned the sale of turnip seed. The defender, a tenant farmer, sowed his 
land with Swedish turnips and sold the resulting seed to the pursuers, who were seed 
merchants. The pursuers sold this seed to their customers. One of these customers 
brought an action against the pursuers, stating that the seed had failed to produce 
Swedish turnip, instead yielding “a spurious or bastard variety of that plant”240. 
Having been found liable, the pursuers then raised an action against Kincaid, 
requesting damages for loss of character and reimbursement of the damages awarded 
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to the customer. The Lord Ordinary found in their favour, and the decision was 
upheld upon the defender reclaiming. 
 Mungo Brown classifies Dickson as a case based on the implied warranty of 
soundness.241 However, the case report itself is ambiguous, making it difficult to 
determine the basis of this action. The Lord Ordinary is said to have found that: 
 
...both under the implied warrandice in a contract of sale, that the 
thing sold shall be of the kind described, and also under the express 
warrandice of the defender, that this was good Swedish seed, the 
defender is liable to make good to the pursuers the damage occasioned 
by the defect in the seed.242  
 
What does this statement mean? Does the reference to the implied warranty that the 
thing sold must be of the kind described refer to the implied warranty of soundness 
or a separate stipulation that goods correspond to their description? The latter 
interpretation is more likely because the Scots common law does not appear to have 
recognised a separate category of contracts of sale by description at this point.243 The 
second part of the quote mentions the express warrandice “that this was good 
Swedish seed”. Does this indicate the recognition of an express term that the seed 
delivered must be the same seed contracted for? Or does it indicate an express 
warranty of quality? 
 There are several small indications that the action is likely to have been based 
on the implied warranty of soundness. The first is a statement that “[i]t was admitted 
that Kincaid had sold the seed in question, optima fide, believing it to be free from 
defect”.244 Defects are mentioned again in the defender’s argument that sowing a 
sample “is the ordinary precaution where seed is to be used of the quality of which 
there is any doubt”;245 and that the pursuers “knew and were bound to know, that this 
sort of seed was universally liable to some risk of latent bad quality”.246 The 
references to defects and quality here suggests that the complaint was viewed as an 
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issue of quality. The defender further argues that “upon the warrandice of sale”, he is 
only “liable for restitution of the price”, and not for “damages or contingent loss”.247 
Restitution of the price was the only remedy available under the implied warranty of 
soundness.248 In support of this argument, he cites several authorities. Two - “Ersk. 
b. 3. tit. 3. § 10” and “Baird against Aitken”249 relate to the implied warranty of 
soundness. However, the remaining authorities - “Stair, b. 2. tit. 3” and “Ersk. b. 3. 
tit. 3. § 9”250 relate to infeftments of property and the implied warrandice of title in a 
contract of sale, respectively.  
 The court found, “that the pursuers were entitled to rely on the warrandice of 
the sale”251. Certain aspects of this case are inconsistent with an action based on the 
implied warranty of soundness. These are the citing of “Stair, b. 2. tit. 3” and “Ersk. 
b. 3. tit. 3. § 9” as authority; and the fact that the remedy given (reimbursement of the 
damages the pursuers had had to pay to their clients) is not the actio redhibitoria.252 
Nevertheless, based on the points stated above, the writer tends toward the belief that 
this case was based on the implied warranty of soundness,253 rather than a breach of 
an express warranty or a stipulation that the goods must correspond to their 
description. However, the case report is not explicit enough to state this with 
certainty. 
 
 (ii) Paterson v. Dickson 
 
Paterson concerned the sale of Ichaboe guano. At the time of contracting, the seller’s 
agent had verbally represented the guano as being, “an excellent parcel [which had 
been] imported direct [sic] from Ichaboe”254. However, the buyer later discovered 
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that bad quality guano had been mixed in with the good guano, resulting in a 
“spurious and adulterated article”,255 rather than the requested Ichaboe guano. The 
buyer refused to pay for the guano, and the seller brought an action for the price. 
 The Lord Ordinary found that: 
 
the sale libelled was per expressum a sale of Ichaboe guano, by which 
description both parties must be held to have had in view (whatever its 
quality or otherwise) genuine guano, imported from the island of 
Ichaboe....Therefore, find that the defender was not bound to receive 
or to pay for the article thus tendered, as duly implementing the 
conditions of his contract.256 
 
This statement suggests that the key issue is that the goods delivered did not 
correspond with the description given. However, the judgement given in the appeal 
suggests that the action was based on the implied warranty of soundness, rather than 
a separate stipulation that goods correspond to their description.  
 The Lord Justice-Clerk opens his judgement thus: 
 
There seems of late years to have been an attempt to get rid of the rule 
of our law as to the guarantee on the part of the seller, of the quality of 
the article sold by him. I have always held it to be a rule of the law of 
Scotland, that when an article is sold at a good market price, this 
implies a warranty on the seller’s part that it is of good quality, or of 
the best quality, according to the price and the circumstance of the 
sale.257  
 
This statement indicates that he is considering the case on the basis of the implied 
warranty of soundness.  
 A further extract from his judgement reads: 
 
...this was a sale of Ichaboe guano; this was the commodity that was 
sold. When you purchase Ichaboe guano, you are entitled to get an 
article containing the properties which peculiarly distinguish it from 
other manures, and an article corresponding in quality to the price you 
pay for it. You are not purchasing common stable manure; you are 
                                                
255 Ibid at 502.	  
256 Ibid at 503 (emphasis own).	  
257 Ibid at 503 (emphasis own).	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purchasing guano, and that description of it known as guano from 
Ichaboe.258 
 
The reasoning in this statement contains two elements. The first, is something akin to 
the English principle that the thing delivered must correspond to its description. The 
second, is that you are entitled to an article of the quality implied by the price. This 
second element is also considered by Lord Moncrieff: “…a sale of an article at the 
highest market price implies a warranty that the article is of the best quality”.259 
 The case report indicates that Paterson v. Dickson was decided on the basis 
of the implied warranty of soundness. It appears to have fallen within the warranty’s 
scope for two reasons. Firstly, the guano delivered did not correspond to the 
description in the contract. Secondly, the guano delivered was not of a quality 
commensurate with the price.  
 
 (iii) An Alternative Analysis: Error? 
 
Bell cites Dickson v. Kincaid and Others as an example of error in substantialibus, 
on the basis that the contract was entered into as a result of a mistake “[i]n relation to 
the quality of the [thing] engaged for, [since] a particular quality was expressly or 
tacitly an essential part of the bargain”.260 Bell’s classification of the Scots law of 
error has been met with much criticism.261 
 I am sympathetic to Bell's argument in this instance. Both Dickson and 
Paterson could be viewed as cases in which there was an error as to the subject-
matter of the contract. In Dickson, this error is mutual. In Paterson, it is unilateral. 
However, error was not the basis of the action in either of these cases.  As the 
analyses above demonstrate, error is not mentioned in the arguments or judgment in 
either case. At no point in these two cases was the issue looked at in the context of 
the law of error.  
                                                
258 Ibid at 504.	  
259 Ibid at 504.	  
260 Bell, Principles (1st ed.): §	  7. From the third edition onwards, Baird v. Pagan is also (incorrectly) 
cited as authority for this statement. 	  
261 See: Gow, J. J. “Mistake and Error”	  (1952) 1 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly: 
475; McBryde, W. W. ‘Error’	  in K. G. C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law: 
Volume II: Obligations: 77.	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 (iv) How Does Comparative Law Deal With Cases Like 
 Dickson and Paterson? 
 
How are cases like Paterson and Dickson dealt with in other jurisdictions which 
adopted the same civilian law derived warranty of soundness? In South Africa, case 
law has produced mixed results. The situation has sometimes been treated as falling 
within the scope of the aediles edict,262 and sometimes as concerning an issue of 
wrongful delivery.263 A case which draws similarities to Paterson and Dickson is SA 
Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v. Park Rynie Whaling Co Ltd. There, a seller who 
delivered “a mixture of whale oil and sperm oil”264 in fulfillment of a contract of sale 
for “No. 3 whale oil”, was found liable under the aediles’ edict because, in his trade, 
this term generally denoted “the third grade of oil obtained from whales other than 
sperm whales”.265  
 In Germany, the current BGB “avoid[s] problems of distinguishing cases of 
non-conforming performance from other irregularities of performance”.266 It does 
this by treating “supply by the seller of a different thing”,267 as falling within the 
scope of non-conforming - or “defective” - performance.268 
 Under the English common law, cases like Dickson and Paterson may have 
been categorised as contracts of sale by description. When an article was sold “by a 
particular description”, what was delivered had to correspond to that description.269 
Where it did not, English law regarded this as a “breach of a condition precedent”,270 
                                                
262 E.g. SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v. Park Rynie Whaling Co Ltd 1916 AD 400; JK Jackson (Pvt) 
Ltd v. Salisbury Family Health Studio (Pvt) Ltd 1974 1 SA 619 (RAD). “The aedilician edict”	  is the 
name given to the implied warranty of soundness in South African law. 	  
263 Marais v. Commercial General Agency Ltd. 1922 TPD 440; Hersman v. Shapiro & Co. 1926 TPD 
367.	  
264 Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 153f.	  
265 SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v. Park Rynie Whaling Co Ltd 1916 AD 400 at 407 (Innes CJ); 
Taken from: Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 153.	  
266  Markesinis et al., Contract (2nd ed): 500.	  
267	  §	  434 III BGB.	  
268	  §	  434 III BGB.	  
269 Benjamin, Treatise on Sale (2nd ed): 487ff; See also: Chalmers, Sale of Goods: 19; s 16, Sale of 
Goods Bill 1889; Sutherland, “Implied Terms on Quality”: 30.	  
270 Benjamin, Treatise on Sale (2nd ed): 526.	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since “there [had] been complete failure to implement the contract”.271 This 
stipulation, that the thing sold must correspond with the description given of it,272 is 
distinct from a warranty of quality. Thus, in Tye v. Fynmore,273 a seller who 
contracted to sell “sassafras wood” was found liable for breach of an express 
warranty because he delivered timber from the sassafras tree when, in the trade, 
‘sassafras wood’ was the term used for the (more expensive) roots of the tree. 
Likewise, in Josling v. Kingsford,274 a seller who sold ‘oxalic acid’ was found liable 
for “breach of contract by failure of performance”275 because what he delivered 
contained 10% sulphate of magnesia, while in the trade the term ‘oxalic acid’ 
pertained to the pure substance. 
 
 (v) Analysis 
 
We have two cases in which the implied warranty of soundness appears to have been 
used to remedy situations where the thing delivered was of a different identity to 
what had been contracted for. The case report for Dickson is ambiguous, though 
there are some indications that the action was based on the implied warranty of 
soundness. The case report for Paterson is more decisive. It contains clear 
indications that the case was based on the implied warranty of soundness and that a 
decisive factor was that the thing delivered did not correspond to the description in 
the contract. 
 Two cases are not enough to definitely determine that the warranty extended 
to situations where the product delivered did not correspond to the identity or 
description in the contract. This is especially so where the report for one case is too 
ambiguous to draw any solid conclusions. However, the suggestion is there. 
Moreover, comparative law indicates that such an extension would not have been 
unique to the Scots law warranty. 
                                                
271 Sutherland, “Implied Terms on Quality”: 35; E.g. Josling v. Kingsford (1863) 13 C.B., N.S. 447, 
143 E.R. 177.	  
272 E.g. Chanter v. Hopkins (1838) 4 M. & W. 399; Barr v. Gibson (1838) 3 M. & W. 390 (Parke, B.).	  
273 (1813) 3 Camp. 462; 170 E.R. 1446.	  
274 Josling v. Kingsford (1863) 13 C.B., N.S. 447, 143 E.R. 177.	  
275 Sutherland, “Implied Terms on Quality”: 36.	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 Even assuming such an extension to the warranty existed in Scots law, it is 
difficult to tell how strictly it was applied in practice. In both Dickson and Paterson, 
the thing delivered was both of a different description and of an inferior quality to 
what had been contracted for. The inferior quality of the product delivered may have 
been why these cases fell within the warranty’s remit.  
 What if in Paterson, the contract had been for an inferior type of guano and 
the more superior Ichaboe guano had been delivered instead? Would the warranty 
still have applied? If the decision rested on the difference in identity, then the answer 
is yes: the decision should still have held. If on the other hand, the main issue was the 
inferior quality of that which was delivered, then it is difficult to see how the 
decision would have held.276  
 It is also worth questioning whether there is some significance in the fact that, 
though the buyers in these cases were sold turnip seed and guano of a different 
variety to what they had intended to buy, they were still sold turnip seed and guano. 
It is unclear whether the warranty would have operated if, for example, they had 
been sold seed which yielded apples rather than the intended turnips, or if they had 
been sold wine when they had intended to buy beer.  
 It is unclear why the warranty of soundness was used to remedy situations in 
which the thing contracted for is of a different identity to that which is delivered. The 
warranty addressed latent qualitative defects in the thing bought. The delivery of a 
product which is of a different identity to what was contracted for, is not a latent 
qualitative defect.277 The situations in Dickson and Paterson did not amount to latent 
defects in any conventional sense; and as such, should not have come within the 
warranty’s scope.  
 
                                                
276 In practice however, it is unlikely that the buyer of a lower quality product would object to being 
delivered a higher quality product. Presumably, the only situation in which such a buyer would have 
an objection is where he needed the lower quality product for a particular purpose. In that instance, he 
would still be able to avail himself of the warranty on the basis that the thing bought could not be put 
to the use to which he had intended it, providing he had informed the seller of his purpose in making 
the purchase.	  
277 A similar sentiment is expressed by Mason J in a South African case. See: Marais v. Commercial 
General Agency Ltd. 1922 TPD 440 at 443f (Mason J).	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(e) The Situations That Fell Under the Warranty: Concluding 
Thoughts 
 
The implied warranty of soundness was wide in scope. Originally conceived as a 
remedy for products which were physically defective, it came to encompass much 
more. In its final form, the warranty extended beyond situations where the thing was 
unfit for its uses; or of a quality incommensurate with the price. It also covered 
situations where the thing was not marketable; and (possibly) where the thing 
delivered was of a different identity to what the buyer had contracted for. This is a 
departure from the aedilitian edict, where liability was limited to defects that 
impeded the usefulness of the slave or beast of burden.278 However, the Scots 
position is not unique: as noted throughout this text, other legal systems contained 
such categories within their versions of the implied warranty of soundness.  
 The writer believes that, had the Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 
1856 and the Sale of Goods Act 1893 not been enacted, the warranty would have 
expanded further in scope. Such expansion can be seen in other jurisdictions that 
continue to use the Roman law based warranty. Some of the best examples of how 
the warranty may have evolved are found in the South African version, which 
continues to be closely patterned on Roman-Dutch law. There, cases279 in the latter 
part of the twentieth century suggest that the warranty may extend to the non-money 
portion of the price paid to the seller.280 Thus, it appears that modern South African 
law extends a warranty created to assign an obligation onto the seller, to also bind 
buyers who deliver a res as payment of the price in a sale transaction.  
                                                
278 D.21.1.38.7; D.21.1.1.7; D.21.1.4.3; D.21.1.1.8; D.21.1.10; D.21.1.10.1-2; D.21.1.12.1; 
D.21.1.14.6.	  
279 Wastie v. Security Motors (Pty) Ltd 1972 2 SA 129 (C); Janse van Rensburg v. Grieve Trust CC 
2000 1 SA 315 (C). For an opposite point of view, see: Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v. 
Mahomed 1989 1 SA 172 (D).	  
280 Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 109. Note that in Roman law, the aedilitian actions extended to 
contracts of exchange (D.21.1.19.5). For a Scottish perspective, see: Forte, A.,	  “Permutations on the 
Contract of Sale”	  (1983) 28 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 108; Forte, A., “A Civilian 
Approach to the Contract of Exchange in Modern Scots Law”	  (1984) 101 South African Law Journal 
691.	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 In another example, South African authority281 suggests that “usefulness [for 
the thing’s purposes] may be impaired by the presence of something which, if it were 
to be considered by itself in isolation, would have some, possibly even great, 
value”.282 The same adaptability is also evident in the German version of the 
warranty.  There, in what is referred to as the “Ikea clause”,283 the improper assembly 
of goods by the seller or his agents is deemed a material defect.284 A material defect 
also exists where the assembly instructions are defective and result in the thing being 
assembled incorrectly.285 
 In Scots law, an example of the warranty’s breadth is found in the fact that 
“issues of quality” were not limited to physical defects or complaints. Physical 
defects were actionable under the warranty: the case law reveals complaints such as  
a horse racked in the back and with a blemish in one eye;286 bottles of ale which had 
burst;287 seed which was bad, and did not vegetate;288 a horse with running thrush;289 
and bad kelp.290 However, the case law also features complaints which go beyond 
physical defects. In Brown v. Laurie, the buyer was given a remedy under the 
warranty because the horse’s advanced age made it a useless purchase. Similarly, in 
McBey v. Reid, a complaint was made under the warranty on the basis that the horse 
sold was a bad worker.291 In other cases, the warranty applied where the thing 
delivered was not what the buyer had contracted to buy.292  
 This is a sensible approach, because a thing’s quality is denoted by more than 
its physical aspects. Indeed, while the aedilitian edict claimed to only recognise 
physical defects or defects rooted in physical causes,293 in practice it recognised 
several defects that were not physical. For example, slaves who had suicidal 
                                                
281 Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v. Inag (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 846 (A).	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tendencies,294 were runaways,295 indulged in aimless roaming,296 had committed a 
capital offence,297 were still subject to noxal liability,298 were extremely “silly or 
moronic”299 or were of an undesirable nationality300 were considered defective under 
the edict.301  
 In its final form, only severe defects were actionable under the Scots law 
implied warranty of soundness. This was not the case at the embryonic stages of the 
warranty's development. Bankton and Forbes, both early writers, suggest that the 
warranty gave relief for both severe and less serious defects. Where the insufficiency 
was so severe it hindered the thing’s use, the buyer could end the bargain via the 
actio redhibitoria. If the insufficiency only rendered the thing less valuable, the 
buyer’s remedy was the actio quanti minoris, which allowed him an abatement of the 
price.302 Such a position is in agreement with Van Leeuwen and Grotius, both of 
whom state that the warranty was available regardless of whether or not it would 
have prevented the buyer from making his purchase in the first place.303  
  Later, Scots law’s rejection of the actio quanti minoris304 meant that only 
severe defects constituted a breach of the implied warranty of soundness. Thus, in 
1773, Erskine wrote that, while the warranty was available where, “a latent 
fault…[was such that the buyer] would not have purchased the goods at any rate had 
he known [of] it”, the rejection of the actio quanti minoris made him doubtful as to 
whether there was a remedy for slighter insufficiencies which would only have 
prompted the buyer to pay a lower price for the thing.305 In Ralston v. Robb, the 
Bench debated whether, “running thrush in its early stage [and mildest form] and 
were it did not produce actual lameness” rendered a horse unsound or was  
                                                
294 D.21.1. 21.3.	  
295 D.21.1.1.1; D.21.1.17.	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“to be numbered among those slighter and more immaterial imperfections of which 
the concealment did not void the sale, and to which warrandice did not apply”.306 In 
Hill v. Pringle, the parties agreed that the warranty did not give relief for “the mere 
inferior quality of an article sold”.307 Thus it appears that in Scots law, only severe 
defects amounted to a breach of the implied warranty of soundness.308 “Severe 
defects” were those defects which rendered the thing unfit for purpose; of a quality 
incommensurate with the price; unmarketable; or (possibly) of a different identity to 
what the buyer had contracted to purchase.  
 In the case law, the distinction between an express term and the implied 
warranty of soundness is not always clear. In addition to Dickson and Paterson,309 
this issue arises in several other cases. In Stevenson v. Dalrymple, the seller wrote to 
the defender stating that his kelp was “pretty good, but not of the best quality”.310 
However, the case proceeded on the basis of a breach of the implied warranty of 
soundness.311 Similarly, in Whealler v. Methuen, the defender agreed to furnish the 
pursuer with, “well-cured red herrings for exportation”.312 Yet, when Whealler was 
unable to sell the herring to a Swiss buyer as he had intended, his claim that they 
were “very ill-cured, and unmarketable”, was made under the auspices of a breach of 
the implied warranty. This was allegedly because, “[i]n the order, nothing [was] said 
as to the quality of the herrings expressly”.313 Why were Stevenson and Whealler not 
litigated on the basis of a breach of an express warranty? 
 The difference may lie in a distinction between, “those parts of the exchanges 
between the parties which are contractual terms and those which are not”.314 Words 
uttered in commendation of the product and statements of opinion do not amount to 
express warranties. This trouble in distinguishing why certain statements are not 
express contractual terms is a difficulty Scots law shares with other jurisdictions. In 
the absence of any insight on this issue in Scots law, comparative law can be looked 
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to for guidance. In South Africa, the judgement in Phame (Pty) Ltd v. Paizes 
explains that: 
 
Whether a statement [is material] will depend on the circumstances of 
each case. Relevant consideration could include the following: 
whether the statement was made in answer to a question from the 
buyer; its materiality to the known purpose for which the buyer was 
interested in purchasing; whether the statement was one of fact or of 
personal opinion; and whether it would be obvious even to the gullible 
that the seller was merely singing the praises of his wares, as sellers 
have ever been wont to do.315 
 
Benjamin comments on the same issue in the context of English law:  
 
A decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which 
the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a 
matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which 
the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion, and to exercise his 
judgment.316 
 
These distinctions are likely to explain the difference between the seller’s statements 
in Stevenson and Whealler, and an express warranty. 
 
 3. The Buyer’s Conduct 
 
While a buyer was entitled to a remedy in respect of latent defects, his conduct in the 
matter was scrutinised. Theoretically, he was not allowed a remedy where he should 
have noticed the defect, had not rejected the subject within a reasonable time, or had 
failed to protect the seller’s interests. However, in practice, failure to adhere to these 
requirements did not always deprive the buyer of a remedy. 
 
(a) A Buyer Who Ought to Have Noticed the Defect May 
Forfeit His Claim to a Remedy 
 
                                                
315 1973 3 SA 397 (A) at 418A (Holmes JA).	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In the late seventeenth century, the sellers in Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay 
attempted to argue that they had not breached an express warranty that the thing was 
marketable because, “at or after the bargain, [the buyers] saw the [beer] in [the 
seller’s] barns, and kilns, and made the ordinary trial, by boiling a handful thereof, 
and were satisfied with the [beer] and received the most part of it”.317 This same 
notion appears in Stair’s Institutions, when he states that a seller who was aware of a 
defect in the thing and had not given an express guarantee of soundness, was only 
liable where the defect had not been shown to the buyer or had not been known or 
evident.318 Both these excerpts allude to the fact that where a buyer has seen or 
examined the thing before buying, yet failed to register defects which he should have 
noticed, he alone is to blame for his carelessness.  
 Academic writings indicate that a similar rule applied to the implied warranty 
of soundness. In their discussions of the implied warranty, Bankton and Forbes state 
that the buyer had no remedy in the context of the warranty where he knew or ought 
to have known of the defect.319 Bankton and Forbes are writing before the implied 
warranty gained judicial recognition in 1761;320 however, their position is echoed by 
post-1761 writers. Erskine writes that the buyer only has a remedy under the 
warranty where, “the latent…insufficiency [was] not easily discoverable”.321 
Similarly, Hume states that the warranty does not apply to faults, “which were patent 
and visible upon the thing”.322 A similar rule is found in Bell’s Principles. Bell states 
that where the buyer has the opportunity to see and examine the goods, he buys them 
caveat emptor, unless the fault was latent at the time.323 
 Thus, it appears that the buyer was only allowed a remedy under the implied 
warranty where he did not and could not have known of the defect at the time of 
purchase.324 Much like in the case of a seller who bore the loss for defects of which 
                                                
317 28 January 1680, M. 14234.	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he had been unaware, a buyer bore the loss for defects he ought to have known of.325 
In such cases, the implication was that he had known of the defect, and been satisfied 
to take the thing as it was.326 The reasoning behind this rule is best articulated by 
Pothier: 
 
...as these defects may be easily known, the buyer is presumed to have 
knowledge of them, and to be willing to make the purchase, 
notwithstanding their existence, and consequently not to suffer any 
wrong....A wrong, which a person suffers through his own fault, is not 
one which the laws ought to relieve against, the law not being made to 
assist the negligent.327 
 
 In a jurisdiction where sale is a good faith contract, a seller is liable for 
defects which the buyer could not have known of prior to purchase. However, the 
law goes no further: in a free market where trade is actively encouraged, the buyer 
must bear the loss for defects he should have been aware of. In such cases, the buyer 
is in an “equal bargaining position and needs no protection or assistance”.328 
 However, it is difficult to tell how much practical application the principle 
received in Scots law. The case law in this area is contradictory. In Brand v. 
Wight,329 the pursuer had bought a pair of carriage horses for a sound price, and one 
was found to be lame. At the time of purchase, the buyer’s agent had heard that one 
of the horses had a fault in one of its hind legs. He asked the seller about this and was 
assured that, “the horse was sound and nothing the worse for it”. The agent relied on 
this assurance, and did not bother to examine or try out the horses; nor did he report 
the issue to the buyer. The case was decided in the seller’s favour, because: 
 
 ...where the seller does not disclose everything, but [offers] sufficient 
 information to put the buyer on his guard, and yet proceeds to take the price 
 of a sound commodity….the buyer must exercise his own judgment, and 
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 determine for himself whether the thing is worth the sound price that is asked 
 for it.330  
  
 This contrasts with the decision in Durie v. Oswald.331 There, the pursuer 
bought a horse which was found to be lame. At the time of purchase, there was a 
visible lump on the horse’s leg. The seller’s servant pointed this out to the buyer, and 
asked him to inspect it. The lump was explained as being an old injury and the 
servant did not mention that the horse was lame. Here, the seller was found liable 
because the buyer had given a sound price, and “the notice given…respecting the 
blemish was an ambiguous and delusive notice”.332  
 This inconsistency appears throughout the case law. In Lindsay v. Wilson,333 
the seller was found liable for the sale of two lame horses, even though the buyer had 
seen these horses both before and at the time of the sale, and the lameness was 
observable “by anyone who viewed them with ordinary attention”. Likewise, in 
Ralston v. Robb,334 the buyer had hired a ferrier to make an examination of the horse 
at the time the contract was made, but the Lord Ordinary found that this was “not 
relevant[,] as any such examination by a purchaser either of horses, or any other 
commodity, does not prevent his claim of warrandice against the seller that his goods 
shall be marketable, and fit for sale, unless the warrandice be expressly waived”. In 
Martin v. Ewart,335 the defender had purchased a mare after inspecting it. The price 
paid was not sound and there was “a visible yellow speck on one of the mare’s eyes. 
The horse turned out to be blind, and the buyer was given a remedy, despite the 
defect having been patent. Again, in Hill v. Pringle, a buyer who sowed bad seed 
was awarded a remedy despite having noticed a bad smell and discolouration upon 
delivery, because “he was entitled to sow on the faith that the seller would not give 
him bad seed”.336  
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 These decisions contrast with the decisions in Muil v. Gibb337 and Scott v. 
Hannah and Hibbert.338 In Muil, the buyer purchased wheat after having first 
examined it. When it was delivered, he rejected it as not being “dressed” as per the 
agreement, and for being “useless and good for nothing” due to effluvia. However, 
the court cited the passage in Bell’s Principles mentioned above and found the buyer 
liable on the basis that he had examined the wheat “at the time of the sale”.339 In 
Scott, the defender had bought a horse at a public sale with an express warranty of 
soundness, having seen it “in the yard along with the other horses…[and] without 
any previous opportunity of a more deliberate inspection”.340 Upon inspecting it after 
the purchase, the buyer found that the horse had a spot on his eye which, “seemed 
likely to injure the sight”.341 However, the case was decided against the buyer. The 
case report explains that: 
 
…the Court seem to have had regard to the patent and visible nature 
of the blemish, which the buyer must be held to have observed, and 
taken him with it as he was, and to have considered that matter in the 
price.342 
 
 Thus, the case law on this issue is inconsistent. In several cases, the buyer 
was able to avail himself of the warranty even where he should have noticed the 
defect at the time of purchase. 
 
(b) Timeous Rejection 
 
 (i) The Principle 
 
The aedilitian edict required the buyer to bring an action for rescission within six 
months of business days, or an action for diminution within a year of business 
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days.343 It is unclear whether the time began to run from the date of the sale, or when 
the defect became discoverable.344  
 The requirement under the Scots law warranty of soundness was less rigid. 
The buyer was under a requirement to communicate his rejection345 of the defective 
product to the seller within a reasonable period of time. Failure to do so was taken as 
an inference that he was satisfied with the contract he had made, and resulted in him 
being deprived of a remedy under the warranty.346 
 The principle that the buyer must reject the thing within a reasonable period 
of time, pre-dates the implied warranty of soundness in Scots law. In the century  
preceding Ralston v. Robertson,347 case law and academic writings dealing with 
express warranties of soundness are seen to emphasize this principle. The case law 
during this period is not consistent in regard to the time-frame within which rejection 
must be made. In one case, a delay of two years did not prejudice the buyer’s 
claim,348 while in another, a delay of just one year left him without a remedy.349 
Some insight into the issue is provided in Morison and Glen v. Forrester, a case in 
which the Lords engaged in some debate as to the appropriate length of time within 
which a faulty product must be rejected. The seller argued that a thing with external 
and visible defects must be rejected within forty-eight hours of the sale, while 
something with inward defects had a leniency period of forty days. However, the 
Lords thought that because “[t]he Roman law gave 60 days, 48 hours [seemed] too 
short a time to be confined to”.350 Unfortunately, the question was never resolved 
because the seller was assoilzied on another issue. However, the majority of the case 
                                                
343 D.21.1.19.6; D.21.1.38; D.21.1.48.2.	  
344 D.21.1.19.6 favours the former, and D.21.1.55 favours the latter. Zimmermann is in favour of the 
latter, see: Zimmermann, Obligations: 218.	  
345 Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.10.15; Bankton, Institute: I.19.2; Hume, Lectures: II.45; Bell, 
Principles (4th ed): §	  99. Note: Bell, Principles (2nd ed): §	  99 says “without unreasonable delay”. 	  
346 Baird v. Aitken and Others,13 Feb 1788, M. 14243; Elliot v. Douglas 25 May 1808, F.C. M.App. 
1, Sale No. 6, Note 2; Russell v. Ferrier and Ainslie, 12 June 1792, Hume 675; Sheriff v. Marshall, 3 
March 1812, Hume 697; Bennoch v. M’Kail, 27 January 1820, Brown’s Synopsis 2195; Pollock v. 
Macadam (1840) 2 D. 1026 at 1028 (Lord Gillies); Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.14.1; Bankton, 
Institute: I.19.2; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.10; Bell, Principles (2nd ed.) §	  99.	  
347 The 1761 case in which the existence of the implied warranty of soundness was first judicially 
recognised. 	  
348 Paton v. Lockhart, 7 July 1675, M. 14232. 	  
349 Brisbane v. Merchants in Glasgow, 28 Nov. 1684, M. 14235.	  
350 23 Jan. 1712, M. 14236 at 14237.	  
 
  63 
law and writings from this period indicate that the onus was on the buyer to offer the 
thing back soon after the insufficiency became apparent.351  
 This flexible measure was adopted early on in the development of the implied 
warranty of soundness. The general consensus in the academic writings and case law 
is that, in order to mount a successful claim under the implied warranty, the buyer 
must rejected the thing as soon as possible, or within a reasonable time of the fault 
being discovered.352 The only differing opinion is Erskine, who claims that the buyer 
must return the thing within a few days of delivery.353 Erskine’s assertion is not 
backed up by any case law.  
 This lack of a specific time period was also followed in the English common 
law, which required “timeous rejection and return of the goods”.354 In Scotland, the 
subjectivity of the test results in a widely differing body of case law. In Stevenson v. 
Dalrymple,355 a soap maker had been sold kelp which was unfit to make soap with, 
and which did not match the description of “pretty good” given of it. He was 
deprived of a remedy under the warranty, partly because he had kept the kelp for 
three weeks without objecting. However, there was an additional factor in this case: 
namely, that he had used up part of the kelp before objecting. In Bennoch v. M’Kail, 
the purchaser of a latently defective horse was deprived of a remedy under the 
warranty because he had kept the horse for thirty-seven days.356 In Jaffray v. 
Webster,357 the purchaser was deprived of a remedy for bad quality rum, because he 
did not complain until three months after the delivery. In Newman, Hunt and Co. v. 
Harris,358 the purchaser of allegedly bad wine was found liable for the price because 
he had not objected for nine months.  
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 In contrast to these cases, is the judgement in Hill v. Pringle. There, a buyer 
who had noticed a discolouration and bad smell in the lint seed he had just bought, 
but chose to sow it anyway and did not object to its sufficiency till the autumn after 
the crop was cut, was still given a remedy. The judges reasoned that, “seed in 
particular seasons may lie dormant, and the proper time to ascertain how it has 
sprung is when the crop is cut”.359 Likewise, in Smith v. Steel,360 the buyer of a 
latently defective horse successfully claimed under the warranty. He did so despite 
not rejecting the horse for three months, though he appears to have known of the 
defect within days of the sale.361 The court’s decision to award the buyer a remedy in 
this case may have been influenced by the fact that they believed the seller to be 
guilty of fraudulent conduct.362 The benefit of this subjective measure lies in its 
ability to produce such varying results since, in doing so, it allows for each situation 
to be judged according to the circumstances which attend it.363  
 Hume and Bell outline several rules relating to the principle’s practical 
application. Firstly, the clock begins to run from when the fault is first discovered.364 
A similar rule exists in both South African law365 and the English common law.366 
According to Hume and Bell, this rule means that the challenge must be made 
immediately in regard to manifest faults.367 However, it must be remembered that 
such situations will be balanced against the rule which denies the buyer a remedy for 
insufficiencies which were apparent at the time the contract was entered into, and 
which he should have noticed. If the fault is not manifest, the clock begins to run at 
the point it becomes so.368 Hume states that, where the insufficiency can only be 
determined through “thorough and repeated trials”, the buyer will be allowed a 
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reasonable time in which to make these trials.369 As a result, “it may thus sometimes 
be no objection to the return of the commodity, that it has been in part consumed in 
the trials - nay, that the buyer has sold the commodity to another, who at length 
returns it on him”.370  
 Bell outlines three additional rules. First, he claims that if the fault, though 
not manifest, is easily discovered by the sort of examination a skilled merchant will 
“naturally [bestow] in buying”, he must immediately investigate and determine the 
soundness of the thing.371 Secondly, if custom dictates a particular time frame for 
examination, then the challenge must be made before this time has expired.372 
Finally, he states that immediate inspection is particularly demanded, “where the 
commodity may alter by keeping”.373 An illustration of the third rule, though not 
referenced by Bell, is Smart v. Begg.374 Here, the purchaser was barred from 
claiming repetition of the price for bad meal, because he had not examined the meal 
for more than two months after accepting delivery. In finding against him, the Lord 
Ordinary stressed the importance of timeous examination in order to make a 
rejection.375 The Lord Justice Clerk indicated that because the meal had not been 
examined for two months after the sale, it was impossible to determine whether the 
meal had been of bad quality at the time of the sale or if it had deteriorated since 
then.376 In general however, Bell’s three statements should be considered cautiously. 
In regard to the first two, Bell can only cite a single English case, and while this does 
not necessarily mean that the statements did not apply to Scots law, their relevance to 
this jurisdiction must at least be questioned. 
 Commentary as to the motivations behind the principle is severely lacking. In 
fact, two cases and two brief passages in academic texts form the complete body of 
commentary available. From these, we are able to gather that the main impetus 
behind the rule was to protect the seller both from wily buyers, and from having to 
suffer more loss than was absolutely necessary. The rule attempted to avoid 
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situations where the insufficiency had only occurred after the thing had passed into 
the buyer’s hands.377 Thus, in Brisbane v. Merchants of Glasgow, the seller was 
absolved from liability for the insufficiency of the thing, because the complaint was 
made a year after the sale took place, “so that the victual might have been 
deteriorated, merely by so long keeping”.378 The rule also prevented situations where 
the buyer had sold the product on without complaint, but then attempted to avoid 
paying the price by pleading insufficiency.379 The rule also sought to ensure that the 
seller suffered “the least possible damage on the occasion”.380 For example, a seller 
who had bought the product from a supplier might still be able to return it to that 
supplier if the product was returned to him rather than used up. Alternatively, while 
the product may have been useless to that particular buyer, the seller might be able to 
find another market for it if it is returned to him.  
 The principle that the buyer must reject the defective product within a 
reasonable period of time in order to successfully avail himself of the implied 
warranty, is followed in numerous cases. However, there is at least one case in which 
it was not applied. In Grant and M’Ritchie v. Dumbreck,381 Dumbreck (a vintner) 
bought half a pipe of port wine from Duncan Robertson (a wine-merchant) at the 
recommendation of James Robertson. Dumbreck’s customers complained that the 
wine was “thin and weak”, and some took their custom elsewhere as a result. Three 
weeks after delivery, Dumbreck made repeated complaints to James Robertson, 
asking that Duncan Robertson replace the wine. Duncan Robertson sent three dozen 
bottles of better port, “to answer his immediate consumption”. For almost two years, 
Dumbreck kept the wine in his cellar, though he continued to “occasionally 
[murmur] about it”. Twenty-two months after the sale, Duncan Robertson’s executor 
creditors382 brought an action for payment against Dumbreck. The court found that 
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the buyer was only liable for the value of the portion of wine he had consumed. This 
decision was made despite the fact that Dumbreck had never:  
 
…made a direct or personal complaint to Duncan Robertson on the 
subject, or explicitly required him to send for the wine, or intimated to 
him that if not sent for the wine should be returned to him, or set aside 
for him, as at his risk.383 
 
In his case report, Hume criticises the fact that the buyer was not found liable for the 
full price despite having failed to reject the wine for almost two years.384 It is unclear 
why the principle of timeous rejection was not applied in this case. 
  
 (ii) The Doctrine Behind the Principle 
 
The requirement of timeous rejection was not a byproduct of the modern Scots 
doctrine of personal bar, because “those rules [which form the doctrine of personal 
bar] are the product of a case law that grew in quantity throughout the nineteenth and 
into the twentieth century”.385 In contrast, most of the case law regarding the 
warranty dates prior to 1856, the year in which the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
Scotland came into force. Thus, Rankine’s A Treatise on the Law of Personal Bar in 
Scotland, published in 1921, does not appear to cite a single case which deals with 
the implied warranty of soundness. 
 However, the rule was not completely divorced from the doctrine of personal 
bar. Reid and Blackie state that, while early principles such as ‘homologation’ and 
‘debito tempore’ - both of which are terms used in the primary sources when 
referring to timeous rejection - are not heads of personal bar and are not relevant to 
the doctrine as we know it, they were part of “the beginnings of a general 
doctrine”.386  
 Thus, when Bankton and Stair write that if the thing is not offered back once 
its insufficiency becomes apparent, “retention will import homologation and 
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acquiescence”,387 the phrase must be evaluated in the context of the time in which it 
was written. In seventeenth century Scots law, ‘homologation’ could be used to 
describe a defence or exception388 which pleaded the “pursuer’s acknowledging or 
approbation of the defender’s right, directly and expressly by consent thereto, or 
ratification thereof, or indirectly, and tacitly by doing deeds importing the same”.389 
This is the context in which Bankton and Stair use the word. The second component 
of the phrase - the word “acquiescence” - did not come to describe “a form of 
personal bar” until around 1800.390 Prior to that, it “was sometimes used along with 
‘consent’ to describe facts that were held to amount to homologation in the form of 
implied consent”.391 Thus, when Bankton and Stair use the phrase “homologation 
and acquiescence” in their discussions of the warranty, they mean that when a buyer 
who has discovered a defect fails to make a timeous rejection, the court may draw 
the inference that he has consented to taking the thing as it is, and deprive him of a 
remedy as a result. In such circumstances, a seller who brought an action for 
payment, or was being sued for return of the price, could use the defense of 
“homologation and acquiescence” to argue his entitlement to payment. 
 The second phrase used in conjunction with the principle of timeous 
rejection, is “debito tempore”.392 Translating into “in due time” or “in proper time”, 
debito tempore was one of many phrases used to describe silence.393 It is even 
possible that the phrase was related to the principle of homologation, since “[s]ilence 
was relevant to homologation”.394 Regardless, the term signified a “delay in asserting 
a right”.395 This is in contrast to modern Scots law, where the phrase “mora, 
taciturnity and acquiescence”396 is generally used to express this idea. This 
inconsistency can however, be explained by the fact that the latter phrase only began 
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to be used judicially from 1877 onwards, and only became a standard plea half a 
century later,397 after Rankine described it as the appropriate plea to use “[w]here the 
element of time is of importance”.398 In contrast, most of the case law dealing with 
the implied warranty dates prior to the mid nineteenth century. Thus, the principle 
could not fall within the ambit of “mora, taciturnity and acquiescence” for the simple 
reason that the doctrine had not yet taken root in Scots law. Instead, another term 
which denoted the buyer’s delay in returning the subject and asserting his right to the 
price was used. Like the phrase “homologation and acquiescence”, non debito 
tempore describes a silence which implies assent to taking the thing as it is. 
 Thus, while the requirement for timeous rejection was not part of the doctrine 
of personal bar, similar principles were responsible for it. In fact, one may go as far 
as to say that the principles underlying it were early predecessors of our modern 
doctrine of personal bar. 
 
(c) Safeguarding the Seller’s Interest 
 
In cases regarding allegations of insufficiency, the buyer was required to protect the 
seller’s interests in the matter while the subject of the sale was in his possession. 
Where he had failed to do so, and the defective thing had perished or deteriorated as 
a result, the value of the seller’s resulting loss could be deducted from his claim, or 
he could be found liable for the price.399 Thus, as soon as a fault was discovered, the 
buyer was under an obligation to “separate the thing and set it aside for the 
seller...abstain[ing] from any use or employment of it as his own...and [taking] all 
due care to keep it for the seller in good condition and free, as far as may be, of any 
further deterioration”.400 This ensured that the seller did not have to suffer any 
unnecessary loss. 
 The exact origin of this rule is unclear. Under the aedilitian edict, a buyer was 
required to make good any reduction in the slave’s value for which he was 
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responsible.401 However, the text does not indicate whether this applied to any 
deterioration or merely that caused by the buyer’s negligence. The rule may also 
have arisen out of the general law. A similar principle exists in relation to goods in 
the seller’s keeping after the contract of sale has been perfected. Though the risk of 
loss generally falls on the buyer during this period of time, the seller is liable where 
the loss results from fault on his part.402 
 The rule received practical application in several Scots cases relating to the 
implied warranty of soundness.403 In Baird v. Aitken and Others, a buyer of imported 
lintseed was denied a remedy because he had sown the seed despite noticing its 
insufficiency, and thus deprived the seller of the chance to return the seed to the 
original seller. The Lords reasoned that “purchasers of articles of this sort were 
bound to make a proper trial, before they proceeded to sow in any considerable 
quantity, so that, if insufficient, the goods might be returned to the seller”.404  
 In Stevenson v. Dalrymple, a soap maker who had bought kelp which was 
unfit to make soap with, was found to have lost the right to object by “receiving the 
article, and giving bills for the price, keeping it so long, and using part of it without 
objecting to its quality”.405 The buyer had pleaded that he had not been able to use 
the kelp until some other kelp had been used up, that he had intimated his rejection as 
soon as he knew of the insufficiency, and that he had stored it in a dry place and 
exposed it to no injury. However, the court reasoned that “it would be dangerous, by 
admitting such exceptions, to shake the established and salutary rule of practice on 
that head”.406  
 In Ramsay v. M’Lellan,407 the defenders bought wood from the pursuer. Upon 
receipt, they found some of the wood to be “unfit for purpose” and communicated 
this to the pursuer. However, instead of returning the wood to the pursuer, they used 
it up. As a result, the court found that the defenders were liable for the full price.  
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 In Ransan v. Mitchell,408 the defender purchased a cargo of cork from the 
pursuer. Upon delivery, he found it to be of inferior quality, and wrote to the seller 
intimating rejection. He specified that he had set the cork aside in a warehouse for 
the seller. The seller was abroad at the time, and on returning, found that the buyer 
had used up much of the cork. The court found that the buyer was liable for the 
whole price, because he had accepted the contract through his conduct.  
 The principle also received consideration in Ewart v. Hamilton,409 where the 
buyer of a lame horse had sold the horse “by roup on the warrant of the bailies” for a 
low sum without consulting the seller. The Court considered whether the fact that the 
horse had been sold without the seller’s knowledge or consent presented a difficulty 
to the buyer’s claim under the implied warranty. The Lord Justice-Clerk concluded 
that, “the sale was by public roup, and I see no prejudice from it; the worth of the 
horse was got”;410 and the seller was found liable. 
 That the rule operated within very narrow confines is illustrated in Dickson 
and Co. v. Kincaid. There, a tenant farmer who had sold seed which was not the 
“Swedish turnip” described, attempted to argue that the buyers were barred from 
making a claim because they had been culpably negligent. First, he argued that, 
being seed merchants, the buyers would have been aware of the risks of different 
varieties of seeds getting mixed up; and because they knew he was “a rustic”, they 
should have taken pains to ascertain that this had not happened. Secondly, he claimed 
that knowing the risks of adulteration, they should have taken the ordinary precaution 
of sowing a sample of it and waiting for it to grow before selling the seed on.411 
However, the Court disagreed, and found that the seed merchants were entitled to 
rely on the warranty, because “it was not incumbent on them to ascertain the purity 
of the seed by sowing it and waiting the result of its growth before exposing it to 
sale”.412 
 It should be noted that this principle was disregarded in at least one case.413  
                                                
408 (1845) 7 D 813. 	  
409 25 February 1791, Hume 667.	  
410 Ibid at 669.	  
411 (1808) F.C. 57 at 60.	  
412 Ibid at 61.	  
413 Hume suggests that the principle was also disregarded in Grant and M’Ritchie v. Dumbreck (11 
December 1792, Hume 673 at 674), where the buyer had kept the wine for two years without making 
 
 
  72 
In Hill v. Pringle, a buyer who sowed the seed despite noticing a bad smell and 
discolouration upon delivery was given a remedy because the judges reasoned that 
“he was entitled to sow on the faith that the seller would not give him bad seed”.414 
This case was unconvincingly distinguished from Baird because in the latter the 
seller had imported the seed and “could know no more of it than the purchaser”, 




A buyer wishing to bring a successful action against the seller for breach of the 
implied warranty of soundness, had to observe a certain standard of contact. He was 
expected to have noticed any detectable defects, had to reject the subject within a 
reasonable time, and had to protect the seller’s interests while the subject remained in 
his possession. His failure to do any one of these could be used by the seller as a 
defence.  
 However, the case law demonstrates that failure to observe this standard of 
conduct was not necessarily fatal to the buyer’s claim. In some of the cases discussed 
above, the seller was found liable for breach of the implied warranty of soundness, 
even though the buyer’s conduct did not meet the required standard. The buyer’s 
conduct was simply a factor considered by the Bench in determining whether or not 




 1. The Actio Redhibitoria 
 
The prevailing academic opinion holds that under the Scots common law, the sole 
remedy for a breach of the implied warranty of soundness, was the actio 
                                                                                                                                     
a formal rejection and had failed to set the wine aside/abstain from using it. The writer disagrees with 
Hume, because in that case the court held the buyer liable for the price of the wine he had used up. 	  
414 Hill v. Pringle (1827) 6 S 229 at 232 (Lord Pitmilly).	  
415 Ibid. 	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redhibitoria.416 This remedy functioned to allow the buyer to reject the goods,417 and 
receive repetition of the price where it had already been paid, or absolved him from 
paying it where it had not.418 The seller, in turn, was entitled to receive back the 
subject of the sale, and its fruits.419 However, the buyer’s remedy was not prejudiced 
where that subject had been destroyed as a result of the insufficiency, or used up in 
the process of the defect being discovered. In such circumstances, he was still 
entitled to either receive back, or refuse to pay, the price.420  
 Mungo Brown writes that, according to both the aedilitian edict and Pothier, a 
buyer was not entitled to make a claim against the seller in regard to a fault if he had 
managed to sell the subject on without loss.421  Since the warranty’s aim is to redress 
any loss suffered by buyers as a result of latent defects, such a rule would make 
sense. It is unclear whether this principle was applied to the Scots law warranty. 
However, case law does demonstrate that where the article had been sold on for a 
reduced rate, the buyer was still entitled to a remedy. Thus, in Jardine v. 
Campbell,422 where a defective horse was sold for a reduced rate by mutual consent,  
the buyer was entitled to repayment of the price with interest, and the expense of 
keeping the horse, while the seller was entitled to receive the price paid for the horse 
by the third party buyer. Likewise, in Ralston v. Robb,423 the buyer, who had sold the 
horse at public roup for a reduced price, was still able to avail himself of the actio 
redhibitoria. 
                                                
416 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.10; Hume, Lectures: II.43; Bell, Principles (4th ed): §	  97; Gloag, 
Law of Contract (1st ed): 707; Gloag and Henderson (1st ed): 170.	  
417 Bankton, Institute: I.19.2; McBey v. Reid, (1842) 4 D. 349.	  
418 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.10; Baird v. Pagan, 14 Dec. 1765, M. 14240; Brown v. Laurie, 16 
June 1791, M. 14244; Brown v. Gilbert; 9 July 1791, M. 14244; Gilmer v. Galloway, (1830) 8 S 420; 
McBey v. Reid, (1842) 4 D. 349. This is in agreement with Pothier and the Dutch Ius Commune 
writers: Pothier, Treatise: 135; Van Leeuwen, Commentaries: IV.18.3; Grotius, Jurisprudence of 
Holland, Vol I: III.15.7.	  
419 Hume, Lectures: II.43; Brown, Treatise: 307.	  
420 Brown, Treatise: 307; Bell, Principles (2nd): §	  97 (this is the first edition of the Principles in 
which any mention is made of a remedy for breach of the warranty). See also: Baird v. Pagan, 14 
Dec. 1765, M. 14240; Hill v. Pringle, (1827) 6 S 229; Gilmer v. Galloway, (1830) 8 S 420; Birnie v. 
Weir (1800) 4 Paton 144; The same position is taken by Pothier and French and South African law: 
Pothier, Treatise: 135; Art. 1647, Code Napoléon (1804 and current versions); Kerr, Law of Sale and 
Lease: 121; Kerr, A.J. and Glover, G., ‘The Aediles’	  Edict’	  in W. A. Joubert (ed), The Law of South 
Africa, Volume 24: Sale to Servitudes, 2nd ed: §37.	  
421 Brown, Treatise: 307.	  
422 15 Jan 1806, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6, Note 1.	  
423 9 July 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6.	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(a) The Extent of Loss Covered 
 
Beyond mere repetition of the price, the Scots law version of the actio redhibitoria 
aimed to reverse matters so completely that it allowed the buyer to recover more than 
the pretium. This was not a unique position. While Grotius424 and Van Leeuwen425 
limit the actio redhibitoria to allowing the buyer to return the thing and getting back 
his money, other interpretations favour a wider remit. Under the aedilitian edict, the 
parties had to “be restored…to their original positions”.426 Thus, the purchaser had to 
return the slave along with any “fruits”427 and make good any deterioration for which 
he was responsible.428 In return, the seller was required to give back the price with 
interest429 and “anything laid out in respect of the purchase”.430 In addition, Ulpian 
states that the purchaser had to be reimbursed if the slave had stolen from someone 
else and the purchaser had had to “make amends”.431 Voet describes the actio 
redhibitoria as requiring the seller to give back the price with interest, as well as 
reimbursing the purchaser for any expenses “incurred in accord with [the seller’s] 
intention by the purchaser on account of the sale, or needfully incurred or incurred 
for the preservation of the very property...[and giving] security for expenses still 
threatening the purchaser”.432 Pothier’s claim that, “things should be restored to the 
same situation, as if the sale had not intervened”, also indicates a liability beyond 
mere repetition. In France, the stipulation that an ignorant seller was only bound to 
“a restitution of the price and [a reimbursement] to the purchaser of the expenses 
occasioned by the sale”433 has been creatively interpreted by the courts to include 
                                                
424 Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, Vol I: III.15.7.	  
425 Van Leeuwen, Commentaries: IV.18.4-5.	  
426 D.21.1.23.7. See also: D.21.1.23.1; D.21.1.60.	  
427 D.21.1.1.1.1; D.21.1.24; D.21.1.31.2.	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damage caused by the sale.434 By the 1940s, ignorant sellers had found themselves 
liable for a broad spectrum of losses, including, “expenses occasioned by the resales 
[which the purchaser] had been obliged to reimburse to the sub-vendees”;435 the 
expenditures incurred in removing and replacing defective sheathing;436 the 
expenditure in preparing soil for planting and the profits lost as a result of failed 
crop;437 and reimbursement of traveling expenses incurred in settling lawsuits raised 
by sub-vendees, as well as injury caused to the buyer’s commercial reputation.438 
 Hume provides the thoroughest summarisation of the Scots law position: 
 
...[the] returning of the price or losing [the] action for the price is 
not...in every instance[,] the only consequence to the seller. If the use 
and destination of the subject sold is such that the buyer, necessarily 
and immediately, must suffer damage from its bad quality in the 
attempt to make use of it, the seller shall be answerable for that 
damage also, although he sold ignorantly.439 
 
In this, he is backed by Brown, who writes that, “where the vendee has suffered loss 
by using the commodity, the vendor is bound to repair that loss, even although he 
was ignorant of the defect”.440 
 The actio redhibitoria is used in this way in case law dating to both before 
and after the warranty was first recognised in Scots law. In the first category is Aiton 
v. Fairie, where the buyer requested repetition of the price and the reimbursement of 
the expense of entertaining the horse.441 While the buyer was unsuccessful, the 
validity of the remedy argued for was not questioned. The second category contains 
five cases in which the buyer requested - and was awarded - a remedy beyond mere 
repetition. In Brown v. Gilbert442 and Dundas v. Fairbairn,443 two buyers of 
                                                
434 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 540. 	  
435 Cass.-req., 29 juin 1847, S. 48.1.705 (sale of defective fertilizer). Quote taken from: Morrow, 
“Warranty of Quality”: 540.	  
436 Cass.-req., 4 janvier 1859, S. 59.1.936. Taken from: Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 541.	  
437 Rouen, 22 mai 1886, S.88.2.166 (defective seed). Taken from: Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 
541.	  
438 Cass.-req., 26 avril 1870, S.70.1.265 (defective starch). Taken from: Morrow, “Warranty of 
Quality”: 541.	  
439 Hume, Lectures: II.43. 	  
440 Brown, Treatise: 304.	  
441 29 Jan. 1668, M. 14230.	  
442 9 July 1791, Hume 671. 	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defective horses were granted repayment of the price with interest, and expenses 
incurred in maintaining the horse and raising the legal process. The buyer in Ralston 
v. Robertson successfully argued that where the seller has breached the implied 
warranty, he must “make up to the buyer the loss accruing to him from [the fault]”.444 
In Hill v. Pringle,445 the buyer was awarded repetition and damages in respect of bad 
seed sold to him. In Whealler v. Methuen,446 a buyer who had bought cured red 
herrings and had them shipped to Dieppe to sell to a third party, was awarded 
repayment of the price, the cost of the freight to Dieppe and the profit he would have 
realised from selling the herring on, had they been of the quality agreed on. The 
buyer in Brown v. Boreland447 successfully claimed back the price with interest and 
the amount of expenses he was liable for in a suit brought against him by a 
subsequent purchaser. 
 So much for the liability of the ignorant seller. What of the seller who 
knowingly sells a latently defective article? The sources do not discuss this issue 
much; however, the ones that do indicate that a greater level of liability falls on such 
a seller. Bankton and Forbes, both writing before the implied warranty was first 
judicially recognised, state that such a seller is liable for all resultant damage 
suffered by the buyer.448 Hume writes that for such sellers:  
 
…the notion of what is to be considered as damage shall be very much 
extended, so as to include a reparation even of all the more remote and 
consequential mischief that ensues - not only for that damage which 
attends the want of the use of the thing, but that which arises 
otherwise, by connection to it. If, for instance, I knowingly sell a 
glandered horse, and the buyer’s cattle are infected and die, I should 
be liable for the value of the whole, nay even for the damage by the 
loss of their labour, the farrier’s bill, and so forth.449 
 
 The primary sources contain no discussion of the exact extent of loss 
recoverable under the actio redhibitoria. In accordance with the rule laid down in 
                                                                                                                                     
443 6 July 1797, Hume 677.	  
444 16 June 1761, M. 14238.	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Hadley and Another v. Baxendale and Others, modern Scots law only allows for the 
recovery of direct losses - i.e. those losses which the parties were, or should have 
been, aware would arise out of a breach of contract.450 Beyond this, indirect losses - 
i.e. those losses which would not have been in the contemplation of the parties as 
arising out of a breach - are not covered unless there is an element of fraud in the 
behaviour of the breaching party.451 While Hadley v. Baxendale is a 1854 English 
decision (occurring two years after Whealler and at least a few decades after the 
expositions given by Brown and Hume), the sentiments expressed in it had already 
been part of Scots law for several decades.452  
 As early as the mid-eighteenth century, Erskine was espousing the view that 
failure to perform an obligation made the obligant liable for any direct damage the 
creditor sustained through this nonperformance.453 Half a century later, Hume would 
add that while Scots law was generally against giving damages which were 
“conjectural...speculative...remote or consequential”, a breaching party would be 
liable for those damages, “which can be said fairly and substantially to have been in 
the view of the parties, at the time of contracting, as a certain consequence of the 
failure to deliver”.454 Mungo Brown further clarifies that remote and indirect 
damages are only awarded where they had “actually been in the contemplation of the 
parties, and...the vendor [had] either expressly or tacitly charged himself with such 
damage in case of his failing to deliver”.455 
 It is submitted that the extent of loss recoverable under the actio redhibitoria 
would have been informed by the more general rule regarding damages in Scots law. 
Thus, by the early part of the nineteenth century, a buyer could utilise the actio 
redhibitoria to recover losses that the parties could have foreseen arising if the 
product proved defective. Beyond that, a seller was only liable for all loss - however 
remote or consequential - if there had been an element of fraud in his behaviour.  
  
                                                
450 (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at 355 (Alderson, B.).	  
451 However, loss which would not normally be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties would 
come under the definition of ‘direct loss’	  if the breaching party had been informed that such a loss 
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452 McBryde, Contract (3rd ed): §	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453 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.86. 	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(b) The Private Law Basis of the Actio Redhibitoria 
 
In the body of available case law, buyers of defective goods are often described as 
seeking, bringing a process for, or being awarded, a “repetition of the price”.456 The 
academic writings on the warranty are more diverse in the terminology employed.  
Erskine describes the buyer of insufficient goods as being able to “sue for the 
recovery of the price”,457 while Brown speaks of the entitlement to “restitution of the 
price”.458 However, both Hume459 and Bell460 also favour the term ‘repetition’.  
 This widespread use of the term ‘repetition’ in the context of claims relating 
to breach of the implied warranty, may lead to confusion as to the kind of remedy 
being sought. This is because in modern Scots private law, the term ‘repetition’ 
denotes the action available under the law of unjustified enrichment, for the 
repayment of money, “paid under a mistaken belief of an obligation to pay”.461 
However, this is not the context in which the term is utilised by the cases on the 
implied warranty of soundness.  
 In tracing the development of unjustified enrichment in Scots law, Robin 
Evans-Jones demonstrates that originally, unjustified enrichment was classified 
under the obligation of recompense and the obligation of restitution, with the latter 
denoting both the obligation to return certa res and certa pecunia.462 While Stair 
used the term ‘repetition’ to describe claims of restitution in regard to property463 or 
money464 which arose from the condictiones, he does not mention an actual 
classification of that name.465 In fact, it is only in the fifth edition of Bell’s 
Principles, under the editorship of Patrick Shaw, that ‘repetition’ is presented as a 
                                                
456 Ralston v. Robertson 16 June, 1761, M. 14238; Brown v. Laurie 16 June 1791, M. 14244; Durie v. 
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separate classification in the law of unjustified enrichment.466 Even then, it did not 
exclusively describe claims regarding the recovery of money, because it is defined as 
a remedy whereby “whatever has been delivered or paid on an erroneous conception 
of duty or obligation, may be recovered on the ground of equity”.467 
 The etymology of the term ‘repetition’ can be traced to the Latin word 
‘repetitio’, which was used to describe claims regarding “a claiming back”.468 In 
Scots law, the term ‘repetition’ was neither exclusive to claims which fell under the 
law of unjustified enrichment, nor to claims regarding the recovery of money, until 
sometime in the twentieth century.  
 Thus, in the case law and academic writings relating to the warranty, the term 
‘repetition’ is used to denote a claim for the recovery of the price paid to the seller 
for an item which proved to be latently defective. It does not signal that the claims 
were made under the law of unjustified enrichment because, even as late as 1860, the 
term was not exclusive to that area of law. The actions of repetition sought by the 
buyers in these cases describe the actio redhibitoria, a contractual remedy available 
upon breach of the warranty of soundness. The term ‘repetition’ is used because, 
until the twentieth century, it described actions in which something was claimed 
back. 
 Further indications that the remedy arose out of the law of contract rather than 
the law of unjustified enrichment, can be found in the case law and academic 
writings. For example, in Ralston v. Robertson, the pursuer is said to have argued 
that a buyer’s right to receive goods which are not defective, “is founded in the 
implied warrandice of the contract”.469 This is followed by the case report for Brown 
v. Laurie, which states that the seller was found to be liable in repetition of the price 
“upon the implied warrandice”.470 In the early nineteenth century, Hume describes 
the implied warrandice in contracts of sale as operating to allow buyers to return 
defective items to the seller.471 The abstract for the case report on Whealler v. 
Methuen states that, by law, “a seller was bound under a contract” to supply a sound 
                                                
466 Ibid: 376; Compare: Bell, Principles (5th ed): §	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article.472 Unjustified enrichment is the remedy used to recover things, services and 
money when a contractual remedy is unavailable because there is no legal basis for 
the transfer. However, the passages quoted above indicate that, though the effect of 
the actio redhibitoria was to restore matters as fully as possible to their pre-
contractual state, the remedy sprang from the contract of sale, rather than outwith it.  
 Looking at the situation thorough the eyes of modern Scots law, the actio 
redhibitoria most closely resembles a rescission of contract scenario. However, it 
would be inaccurate to state that under the Scots common law, breach of the implied 
warranty regarding soundness resulted in the contract being rescinded. This is 
because “[r]escission was not normally regarded in Roman law as a remedy to be 
exercised on breach of contract”.473 As a general rule, the only remedy available in 
Roman law for breach of contract was an action for damages.474 The actio 
redhibitioria was not derived from the principle of rescission of contract because the 
Romans did not recognize such a principle. Instead, it was a special action invented 
by the aediles to provide buyers of defective slaves and cattle with a remedy. This 
special remedy was preserved and updated by Justinian, before passing through the 
vessel of the ius commune into Scots law, at a time when the Scots approach to 
breach of contract was fragmented.475 Thus, the actio redhibitoria is distinct from the 
remedy of rescission.  
 
 2. The Actio Quanti Minoris 
 
In Roman law, the buyer of insufficient goods had two remedies at his disposal. The 
first was the actio redhibitoria. The second was the actio quanti minoris, which 
allowed him, “to get back part of the price of the [defective] thing that he had 
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purchased”,476 whilst continuing to retain the thing.477 For most of Scotland’s recent 
legal history, this second remedy is thought to have been rejected.478  
 In examining the remedy in the context of the implied warranty of soundness, 
this section details several findings. The first, is that there is evidence in the case law, 
of the remedy having been utilised by buyers of latently defective articles. Much of 
this usage dates to the pre-1761 period. However, occasional attempts to utilise the 
actio quanti minoris were also made in the post-1761 period and after the remedy 
was thought to have been rejected. This is not unexpected, considering the remedy 
was the natural solution in scenarios where the defect had not been discovered before 
the thing had been used up. The second, is that the remedy was rejected because it 
was confused with another remedy of the same name.479 The third, looks at the 
circumstances in which the actio quanti minoris was available to remedy latent 
defects. The fourth, is that the scope of the actio quanti minoris - at least in relation 
to the implied warranty of soundness - was extremely limited. 
 
(a) The Rejection of the Actio Quanti Minoris 
 
 
Stair explains that in Scots law, “only a latent insufficiency of the goods and ware, at 
the time of the sale and delivery, is sufficient to abate or take down the price”.480 He 
means that the remedy is exclusive to latent insufficiencies: no other complaint can 
give rise to it. His statement is necessary because Roman law had two different 
remedies, both of which were referred to as the actio quanti minoris.  
 The first was available to remedy the insufficiency in something sold to the 
buyer. The second provided relief in cases of laesio enorm, where something had 
been sold at more than twice its value. It was this second actio quanti minoris which 
was rejected by Scots law, for  “our custome alloweth [it] not”.481 In Stair’s time, the 
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actio quanti minoris which gave remedy in cases of latent insufficiency was utilised 
by Scots law.482  
 That the actio quanti minoris was initially recognised as a remedy for 
insufficiency in sale, is evident in the case law dating to the latter part of the 
seventeenth century. In the case report for Watson and Chiesly v. Stewart, the Lords 
are recorded as stating that the actio quanti minoris “only took place where, 
immediately upon discovering the insufficiency, it was reclaimed against and was yet 
extant and undisposed of”.483 Morison’s Dictionary contains four cases where the 
remedy was sought by buyers of latently defective products; and in each, no 
objection is made as to the competence of the remedy. In Hoggersworth v. 
Hamilton,484 the buyer was denied the remedy, not because its application to Scots 
law was questioned, but because “the averments were insufficiently specific as to the 
nature of the deficiency”.485 The buyer in Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay486 was 
denied his request for the actio quanti minoris in respect of a portion of beer which 
was discovered to be insufficient before it had been steeped. The denial did not relate 
to the remedy’s competence in Scots law. Instead, it was because the court found that 
an express warranty that the beer was “good, sufficient and marketable” did not 
extend to a guarantee that it was sufficient to be malt, so long as it was sufficient to 
be meal. In Paton v. Lockhart,487 the buyer’s request for a proportional abatement in 
the price of packs of skins which he alleged were spoiled and eaten by rats, “was 
allowed to be referred to oath”.488 Similarly, where a buyer requested a deduction in 
price in respect of blackened and spoiled wheat, the Lords sustained his reason, “and 
allowed him to prove the badness of the victual”.489 However, these cases must be 
read with caution, because they date to a period when it was unclear whether an 
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implied warranty of soundness existed. As a result, it is difficult to gauge whether the 
cases are based on the implied warranty, fraud or the breach of an express guarantee.  
 Bankton and Forbes, both of whom believed that the contract of sale 
contained an implied warranty of soundness, also recognise the actio quanti minoris 
as an appropriate remedy where that warranty was breached. The former claims that 
it was utilised where the insufficiency only rendered the thing less valuable,490 and 
the latter, that its proper place was in cases where the buyer would have paid a lesser 
price for the thing had he known of its insufficiency.491 Unlike Stair,492 who makes 
no distinction between the actio quanti minoris and the actio redhibitoria, both 
Bankton and Forbes believe that the actio quanti minoris was exclusive to cases 
where the defect was not grave enough to hinder the thing’s use.  
This link to insufficiencies which merely lowered the worth of the thing may indicate 
a growing confusion between the two capacities in which the civilian tradition 
utilised the actio quanti minoris. Certainly, from the mid-eighteenth century 
onwards, almost all sources reject the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for 
insufficiency - something which more than one academic claims is a byproduct of a 
confusion between the two distinct civilian remedies which shared the same name.493  
 Thus, the first edition of Kames’ Principles of Equity, published in 1760, 
states that Scots law has rejected the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for latent 
defects.494 In 1773, Erskine writes that, while Roman law allowed the actio quanti 
minoris to remedy slighter insufficiencies, Scots law’s rejection of it in relation to 
laesio enorm led him to doubt whether it would be considered competent in cases 
involving insufficiency.495  
 Half a century later, Mungo Brown confirms this position: “we have rejected 
the actio quanti minoris, as being inconsistent with the true principles of the contract, 
and hurtful to the interests of commerce”.496 Like Bankton and Forbes, he links the 
Roman use of this remedy to slighter insufficiencies which merely affect the thing’s 
                                                
490 Bankton, Institute: I.19.2.	  
491 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832.	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value. Likewise, the seller in Hill v. Pringle is recorded as pleading that “...the mere 
inferior quality of an article sold did not fall under the implied warrandice in sale, as 
no actio quanti minoris lay by the law of Scotland”.497 So ingrained does the idea of 
its rejection become, that Hume’s Lectures and Bell’s Principles do not even 
mention the actio quanti minoris by name when they discuss the remedies available 
to the buyer of an insufficient item. 
 However, though by and large the remedy was considered to have been 
rejected by Scots law from the eighteenth century onwards, there are three notable 
exceptions. In Stevenson v. Dalrymple,498 a soap maker was sold kelp which he 
alleged was so bad it was unfit to make soap with. There was some delay in him 
notifying the seller of his rejection, during which time he had used up a portion of the 
kelp. The Lord Ordinary found the kelp, “was of very inferior quality, and unfit for 
soap making”, but that in respect of the kelp he had used, the buyer was obliged to 
pay a reduced price which better reflected its worth. While the decision was later 
overturned, the competence of the remedy provided had no bearing on this. The 
initial judgment is significant in that the remedy provided is the actio quanti minoris. 
The Lord Ordinary, accepting the truth of the buyer’s complaint and the impossibility 
of returning the portion of kelp which had been used, did justice to both parties by 
insisting that the buyer pay a reduced price in respect of this portion. This decision 
was subsequently overturned, and the buyer was found liable for all the kelp. 
However, this was because the court felt that he had forfeited any right to relief by 
“receiving the article...giving bills for the price, keeping it so long, and using part of 
it without objecting to its quality”; and not, as one might expect, from any feeling 
that the remedy provided by the Lord Ordinary was one which Scots law had 
rejected.  
 The second exception is found in Hume’s Lectures. Hume’s discussion of the 
implied warranty of soundness states that: “…the buyer may return the subject on the 
seller, and is not obliged to keep it even at any lower and abated price; because it is 
not the sort of subject which he meant to buy”.499 Does this amount to an 
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acknowledgement that, in Hume’s time, the actio quanti minoris was a competent 
remedy for breach of the implied warranty of soundness? It is difficult to tell. Hume 
does not overtly present the actio quanti minoris as a remedy available for latent 
defects; but he does hint at it in the quote above. Moreover, though he goes on to 
discuss the actio redhibitoria, he does not afford the same treatment to the actio 
quanti minoris. On the other hand, while he mentions that the actio quanti minoris 
for laesio enorm has been rejected by Scots law,500 he does not mention the status of 
the actio quanti minoris for latent defects. Hume does discuss the actio quanti 
minoris further on in his discussion of the contract of sale; however, this only in 
relation to situations where “some part or article of the estate covenanted for had not 
at all been delivered”.501 
 The third exception is found in one of Bell’s writings. Though his Principles 
makes no mention of the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for insufficiency, his 
Commentaries is different. There, he mentions the actio quanti minoris twice in his 
discussion of the implied warranty. First, he states that if goods: 
 
ordered to be sent abroad…do not correspond to the description in the 
order, or (where no special description is given) to that of 
merchantable goods; they may be returned, or an abatement 
demanded.502 
 
This passage appears in the third edition of Bell’s Commentaries. In subsequent 
editions, the reference to an abatement of the price (italicised above) is deleted and 
replaced with “damages recovered”.503  
 Bell’s second reference to the actio quanti minoris occurs when he explains 
that if the thing bought is not fit for the purpose specified by the buyer, but this fact 
is not uncovered until it has already been used, “an abatement may be demanded in 
the price”.504 This passage remains unchanged in subsequent editions.505  
                                                
500 Ibid: II.47f. 
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 The remedy of an abatement in the price is the actio quanti minoris. It is 
unclear why Bell presents it as a viable remedy, when his contemporaries believed it 
to have been rejected, and when he himself does not mention it in his other works. A 
plausible explanation is that, in both passages, Bell is drawing on English law. The 
English common law position in regard to defects was caveat emptor. However, 
there were exceptions to this principle. One was that where goods were ordered by 
description, from a seller who dealt in goods of such description, and “the buyer 
[had] no opportunity of examining the goods”, there was an implied warranty that the 
goods were “of merchantable quality and condition”.506 Another was that where the 
buyer relied on the seller’s skill and judgement in purchasing something for a 
specific purpose “known to the seller”, and the goods were of a kind supplied by the 
seller in the course of his business, there was an implied warranty that the goods 
were fit for that purpose.507 These two scenarios are similar, though not identical, to 
the situations detailed in Bell’s passages. Under English law, where either of the two 
warranties described above was breached, one remedy available to a buyer who had 
already accepted the goods, or where property in the goods had already passed to 
him, was “diminution or extinction of the price”.508 This may explain why Bell 
presents the actio quanti minoris as a valid remedy in his two passages. 
 An examination of the sources reveals evidence that prior to the mid-
eighteenth century, the actio quanti minoris was an accepted remedy for latent 
insufficiency in sale. Its rejection came about mistakenly, because it was confused 
with another remedy of the same name which Scots law had long rejected. However, 
since the remedy was the natural solution to cases where the insufficiency had not 
been discovered before the thing had been used up, the occasional attempt to utilise it 
can be witnessed even after its rejection. 
 
(b) The Circumstances of Its Use 
 
There are several theories as to the circumstances in which the actio quanti minoris 
was used. Stair, who writes of latent defects in the context of breached express 
                                                
506 s 17(3), Sale of Goods Bill 1889; Taken from: Chalmers, Sale of Goods: 21.	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warranties and fraudulent sellers, makes no suggestion that different remedies 
applied depending on the level of gravity:509 to him, the buyer was always equally 
able to choose between the actio quanti minoris and the actio redhibitoria. While 
this view finds no allies in Scots law, it fares better on the continent, echoing the 
position taken by Pothier510 and the Code Napoléon of 1804.511  
 In contrast, Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay,512 a case involving an express 
warranty of quality, provides a different interpretation as to the roles of the two 
remedies. There, the buyer argued that “by the civil law and our custom”, the actio 
redhibitoria was applied where the insufficiency occurred, “before acceptation of the 
ware”. On the other hand, where the insufficiency appeared either after acceptation, 
or after the thing had already been used up, the actio quanti minoris was applied to 
abate the price, “according to the damage, and reduced to that rate such ware would 
have given, if the latent insufficiency had been known”. 
 However, the more widespread belief was that the remedy differed according 
to the gravity of the insufficiency. The actio redhibitoria was available where the 
defect in the thing hindered its use.513 The actio quanti minoris remedied 
insufficiencies of a slighter nature, where the buyer would still have entered into the 
contract even if he had been aware of the defect.514 It was the relief available where 
the primary inconvenience caused by the defect was that it rendered the thing less 
valuable.515 This interpretation is seen in the parties’ arguments in Hill v. Pringle. 
The seller argued that, “...the mere inferior quality of an article sold did not fall under 
the implied warrandice in sale, as no actio quanti minoris lay by the law of 
Scotland”.516 The buyer replied that, “...the defect here was such as to unfit the seed 
entirely for sowing, the only purpose to which it could be applied, and so was a 
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ground for demanding total repetition and damages, and not a mere deduction of 
price”.517  
 The majority position is likely to be a legacy of the Dutch influence on Scots 
law. It contains echoes of Van Leeuwen, who claimed that, “if the defect be such, 
that [the buyer] would notwithstanding have bought the thing, the purchase will be 
binding, and he can...claim back the amount above what he would have promised if 
he had known of the defect”;518 and of Voet, who wrote that the action was granted, 
“mainly for a defect such that the purchaser would not have bought for so much had 
he known of it”.519  
 A similar stance is still taken in some modern jurisdictions. In South Africa, 
one of the circumstances in which the actio quanti minoris is utilised, is where “[a] 
disease or defect...is not important enough to give rise to an actio redhibitoria, and 
yet is not so unimportant as to fall within the maxim de minis non curat lex”.520 
Under the current law in Germany, reduction of price is available as a secondary 
remedy in cases where the breach (in this case, the defect in the thing sold) is not 
serious enough to warrant termination.521 
 The actio quanti minoris is a valuable tool within the context of the implied 
warranty of soundness. It allows buyers relief in those cases where the defect would 
not be deemed severe enough to warrant the more drastic measure of termination. It 
also gives the buyer a valuable option wherein he can choose to keep the defective 
thing, but is economically compensated for the fact that it is not of an acceptable 
quality. Scots law’s rejection of the actio quanti minoris stunted the application of its 
implied warranty of soundness. Without this remedy, the buyer of a defective 
product was at an economic and commercial disadvantage unless: 1) he chose the 
drastic remedy of termination; and 2) the defect was severe enough to warrant such 
termination. 
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(c) Scope 
 
A. L. Stewart explains that in Scots law, the actio quanti minoris was “an action by a 
purchaser retaining goods[,] either for damages or for abatement of the price”.522 In 
his study of the actio quanti minoris and its rejection in Scots law, Evans-Jones 
writes that: “[t]he actio quanti minoris is conceived by Scots law primarily as the 
right of the buyer of defective property to retain the object and claim damages in 
respect of the defect”523. In other parts of the text, his terminology changes from 
“damages” to “a reduction of the price”.524 
 The use of the term “damages” in this context is a misnomer. “Damages” 
suggests a remedy wider than abatement of the price. It indicates the potential for 
compensatory measures. In the context of the implied warranty of soundness, the 
actio quanti minoris denoted a restitutionary remedy, whereby the buyer could retain 
the defective subject and claim a reduction of the price to reflect its actual value.525 
 This is apparent in both case law and academic writings pertaining to the 
subject. In mentioning the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for a buyer who has been 
sold something with a latent insufficiency, Forbes describes it as allowing the buyer 
to retain the subject while gaining “an abatement of the price”.526  Even Erskine and 
Brown, who claim that the remedy is rejected in Scots law, explain that in Roman 
law, it allowed the buyer “to…[sue] for the recovery of as much of the price as 
exceeded what he might reasonably have given for the subject had he known the 
defect”.527 This pattern holds true in almost all of the cases which pertain to, or 
discuss, the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for breach of the implied warranty of 
soundness.  
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 Of the cases which date to the pre-1761 period,528 requests range from, “a 
proportional abatement of the price”529 and “crav[ing] deduction”,530 to “[an 
abatement of the price] according to the damage, and [reduction] to that rate such 
ware would have given, if the latent insufficiency had been known”.531 Case law 
from the post-1761 period is no different. Thus, in Hill v. Pringle, when the seller 
pleaded that, “no actio quanti minoris lay by Scots law”, the buyer argued that he 
was demanding repetition and damages (the actio redhibitoria), “not a mere 
deduction of price”.532  
 Such an interpretation of the actio quanti minoris is in keeping with how the 
remedy is treated in comparative law. Voet, Grotius, Van Leeuwen and Pothier all 
describe it as a remedy which, when invoked in the context of the warranty of 
soundness, allowed for an abatement of the price.533 In South Africa, the actio quanti 
minoris continues to be used to secure “the return of a portion of the purchase 
price”.534 Under the English common law, the buyer’s action for damages was set up 
separately from the action he raised in diminution of the price.535  
 Only Stair, Bell and Bankton contradict this interpretation of the actio quanti 
minoris. In discussing the Roman remedies for latent defects in the title on sale, Stair 
describes the actio quanti minoris as “making up the buyer’s interest”.536 A similar 
statement is found in his title on reparation. There, he states that by the actio 
redhibitoria et quanti minoris, the Romans allowed the deceived to either annul the 
bargain, or “obtain what damage they had sustained by the fraud”,537 and that the 
“sophistication of ware, or [the] concealing of [an] insufficiency”538 were such 
instances of fraud. Both these passages detail a compensatory remedy, because the 
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buyer’s interest in the matter, or the damage sustained by him, can extend beyond a 
mere abatement of the price. Take, for example, a scenario where a buyer 
unknowingly purchases a faulty television, which he then sends for repairs. In this 
situation, his interest extends to the money spent in having the television repaired. 
 However, both these passages should be read with caution, for Stair only 
claims to be discussing the Roman law position on the matter, and never expressly 
clarifies if it also applies to Scots law. Furthermore, a third passage, in the title on 
obligations, contradicts the first two passages. There, Stair claims that, “[t]his agreeth 
with our custom, by which only a latent insufficiency of the goods and ware, at the 
time of the sale and delivery, is sufficient to abate or take down the price”.539 Here, 
the actio quanti minoris is presented as a remedy which merely abates the price to 
reflect the thing’s actual value. Furthermore, the wording in this passages clarifies 
that Stair is speaking of Scots law. Thus, Stair’s three passages on the actio quanti 
minoris are inconclusive. It is difficult to tell whether his first two passages speak 
also of Scots law, and if they do, why he presents the actio quanti minoris as being 
both restitutionary and compensatory. 
 Bankton writes that where the latent defect hinders the thing’s use, the buyer 
can annul the bargain via the actio redhibitoria; but if the defect merely reduces the 
thing’s value, only a reduction in the price via the actio quanti minoris is available to 
the buyer. He goes on to state however, that a seller guilty of dolus “is liable in all 
damages sustained therethrough”.540 Thus, Bankton’s account of the actio quanti 
minoris allows for compensatory damages in cases where the seller is guilty of fraud. 
This is to be expected, as Scots law allowed the recovery of both direct and indirect 
loss caused by a breach of contract, where the seller was guilty of fraud.541  
 Bell mentions the actio quanti minoris in his discussion of the implied 
warranty in the Commentaries. According to a passage in the third edition:  
 
if goods be ordered to be sent abroad; if they do not correspond to the 
description in the order, or (where no special description is given) to 
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that of merchantable goods; they may be returned, or an abatement 
demanded.542 
 
This passage appears to present the actio quanti minoris as a restitutionary remedy. 
However, in the fourth edition, the latter part of the passage is altered to: “…they 
may be returned, or damages recovered”.543 The authority cited remains largely 
unchanged between the third and fourth editions.544 What is the significance of this 
alteration? Has Bell changed the buyer’s remedy from the actio quanti minoris to 
damages? It seems unlikely, since the authority remains almost unchanged. Or is Bell 
still referring to the actio quanti minoris, but presenting it as a compensatory remedy 
rather than a restitutionary one?  
 A possibility is that Bell’s passage is inspired by English law. The authorities 
cited in this passage are all English cases. The English common law recognised an 
implied warranty of quality in respect of goods ordered by description, where the 
buyer had had “no opportunity of examining the goods”.545 Where this was breached, 
but the property in the goods had already passed to the buyer, or the buyer had 
already accepted the goods, the two remedies available were an action for the 
“diminution or extinction of the price” and an action for damages.546 The alteration 
made between the third and fourth editions may be due to a confusion between these 
two remedies. An import from English law would also explain why Bell mentions an 
abatement of the price, despite writing after the actio quanti minoris had already 
been rejected in Scots law.  
 The discussion in the Commentaries makes a second reference to the actio 
quanti minoris. In the same paragraph, it states that: “[t]he commodity must be fit for 
the particular purpose specified by the buyer, and if not, it may be rejected; damages 
claimed; or if used before being discovered, an abatement demanded in the price”.547 
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The primary authority cited here is a Scottish case, Baird v. Pagan and Others.548 
However, while this case is authority for the principle that a thing supplied for a 
particular purpose must be fit for that purpose, the remedy granted was the actio 
redhibitoria. This passage presents the actio quanti minoris as a restitutionary 
remedy, and remains unchanged in the fourth and fifth editions.549 However, it is 
possible that this passage, which comes immediately after the passage above, may 
also be an English law import.550  
 In the end, it is impossible to tell whether Bell regarded the actio quanti 
minoris as a remedy that extended to damages or was limited to an abatement in the 
price. Bell, like Stair, does not provide sufficient evidence to elicit the conclusion 
that, in the context of the warranty, the actio quanti minoris allowed the buyer to 
claim more than a reduction of the price.  
 Interestingly, discussions of the actio quanti minoris in this context do not 
even mention the availability of direct damages alongside abatement of the price.  
This is strange, because the general Scots law position allowed direct damages to be 
recovered for breach of contract where the offending party was not guilty of dolus.551 
The sources suggest that, in the context of the implied warranty of soundness, the 
actio quanti minoris allowed the buyer to retain the purchase and claim a reduction 
in the price. There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the remedy extended 
beyond this to allow the buyer to retain the object and claim compensatory damages. 
 
 3. Pure Damages? 
 
Under both Roman law and the civilian tradition, a buyer of insufficient goods had 
only two remedies at his disposal: the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris.  
In Scots law, the rejection of the latter remedy left buyers with only the actio 
redhibitoria. However, the buyer’s arguments in Baird v. Aitken and Others suggest 
the possibility of a third remedy. In response to an action for payment brought 
against him, the buyer argued that the seed had been bad, and that: 
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[e]very merchant is understood to warrant the sufficiency of the goods 
which he has sold at the ordinary price; and therefore, when these 
have proved altogether unfit for the uses of the purchaser, he is liable 
in damages. Surely then, in such a case, he can have no claim for the 
price.552  
 
The suggestion that buyers of latently defective products could have a remedy of 
damages separate from the actio redhbitioria, merits exploration.  
 It is difficult to identify the source upon which this assertion was based. Only 
two cases feature an action for damages which is separate from the actio 
redhibitoria, and both of these are dated after Baird. In the first case, the pursuer was 
a buyer who had been sold annual seed when he had explicitly stated that he only 
meant to buy the perenial kind.553 As a result, he “brought an action for damages”. 
This action is unlikely to have been based on the actio redhibitoria, because it is 
primarily an action for damages and not for recovery of the price. A. L. Stewart 
believes that the action was the actio quanti minoris,554 because he believes that the 
actio quanti minoris was a remedy whereby the purchaser retained the goods and 
claimed either an abatement of the price, or damages.555 However, the Scots law 
actio quanti minoris did not allow buyers to retain the product and claim damages in 
respect of the defect.556 As a result, it is likely that this was an action for pure 
damages. The case report does not suggest that there were any objections to this 
remedy. Nevertheless, the seller was assoilzied; and in a subsequent advocation, “the 
pursuer restricted the damages claimed by him to the price of the seed, with interest”. 
Thus, while the initial claim resembled neither of the two traditional remedies, this 
was later amended to the actio redhibitoria. This case should be treated with caution 
however. While it is cited by both Brown and Hume557 as an example of the implied 
warranty of soundness, the only existing case report is too vague to determine what 
the basis of the action was.  
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 The second case is Dickson and Company v. Kincaid,558 where a “spurious 
and degenerate variety” of turnip seed was sold to the pursuers as being Swedish 
turnip seed. The pursuers subsequently sold the seed to a third party, who brought an 
action against them for reparation of loss. Having been found liable in damages in 
this action, Messrs. Dickson then brought an action for damages against Kincaid - 
who had been unaware of the defect - for both the loss of character they had suffered, 
and the action they had been subjected to. This was an action for pure damages, 
including “a reparation of all the more remote and consequential mischief”.559 The 
Lord Ordinary granted the request for damages in respect of both grievances. The 
defender reclaimed, objecting that though, “upon the warrandice in the contract of 
sale...the defender might be liable for restitution of the price, yet he cannot be made 
responsible for damages or contingent loss”.560 The pursuers later “passed from their 
claim of solatium”,561 and the court “alter[ed] the interlocutor complained of in so far 
as regards the solatium...and [assoilzied] the petitioner from that article”.562 
However, the remedy awarded was still not a repayment or abatement of the price: it 
was a reimbursement of the damages which Messrs. Dickson had had to pay to the 
third party in respect of the insufficiency.  
 To understand the claims in this case, it is helpful to know that at the time, 
fraud was a widely construed concept in Scots law. 563 Dickson contains two separate 
claims. At one point, the Lord Ordinary refers to the action as “a civil action of 
damages”564. This is accurate: the claim for solatium as a remedy for defamation of 
the pursuer's business reputation, is delictual. This claim was likely dropped because 
                                                
558 (1808) F.C. 57. 	  
559 Hume, Lectures: II.44; Note: Hume states that this is only available where the seller has behaved 
fraudulently - something which this particular seller had not done. 	  
560 (1808) F.C. 57 at 60.	  
561 Ibid at 61.	  
562 Ibid at 61.	  
563 See: Reid, D., "The Doctrine of Presumptive Fraud in Scots Law" (2013) 34 The Journal of Legal 
History pp. 307-326; Reid, D., “Fraud in Scots Law” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh 2012) pp. 
41-92. 
564 (1808) F.C. 57 at 59.	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businesses do not have personality rights, and cannot, as a result, claim for 
solatium.565 
 Dickson also contains a separate claim based on breach of the implied 
warranty of soundness. The Lord Ordinary states that the seller’s liability was 
founded, “under the implied warrandice in a contract of sale”;566 and that there is 
both an express warranty and an implied warranty of soundness in this case.567 It is 
also clear from the parties’ arguments that the claim made was based on the notion 
that the seed sold had been defective, and at various points, they make reference to 
the action being based on the implied warranty of soundness.568  
 The section on the implied warranty in the fourth edition of Bell’s 
Commentaries states that, where goods which have been commissioned to be sent 
abroad do not match either the description given, or the description of merchantable 
goods, “they may be returned or damages recovered”.569 It is unclear whether the 
second remedy mentioned is an allusion to damages recovered under the actio quanti 
minoris or an action for damages in its own right. As mentioned earlier, this passage 
is different from that in the third edition.570 The third edition version reads: “they 
may be returned, or an abatement demanded.571 There are also indications that Bell 
may be drawing from English law in this passage.572  
 Bell’s Commentaries also mentions the remedy of damages in the passage 
which comes immediately after the one above. The third edition states that, where a 
thing is not fit for an avowed purpose, “it may be rejected; damages claimed; or if 
used before being discovered, an abatement demanded in the price”.573 Here, 
damages is presented as a remedy distinct from rejection (the actio redhbitoria) or 
abatement of the price (the actio quanti minoris).  
                                                
565 For solatium as an eighteenth century construct, see Blackie, J., 'Defamation' in K. G. C. Reid and 
R. Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law: Volume II: 676ff. For uncertainty as to how cases in 
which the pursuer was a business were analysed in this time period, see page 703f of the same chapter. 
566 (1808) F.C. 57 at 59.	  
567 Ibid. 	  
568 See page 46f.	  
569 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (4th ed): 349 (emphasis own). See also: Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (5th 
ed): 438.	  
570 See discussion at page 91f. 	  
571 Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 283f (emphasis own). 
572 See discussion at page 92.	  
573 Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed): 284 (emphasis own). See also: Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (4th 
ed): 349.	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 However, the passage is altered in the fifth edition to: “it may be rejected and 
damages claimed; or, if used before the defect is discovered, an abatement may be 
demanded in the price”.574 The deletion of the semicolon between “rejected” and 
“damages”, coupled with the insertion of an “and” in its place, alters the passage. It 
now looks like the buyer’s remedy is rejection and damages (i.e. the actio 
redhibitoria). The cause of this change is unclear. There is also the possibility that 
Bell is importing English law in this passage.575 As a result, Bell’s passages cannot 
be used as definitive proof that in Scots law, an action for damages in its own right 
was a competent remedy for breach of the implied warranty of soundness.  
 The possibility of a remedy of damages for breach of the implied warranty is 
raised in only three cases. Of the two cases where the action was brought, the first 
was amended to the actio redhibitoria. However, in the second case, the action for 
damages succeeded. Thus, the Scottish implied warranty of soundness may have 
been in the early stages of evolving a remedy of pure damages. Scotland would not 
be the only jurisdiction in which the civilian-derived warranty expanded to offer a 
third remedy. In France, the two traditional remedies available under the Code 
Napoléon are supplemented by a third remedy evolved by the courts: the astreinte. 
By it, the buyer of a reparable defective item is able to obtain a court order to have it 
repaired within a certain period of time.576  
 Perhaps this evolution of a third remedy is a testament to the fact that, while 
termination and diminution are useful remedies, they do not answer the need in every 
circumstance. For example, the option to request that the defective item be repaired 
is a valuable tool. By it, the seller is given a second chance to bring his performance 
into conformity with what was agreed under the contract. As a result, the buyer 
receives a thing of the quality desired, and the seller receives the total price. Under 
recent reforms promulgated to bring the law into conformity with a European 
directive, the primary remedy in German law is to require the seller to “bring the 
performance into conformity with the contract”.577 Only after this option has been 
exhausted, is the buyer allowed to avail himself of secondary remedies such as 
                                                
574 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (5th ed): 438.	  
575 See discussion at page 85f and 91f. 	  
576 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 537. Cites: Cass.-civ., 11 avril 1933. S. 1933.1.263.	  
577	  §	  437 Nr. 1 BGB; §	  439 BGB.	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termination, damages or diminution of price.578 Similarly, under the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979, the buyer’s primary remedy579 in a consumer contract,580 is to ask the 
seller to repair or replace the goods581 within a reasonable time and without 
significant inconvenience to the buyer.582 Only after this remedy is exercised,583 can 
the buyer avail himself of the remedies of abatement and termination.584  
 However, it must be noted that, though the remedies of repair and 
replacement are more adept at preserving the contract while bringing it into 
conformity with what was originally intended, they are perhaps especially useful to a 
world where things which are sold are mass-produced and can be easily repaired or 
replaced. These remedies may not have been as useful or as appropriate in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century Scotland, where the manufacturing revolution was only just 





The implied warranty of soundness imposed a contractual obligation on the seller to 
deliver an article free of latent qualitative defects at the time of the sale. It was 
developed exclusively through case law featuring corporeal moveable property. The 
warranty was breached by defects which rendered the article: unfit for its ordinary or 
avowed purposes; of a quality incommensurate with the price; or unmarketable. The 
warranty may also have addressed situations where the product delivered was of a 
different identity to what had been contracted for. Case law demonstrates that the 
warranty was not confined to physical defects.  
 In a claim for breach of the implied warranty of soundness, the buyer’s 
conduct could be used as a defence by the seller. A buyer could be deprived of a 
                                                
578	  §	  323 I BGB; §	  281 I BGB.	  
579 s 48C(2)(b), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 	  
580 s 48A(1)(a), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 	  
581 s 48B(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 	  
582 s 48B(2)(a), Sale of Goods Act 1979. Note however, that the buyer cannot exercise this right where 
the remedy is impossible or disproportionate (s 48B(3), Sale of Goods Act 1979). 	  
583 s 48C(2)(b), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 	  
584 s 48C(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 	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remedy under the warranty where he had failed to notice a defect which was patent at 
the time of sale, had not rejected the article within a reasonable time, or had not 
protected the seller’s interests. However, a failure to meet the required standard of 
behaviour was not always fatal to the buyer’s claim.  
 A buyer claiming for breach of the implied warranty of soundness had only 
one remedy available to him. This was the actio redhibitoria, under which the 
contract was terminated. The subject would be returned to the seller, and the buyer 
would receive back the price paid. The buyer could also claim damages for direct 
loss suffered. If the seller was guilty of fraud, his liability extended further, to 
damages for indirect loss suffered as well. 
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Chapter IV - The Implied Warranty of Soundness in 




The previous chapter examined the origins and substantive framework of the Scots 
common law implied warranty of soundness in contracts of sale. This study was 
conducted in the context of corporeal moveable property, because this was the only 
type of property featured in the known case law. However, if the Scots common law 
underlying contracts of sale was unified, then the warranty should be applicable to 
contracts of sale for all types of property. Thus, the remaining chapters of this thesis 
will examine the warranty’s application to contracts of sale for corporeal 
immoveable and incorporeal property.  
 The present chapter will focus on the warranty’s application to corporeal 
immoveable property. Latent qualitative defects are more likely to be physical rather 
than legal.585 Because corporeal immoveable property has a physical presence, it is 
more likely to have latent qualitative defects. Thus, the implied warranty of 
soundness is likely to be more relevant to this type of property than to incorporeal 
property.  
 Comparative law recognises that corporeal immoveable property can be 
affected by latent qualitative defects. Justinian’s Digest extends the scope of the 
aedilitian edict to corporeal immoveable property.586 In France587 and South 
Africa,588 the same civilian-derived warranty applies to contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable property. In Germany, the provision that the thing purchased 
                                                
585 Although, there are examples of latent qualitative defects which are legal, as we shall see later in 
this chapter.	  
586 D.21.1.1pr; D.21.1.49; D.21.1.60.	  
587 See: Article 1642-1, Code Napoléon (the current version); Pothier, Treatise: §	  207; Morrow, 
“Warranty of Quality”: 530-532. Morrow also cites several cases which illustrate that the French 
implied warranty of soundness applied to sales of corporeal immoveable property: Cass.-req., 1 mars 
1876, S. 76. 1. 318; Cass.-req., 27 juillet 1909, D. 1910. 1. 187; Cass.-civ., 29 mars 1852, D. 52.1. 65; 
Cass.-req., 16 novembre 1853, D. 53. 1. 322; Paris, 16 novembre 1853, D. 67.2.227; Paris, 21 juin 
1870, D.71.2.42; Rennes, 6 janvier 1893, D. 94. 2. 148.	  
588 E.g. Knight v Hemming 1959 1 SA 288 (FC).	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should be free of material defects is not limited to any one type of property.589 Yet, in 
Scotland, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the implied warranty of soundness 
did extend to corporeal immoveable property.590 
 The work in this chapter is valuable for several reasons. Firstly, it will aid in 
determining whether or not the Scots common law underlying contracts of sale was 
unified. Secondly, it seeks to settle an ongoing debate as to whether or not the 
warranty extended to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property. The 
answer to this question is relevant to our present-day understanding of the Scots 
contract of sale for corporeal immoveable property. Such contracts continue to be 
regulated by the Scots common law. If the warranty is found to have applied to 
contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property in the past, then in the absence 
of any express provisions, it continues to apply to such sales in the present day.  
 The chapter starts with a literature review. This will explore the positions 
taken by institutional and other relevant writers in regard to the question of whether 
or not the implied warranty of soundness applied to contracts of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property. The chapter will then look at the distinction between the 
implied warranty of soundness and the implied warrandice of title; and examine how 
a tendency to conflate the two guarantees may have affected the application of the 
implied warranty of soundness to corporeal immoveable property. The third part of 
this chapter will study relevant case law. The final part will look at several factors 
which may have influenced the use of the implied warranty of soundness by buyers 
of corporeal immoveable property. 
 In summary, this chapter will put forth the following argument. There is a 
lack of consensus in the sources as to whether or not the warranty applied to 
corporeal immoveables. This suggests that the question was probably not relevant. 
The issue may not have been relevant for several reasons. Firstly, the relatively low 
volume of sale transactions featuring corporeal immoveable property in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would have meant that there was less chance of 
actions alleging a breach of the warranty in the context of this type of property 
                                                
589 See: §	  434 BGB.	  
590 See discussion at page 103.	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arising. Secondly, a combination of factors may have resulted in buyers not seeking 
redress under the warranty when latent defects did arise in this type of property.  
 
 1. The Sale Transaction in the Context of Corporeal  
 Immoveable Property 
 
It is important to define the boundaries of this research. A sale transaction for 
corporeal immoveable property consists of two stages. The first stage is the contract 
of sale, otherwise known as the missives of sale. At the conclusion of the missives, 
which must be in writing,591 the parties derive personal rights and obligations.  
 The second stage is known as the conveyance. This is the stage at which 
ownership passes from seller to buyer. In early law, ownership of land was 
transferred through symbolic delivery and the giving of sasines.592 The Registration 
Act 1617 made it compulsory for the instrument of sasines to be registered in the 
Register of Sasines. A judgement in 1847 clarified that an unregistered instrument 
had no effect.593 The law surrounding the transfer of corporeal immoveables 
underwent statutory transformation again in the mid- to late- nineteenth century.594 
Today, the conveyancing stage is comprised of: (1) execution and delivery of a 
written disposition;595 and (2) the subsequent registration of that disposition.596 
Registration is the point at which ownership of the property passes to the buyer.597 
This thesis deals only with the contract stage of the sale transaction.  
 
B. Literature Review 
                                                
591  Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.2.2; Note: this rule is now embodied in s 2(a)(i), Requirements of 
Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.	  
592 For more information, see: Gretton, G. L., ‘Feudal System’	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 89, 
90; Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  640.	  
593 Young v. Leith (1847) 9 D. 932. 	  
594 See: Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868.	  
595 See: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  640. 	  
596 s 50 (1), Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (in force from 8 December 2014). See also:  
Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  640. 	  
597 s 50 (2) and (3), Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012. This provision comes into force on 8 
December 2014. For the law before this date, see: s 3(1), Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979; s 
4(1), Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000. See also: Reid et al., “Transfer of 
Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  640. 	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The latter part of the twentieth century saw an old debate reignited: did the Scots 
common law implied warranty of soundness apply to contracts of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property? Several academics and jurists took opposing positions on the 
matter. In 1963, a paper in the Conveyancing Review argued that while the warranty 
did apply to corporeal immoveables, it was not used because it had little practical 
purpose in such sales.598 In a 1977 case, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Maxwell, stated in 
obiter comments that: “[a] sale of heritage does not imply a warranty of the condition 
of the heritage”.599 This statement is made without reference to any authority, a fact 
which Black describes as “not wholly surprising, since there is no authority for it”.600 
Black argues that: “[t]he law of Scotland does recognise in a sale of heritable 
property an implied warranty of the condition of the subjects”.601 In response, 
Halliday602 and Cuisine603 argued that the implied warranty of soundness did not 
apply to sales of corporeal immoveable property. It should be noted that Halliday and 
Cuisine are speaking of the conveyancing stage of the transaction, rather than the 
contracting stage. Reid reconciles the two views by arguing that the warranty of 
soundness is implied into the missives of sale, but “is not carried forward into the 
disposition”.604  
 This argument reflects the confusion in the older sources. As the literature 
review605 below will demonstrate, there has never been a clear consensus on whether 
or not the implied warranty of soundness applied to contracts of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property.  
 
                                                
598 Edward, D. A. O. “Latent Defect in Heritable Property”	  (1963) 3 The Conveyancing Review 144.	  
599 Aberdeen Development Co. v. Mackie, Ramsay & Taylor 1977 S.L.T. 177 at 181.	  
600 Black, R. “Practice and Precept in Scots Law”	  (1982) 27 Juridical Review: 48.	  
601 Ibid.	  
602 Halliday, J. M. “The Scope of Warrandice in Conveyances of Land”	  (1983) 28 Juridical Review 1.	  
603 Cusine, D. J. “Warrandice and Latent Defects in Heritage”	  (1983) 28 Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland 228.	  
604 Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 164f.	  
605 Note, the literature review does not consider Stair’s Institutions, because Stair did not recognise the 
existence of an implied warranty of soundness in contracts of sale. Bell’s Commentaries is excluded, 
because the discussion on the contract of sale relates exclusively to corporeal moveable property. 
Likewise, Bell’s Inquiries is excluded because it deals exclusively with corporeal moveable property. 
See discussion at page 15 and 21f. 	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 1.  Sources Which Do Not Discuss the Warranty’s  
 Application to Corporeal Immoveable Property 
 
(a) Erskine’s Institutes, Bell’s Principles and Brown’s 
Treatise 
 
Erskine’s Institutes, Bell’s Principles and Brown’s Treatise all contain a discussion 
of the implied warranty of soundness.606 Erskine’s discussion is located in his title on 
the contract of sale. Brown’s discussion takes place in the chapter on warrandice. In 
Bell’s Principles, the implied warranty is covered in the chapter containing the 
general discussion on the contract of sale. The second chapter on sale,607 which 
discusses principles that have special application to sales of land, does not mention 
the warranty. 
 These discussions do not address the question of whether or not the warranty 
applies to corporeal immoveable property. Corporeal immoveable property is simply 
not mentioned. Mungo Brown cites a great deal of case law in his discussion, but 
they all relate to corporeal moveable property. Both Bell and Erskine refer to 
“goods” in the context of this discussion; however, it is unclear whether this 
implicitly limits the warranty to corporeal moveable property.  
 The fact that these authors do not mention corporeal immoveable property in 
their discussions of the warranty of soundness does not necessarily indicate that the 
warranty was restricted to corporeal moveable property. In each of these texts, the 
implied warranty of soundness is treated within a chapter (or book, in Brown’s case) 
that takes a unified approach to the contract of sale. In the few cases where a 
principle varies in its application to different types of property, this is highlighted.608 
The discussions on the implied warranty of soundness do not indicate that the 
warranty was exclusive to contracts of sale for corporeal moveable property. It is 
                                                
606 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.9; Brown, Treatise: 285ff; Bell, Principles (1st ed): §44; Bell, 
Principles (4th ed): §	  95ff.	  
607 This chapter first appears in the second edition. 	  
608 See page 11f and 13f. 	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submitted that this suggests that these authors had no reason to believe that the 
warranty was limited to corporeal moveable property.  
 
(b) Kames, Principles of Equity 
 
Kames’ Principles of Equity contains a brief discussion on the implied warranty of 
soundness.609 This discussion is in general terms, and there is no indication that the 
warranty is confined to a particular type of property.  
 
(c) Conveyancing Texts 
 
Each of the conveyancing texts contains a discussion on the contract of sale. These 
discussions tend to focus on the sale of lands. Most of these texts610 do not mention 
qualitative latent defects, either in their discussions of the contract of sale,611 or 
elsewhere.612 Neither do they refer to any implied or express obligation relating to 
the quality of the thing bought. These texts discuss only three contractual obligations 
to which the seller is subject: to deliver a valid disposition upon payment,613 to 
disencumber the subject,614 and to provide the buyer with a sufficient progress.615 In 
                                                
609 Lord Kames, H. Home, Principles of Equity, Vol I, 3rd ed: 267ff. 
610 Wood, Conveyancing; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed); Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing 
(3rd ed); Napier, Conveyancing; Burns, Handbook (1st ed); Burns, Handbook (5th ed); Burns, 
Conveyancing (1st ed); Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed); McDonald, Conveyancing (1st ed); Craigie, 
Heritable Rights (1st ed); Craigie, Heritable Rights (3rd ed). 
611 Wood, Conveyancing: 195ff; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed): 127ff; Bell, Treatise on 
Conveyancing (3rd ed): 141ff; Napier, Conveyancing: 469ff; Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 56ff; Burns, 
Handbook (5th ed): 173ff; Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 92ff; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 158ff; 
McDonald, Conveyancing (1st ed): 97ff; Craigie, Heritable Rights (1st ed): 33ff; Craigie, Heritable 
Rights (3rd ed): 246. 
612 An exception is Russell’s Theory of Conveyancing. Russell does not mention an implied warranty 
of soundness. Nor does he suggest that buyers insert express provisions regarding the quality of the 
subject into either the missives or the disposition. However, he does suggest that a prospective buyer 
should inspect the tenant’s farms and houses, examine the tacks and rental, or (in relation to houses in 
the burgh) check the roof. This advice is of limited relevance, as Russell is merely cautioning buyers 
to exercise due vigilance in making their purchase. See: Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 215f; Russell, 
Conveyancing (2nd ed): 215f.	  
613 Craigie, Heritable Rights (1st ed): 34; Wood, Conveyancing: 197; McDonald, Conveyancing (1st 
ed): 102; Napier, Conveyancing: 471.	  
614 Wood, Conveyancing: 197; Craigie, Heritable Rights (3rd ed): 256; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 
174; McDonald, Conveyancing (1st ed): 102; Napier, Conveyancing: 479.	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many of these works the emphasis is overwhelmingly on issues of title, with the 
ensuing discussions being largely devoted to the semantics of these three obligations.  
 The fact that these conveyancing texts do not discuss latent qualitative defects 
or the implied warranty of soundness, indicates one of two possibilities. The first is 
that the implied warranty of soundness did not apply to contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable property. The second, is that the warranty had no practical 
relevance to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property.  
 
 2.  Sources Which Indicate that the Warranty Did Not 
 Apply to Corporeal Immoveable Property 
 
Bankton’s Institute expressly limits the implied warranty of soundness to contracts of 
sale for goods: 
 
By [Scots law], in sale of goods and lands, where no warrandice is 
exprest, absolute warrandice is implied, viz. That the seller has good 
right to the same, and shall warrant the purchaser against all 
evictions…and further, as to goods, that they labour under no latent 
insufficiency…616 
 
Bankton does not give any reason for why he limits the warranty to corporeal 
moveable property. Bankton is writing at a point when the Scots implied warranty of 
soundness is in the early stages of development. His Institute is only the first or 
second source617 to acknowledge the implied warranty’s existence in Scots law. Its 
publication pre-dates the 1761 decision618 in which the warranty was first judicially 
recognised, by a decade. 
 In this context, it difficult to understand why Bankton limits the warranty to 
corporeal moveables at this early point in its development. No sources prior to 
                                                                                                                                     
615 Craigie, Heritable Rights (1st ed): 34; Craigie, Heritable Rights (3rd ed): 256; Burns, Handbook 
(1st ed): 56; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 174; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed): 142; Bell, 
Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 154; Napier, Conveyancing: 472ff.	  
616 Bankton, Institute: I.19.8 (in the section comparing Scots law to English law) (the last emphasis is 
my own). 	  
617 Forbes’	  Great Body was written between 1714-1739. Bankton’s Institute was written before 1751. 
It is unclear which was written first. 	  
618 Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 14238.	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Bankton suggest such a limitation. Furthermore, the analysis in chapter two 
demonstrated that academic writers (including Bankton) generally took a unified 
approach to the contract of sale. There were policy or practical justifications for the 
few occasions where a principle varied in its application to different types of 
property. In this case, there are no obvious practical or policy justifications for 
limiting the implied warranty of soundness to corporeal moveable property. 
 Montgomerie Bell’s Conveyancing mentions the implied warranty of 
soundness in the discussion on the clause of warrandice, located in a chapter on 
common clauses in deeds.619 The chapter’s opening sentence indicates that the 
discussion relates to “any conveyance or other deed”.620 Thus, it is possible that some 
of this discussion pertains to the contract of sale. In the discussion on warrandice, 
Bell writes:  
 
 Formerly, absolute warrandice was implied on the sale of goods, but by the 
 Mercantile Law Amendment Act of 1856, the seller was not held bound in 
 warrant of their quality or sufficiency, if he was ignorant of defects at the  
 time of the sale, unless he shall have sold them for a specified and particular 
 purpose, in which case he shall be considered, without any express warranty, 
 to warrant that they are fit for such purpose.621 
 
Bell is referring to the common law implied warranty of soundness, the remit of 
which was considerably reduced by section 5 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
Scotland 1856. He does not mention the warranty of soundness in relation to lands or 
debts - there, the discussion is focussed on the guarantee of title. The significance of 
this is unclear. It may suggest that the warranty did not apply to corporeal 
immoveable property. Alternatively, it may indicate that the warranty had no 
practical significance to sales of such property.   
 Both Bell and Bankton incorrectly conflate the implied warrandice of title 
with the implied warranty of soundness. Both refer to the implied warranty of 
soundness as the “absolute warrandice”. However, the term “absolute warrandice” 
                                                
619 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 203ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 214ff. 
620 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 203; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 214. 
621 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 208; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 219. 
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describes the implied guarantee of title.622 The implied warranty of soundness was a 
separate guarantee that was distinct from the absolute warrandice.   
 The earlier analysis of Erskine’s Institute highlighted that the discussion on 
the implied warranty of soundness does not consider the question of whether or not 
the warranty applies to corporeal immoveable property. However, this changes in the 
eighth edition, which was edited by J. B. Nicholson. The discussion on the implied 
warranty of soundness is unchanged from the first edition. However, Nicholson adds 
the following footnote: “The rule long recognised in Scotland, that payment of a full 
price implied that the goods sold were sound and merchantable, has been displaced, 
if not entirely overturned, by [section 5 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
Scotland 1856]”.623 Nicholson is referring to the fact that the 1856 Act limited the 
warranty’s application in relation to corporeal moveable property to unascertained 
goods. However, section 5 only applied to corporeal moveable property: the 
warranty’s application to corporeal immoveable and incorporeal property would have 
remained unchanged. Thus, Nicholson’s statement indicates a belief that the 
warranty was restricted to corporeal moveable property.  
 The first edition of Halliday’s Conveyancing states that the buyer of a house 
does not have any remedy against serious physical defects, unless the seller was 
guilty of misrepresentation.624 The only authority cited is Aberdeen Development Co. 
v. Mackie, Ramsay & Taylor.625 As this passage is not located in the chapter on the 
contract of sale, it is unclear if Halliday is referring to the contract stage, the 
conveyancing stage, or both. 
 Similarly, the seventh edition of McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual states 
that in “a contract of sale and purchase of heritage”, there is no implied term relating 
to “the fitness of the subjects for [the buyer’s] purpose [or] the structural condition of 
all buildings on the property”.626 However, no authority is cited.  
 Menzies’ Conveyancing mentions the implied warranty of soundness in the 
discussion on the implied warrandice in deeds of conveyance. Here, Menzies states 
                                                
622 See discussion at page 123. 	  
623 Erskine, Institute (8th ed.): III.3.9, footnote d.	  
624 Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol II (1st ed): 451. 
625 1977 S.L.T. 177. 
626 McDonald, Conveyancing (7th ed): § 28.12.  
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that while there is an implied warrandice of quality in the sale of a horse and in a 
lease, the warrandice in conveyances of lands and debts relates “only to the security 
of the possession or sufficiency of the title”.627 However, this statement is irrelevant 
to our analysis, because Menzies is speaking of the conveyancing stage, and not the 
contracting stage.  
 
 3.  Sources Which Indicate that the Warranty Did 




Forbes’ Great Body is only the first or second source628 to recognise the existence of 
an implied warranty of soundness in Scots law. In his discussion of the warranty, 
Forbes draws on two examples relating to latent defects in the sale of lands.  
 The first example is of poisoned land: “[t]he purchaser of a field may get the 
sale dissolved, if there arise out of that ground malignant vapours which render the 
use of it dangerous”.629 This illustration is taken from Roman law. Forbes cites a 
similar passage from Ulpian’s discussion of the aedilitian edict: “[t]here is, in no 
way, any doubt that when land is sold, it may be the object of rescission; suppose 
that the land be noxious, rescission will be possible”.630  
 The author has been unable to find any Scots cases relating to the poisoned 
land example. However, the example itself is plausible. Land which is dangerous to 
use will be unfit for its ordinary uses, is presumably of a quality incommensurate 
with the price, and will be unmarketable. There are also hypothetical situations in 
which land could become poisoned. For example, land could become poisoned and 
unable to grow crops due to exposure to mine runoffs from a nearby lead mine. 
 The second example arises in the context of the actio quanti minoris, which 
Forbes describes as the remedy used when the buyer would have paid a lower price 
                                                
627 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 148; See also: Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 175.	  
628 See footnote 617. 
629 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 831.	  
630 D.21.1.49.	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for the defective thing. Forbes writes: “[t]hus, a purchaser of land liable to a service, 
which did not appear, and the seller did not declare, may procure an abatement of the 
price”.631 This illustration is also taken from Roman law. Forbes cites the aedilitian 
edict as authority for this example; and a similar passage on the edict in the Digest 
states: “[w]hen action is brought concerning a servitude, the losing vendor will be 
liable for the amount by which the purchaser would have bought more cheaply, had 
he been aware of the existence of the servitude”.632  
 The idea that undisclosed servitudes are latent qualitative defects will be 
explored in further detail later. For the time being, it is important to note that later 
developments in Scots law moved away from Forbes' analysis. Since 1835,633 Scots 
law has considered undisclosed real conditions to be a breach of the seller’s 
guarantee of title. 
 Forbes’ Great Body was written between 1714-1739, at a point when the 
Scots law implied warranty of soundness was still in the early stages of development. 
Forbes is writing before the warranty was first judicially recognised in 1761.634 In 
this context, the fact that his examples are taken from Roman law is understandable. 
At this point, there are no Scottish cases illustrating how the warranty is used. The 
inclusion of two examples relating to land indicates that Forbes believed the Scots 




More’s chapter on the contract of sale has a section on warrandice, where he 
discusses both the implied warranty of soundness and the implied warrandice of title. 
He begins by discussing the common law implied warranty of soundness, stating 
that: “the vendor must warrant the article to be fit for the use for which he sells it, 
                                                
631 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 832.	  
632 D.21.1.60.	  
633 Urquhart v. Halden, (1835) 13 S. 844. 
634 See page 22f.  
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and such as he describes it to be”.635 He also notes that “the rule as to latent defects 
has been altered by the statute of 1856”.636 
 The next paragraph contains the following statement:  
 
And where the property which has been sold happens to be burdened 
with a servitude, which the vendor knows would render it unfit for the 
purpose for which the purchase has been made, the warrandice will be 
incurred equally as if the property had been evicted from the buyer.637 
 
This is a puzzling statement. On the one hand, the reference to the thing being unfit 
for its avowed purpose is reminiscent of the implied warranty of soundness.638 
However, eviction is the criteria required for the implied warrandice of title in the 
disposition to be breached.639 More’s statement is conflating aspects of two distinct 
implied guarantees in a contract of sale: the implied warrandice of title and the 
implied warranty of soundness.  
 If More is trying to assert that undisclosed servitudes are a breach of the 
implied warranty of soundness, he is incorrect. As mentioned above, Scots law 
regards undisclosed servitudes as a breach of the implied warrandice of title.  
As a result, it is unsurprising that the two authorities cited by More in illustration of 
this rule do not relate to the implied warranty of soundness. Murray v. Buchanan640 
is a case involving the lease of a property burdened with legal restrictions which 
rendered it unfit for the tenant’s purpose. Urquhart v. Halden641 involved an 
undisclosed negative servitude on the land which constituted a breach of the implied 




                                                
635 More, Lectures, Vol I: 153.	  
636 Ibid: 154.	  
637 Ibid: 154-155 (emphasis own).	  
638 See discussion at page 30ff.  
639 For more information, see: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 
707. 
640 19th January 1776, M.16,636.	  
641 (1835) 13 S. 844. 	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In the second edition of The Law of Contract, Gloag writes: “a seller of land does not 
impliedly warrant that it is suitable for the purpose for which the buyer may have 
stated that he wants it, or that it is, in any sense of that expression, of merchantable 
quality”.642 Thus, Gloag indicates that the implied warranty of soundness, as 
developed in relation to corporeal moveable property, does not apply to corporeal 
immoveable property.  
 Instead however, he argues that: “[i]n a sale of heritage the obligation of the 
seller to furnish what he has sold, as it has been construed, may in substance amount 
to an implied term or warranty of quality”.643 This obligation, he claims, arises from 
the seller’s duty to deliver, “a free and unfettered subject [which is] Totus teres atque 
rotundus”.644 It should be noted that Gloag treats the conveyance as a contract. As a 
result, it is unclear whether he is referring to the contract, the conveyance or both in 
this discussion.  
 Gloag suggests that the duty to deliver a subject totus teres atque rotundus is 
breached where the seller “tenders a property subject to a bond, burdened with a feu-
duty larger than is stated, subject to a reservation of minerals, fettered by building 
restrictions, or affected by a servitude”.645 However, this statement is incorrect. The 
cases cited by Gloag do not support his claim.  
 In Bremner v. Dick, the buyer was allowed to terminate the contract because 
the feu-duty was larger than stated, which meant that the seller “[could not] deliver 
the subject he had offered to sell”646. In Clason v. Steuart,647 the buyer of a property 
burdened with a feu-duty which was larger than stated, was allowed to terminate the 
contract on the basis of error in substantialibus.  
 The remaining cases were all based on the implied warrandice of title. The 
inhibition on the purchased house in Horne v. Kay648 and the bonds which burdened 
the land bought in Christie v. Cameron649 were classed as encumbrances which 
                                                
642 Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 314.	  
643 Ibid: 313f.	  
644 Ibid: 314. Quote attributed to Urquhart v. Halden, 1835, 13 S. 844, 849 (Lord Balgray). “Totus 
teres atque rotundus translates as “finished and completely rounded off”.	  
645 Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 314.	  
646 (1911) S. C. 887 at 894 (Lord Johnston).  
647 (1844) 6 D. 1201. 
648 (1824) 3 S. 54. 
649 (1898) 25 R. 824. 
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breached the warrandice of title. In Urquhart v. Halden,650 an undisclosed negative 
servitude was found to breach the warrandice of title. Unknown building restrictions 
on the land sold were found to breach the warrandice of title in Louttit’s Trustees v. 
Highland Railway Co.651  
 In Robertson v. Rutherford and Whyte v. Lee, the undeclared reservation of 
minerals was found to breach the warrandice of title. In Crofts v. Stewart’s 
Trustees652 however, the decision went against the buyer because he had known that 
the minerals were reserved. Undeclared reservations of minerals are treated as a title 
issue because the vertical extent in a conveyance of land is a coelom usque ad 
centrum (from the heavens to the centre of the earth).653 As such, minerals under the 
land are assumed to pass to the new owner, unless they are expressly reserved in the 
disposition.654 
 Thus, in none of the cases cited by Gloag, was the complaint treated as an 
issue of quality. In the majority of the cases, the complaint was treated as a title 
issue. The implied warranty of soundness is mentioned in Louttit’s Trustees v. 
Highland Railway Co. However, this is a cursory reference made by Lord M’Laren 
in considering the remedies available to a purchaser of property which is disconform 
to contract due to a defect in quality or title.655 The case itself was argued and 




In his discussion of the implied warranty of soundness, Hume expressly clarifies that 
it also applies to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property: 
 
                                                
650 (1835) 13 S. 844. 
651 (1892) 19 R 791. 
652 (1926) S.C. 891.  
653 Glasgow City and District Railway Company  v. Macbrayne (1883) 10 R. 894 at 899 (Lord 
M’Laren). For more information, see Reid, K. G. C., ‘Landownership’ in S.M.E., Volume 18: 
Property: § 198. 
654 For more information, see: Reid, K. G. C., ‘Landownership’ in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 
209.  
655 See: (1892) 19 R 791 at 799-800. 
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I have taken the whole of these illustrations from the sale of moveable 
subjects; but this is only because it is chiefly in that department that 
examples of latent faults and vices happen, and by no means with any 
view of limiting the doctrine to the moveable class of things. The truth 
is that tenements of land are not often visited by such latent vices and 
diseases as may afterwards break out and destroy the use of the 
subject. But put a proper case, and the same principle will rule. 
Suppose, for instance, that I buy a new house from a person for whom 
it has been built by contract and that in a month it tumbles down; 
though this happen without any fraud on the part of my author the 
seller and owing to some fault in the contrivance or some 
insufficiency in the execution, of which the seller was no judge, still I 
take it I am free of this bargain, or, if I have paid, I have repetition of 
the price restoring the materials to the seller for him to make the most 
of.656 
 
Thus, Hume believes that the implied warranty applied to corporeal moveable 
property.  
 How significant is the fact that he cannot cite a single case in support of this 
statement? Since Hume’s work was derived from his lectures, he cites significantly 
more case law than the other writers. The discussion on the implied warranty refers 
to many cases, both reported and unreported. The fact that Hume does not cite any 
reported or unreported cases relating to the warranty’s application to corporeal 
immoveable property, suggests that such case law may not have existed.  
 
(e) Gretton and Reid 
 
The implied warranty of soundness is referred to in the discussion on missives of sale 
in Gretton and Reid’s Conveyancing. The first edition states that: “[t]he seller 
warrants the title but he does not usually warrant the physical state of the subjects of 
sale. The rule here is caveat emptor: it is for the buyer to have the property 
surveyed”.657 However, this statement is later altered. The most recent edition 
describes it as being the “traditional view”;658 and argues, in a footnote, that the view 
                                                
656 Hume, Lectures: II.42-43.	  
657 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed): 71.	  
658 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 74.	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can be challenged on the ground that the sale of land falls within the general common 
law of sale, which did recognise such an implied warranty.659 
 
(f) Undisclosed Real Conditions and the Implied Warranty of 
Soundness 
 
Forbes, Gloag and More suggest that undisclosed real conditions are latent 
qualitative defects. They are incorrect. Scots law did not regard undisclosed real 
conditions as falling within the scope of the implied warranty of soundness.  
 The confusion evidenced by these three writers may stem from a historical 
uncertainty as to whether the warranty applied to undisclosed real conditions. 
According to a passage in Justinian’s Digest, undisclosed servitudes came within the 
scope of the aedilitian edict.660 However, this position was not adopted by Grotius or 
Voet. Grotius believed that the duty to “deliver the property free from all servitudes” 
fell within the seller’s obligation to deliver ownership or vacant possession.661 Voet 
suggests that an undisclosed tax or servitude only falls within the scope of the 
implied warranty of soundness where the seller was guilty of dolus, or had given the 
buyer an express warranty of quality.662 In this statement, Voet is likely to be 
favouring the position taken by the actio empti.663 
 This tension between Roman law and some of the Ius Commune writers is 
reflected in the position taken by South African law. In Southern Life Association v. 
Seagall, the judge applied Voet’s view.664 In contrast to this, is the judgement in 
Overdale Estates (Pty.) Ltd. v. Harvey Greenacre & Co. Ltd.665 Here, an undisclosed 
building restriction was found to be a latent defect within the contemplation of the 
aedilitian edict. While this case was based on both the existence of a latent defect and 
an innocent misrepresentation,666 the transcript indicates that the undisclosed 
                                                
659 Ibid: 74, Footnote 56.	  
660 D.21.1.60.	  
661 Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, Vol I: III.15.4-5.	  
662 Voet: XXI.1.1.	  
663 See: D.19.1.21.1 
664 (1925) 42 The South African Law Journal 272.	  
665 1962 (3) SA 767 at 767 (D).	  
666 Ibid.	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servitude would have been actionable under the edict even if the seller had not been 
guilty of innocent misrepresentation.667  
 In contrast to South Africa, Scots law has never considered undisclosed real 
conditions as coming within the ambit of the implied warranty of soundness. Instead, 
undisclosed real conditions are today considered to be a breach of the seller’s 
guarantee of title. Several cases dated to the seventeenth century (and thus 
immediately preceding Forbes) demonstrate unsuccessful attempts by various buyers 
to argue that undisclosed real conditions on the land were a breach of the seller’s 
absolute warrandice (i.e. the warrandice of title).668 However, while the law was not 
clear in Forbes’ time, it was settled by the time More and Gloag were writing. In 
1835, almost a century after Ralston v. Robertson,669 the court in Urquhart v. 
Halden670 found that the presence of an undisclosed negative servitude was a breach 
of the absolute warrandice. The decision opened the floodgates to other successful 
actions from buyers in similar situations.671 Today, undisclosed servitudes that the 
buyer could not have known of are considered a breach of the seller’s warrandice of 
title.672  
 
 4.  Sample Styles for Missives of Sale.  
 
Burns673 and Montgomerie Bell674 provide sample styles for missives of sale. These 
do not contain any provisions addressing qualitative defects in the subject. Burns, in 
particular, provides an assortment of sample styles: a minute of sale for a landed 
                                                
667 1962 (3) SA 767 at 774 (D). For more information on the South African position, see: Horwood, T. 
B. “Some Notes on the Aedilitian Remedies”	  (1932) 1 South African Law Times 83. For an analysis 
on whether undisclosed real conditions should fall within the implied warranty’s scope, see page 131f. 	  
668 Sandilands v. Earl of Haddington, 21 June 1672, M. 16599; Patrick Falconer v. The Earl 
Marshall, 21 July 1614, M. 16571; Gordonstoun and Nicolson v. Paton (1682) M. 16606; Paton v. 
Gordon (1682) M. 14170; See: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: 
§	  705.	  
669 The first case in which the existence of an implied warranty of soundness was judicially 
acknowledged. See page 22f.	  
670 (1835) 13 S. 844.	  
671 E.g. Louttit’s Trustees v. Highland Railway Co (1892) 19 R 791; Welsh v. Russell (1894) 21 R 
769. For a full list, see: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  705, 
footnote 5. 	  
672 See: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  705.	  
673 Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 101ff; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 182ff.	  
674 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 648ff;  Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 696ff. 
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estate, an offer of sale for a dwelling house, and an offer of sale for a tenement. 
Provisions addressing qualitative latent defects in the subject are not present in any 
of these styles.  
 This pattern is largely consistent with the sample styles provided in The 
Encyclopaedia of Scottish Legal Styles (1935). This contains sample missives or 
minutes of sale for different kinds of corporeal immoveable property: houses, a 
bungalow, a flat, a shop and landed estates. In general, these styles do not contain 
provisions addressing latent qualitative defects in the subject. The only exception is 
the missives for a bungalow under construction. Clause six states: “The fabric of 
house roads pavements drains water channels electric light and gas installations and 
others above mentioned shall be maintained to [date] by the seller who shall put right 
any defect appearing on or before that date”.675  
 Thus, missives of the bygone era generally did not contain provisions 
addressing qualitative defects in the subject. This may have been because, in the past, 
missives were short, spanning only a few lines.676 According to Gretton and Reid, it 
was rare to insert “warranties as to physical quality” until the late 1970s.677  
 This can be seen if we look at sample styles towards the end of the twentieth 
century. The fourth edition of Davidson’s Conveyancing Styles Book (1980), 
contains sample missives of sale for a house and a flat. The provisions regarding 
qualitative defects are minimal, consisting of a requirement that the seller keep the 
subject in its present condition and be liable for damage, until the date of entry.678 
Halliday’s Conveyancing (1986 and 1996) includes several sample styles for offers 
to buy corporeal immoveable property.679 These contain clauses addressing 
qualitative defects in the property.680 Green’s Practice Styles (1995 onwards), 
                                                
675 Scottish Legal Styles: 97-98 (Style No 80). 
676 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 43.	  
677 Ibid: 74. Note that according to Gretton, conveyancers in	  the	  1970s generally assumed that there 
was no implied warranty of soundness in sales of corporeal immoveable property. Statement by 
George Gretton (Personal communication 5 May 2015).	  
678 Davidson, G. Conveyancing Styles Book, 4th ed: 140 (clause 7), 150 (clause 7).  
679 Such as a semi-detached villa, a tenement flat and a licensed hotel.  
680 Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol II (1st ed): 67 (clauses 3 and 11), 70 (clauses 3 and 11), 73 (clause 
15); Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 98-99 (clause 3 and 11), 102-103 (clause 3 and 11), 110 
(clause 15). 
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contains three sample offers to purchase corporeal immoveable property.681 Each of 
these contains a clause682 addressing qualitative defects in the property683 and 
apportioning liability. The second edition of Cuisine’s and Rennie’s Missives (1999) 
states that it is common to insert guarantees about wormwood, rot and damp in the 
missives of sale.684  
 
 5.  Analysis 
 
The literature review demonstrates several things. The most significant of these, is 
that there is no consensus on whether or not the implied warranty of soundness 
applied to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property. Several of the 
sources do not address the question at all. The ones that do, take contradictory 
positions.  Bankton and Forbes, both writing just before the warranty first received 
judicial recognition, take opposing views. Bankton, an institutional writer and thus 
authority in Scots law, indicates that the warranty applies only to contracts of sale for 
goods. Hume, whose Lectures is so highly regarded that it is treated as authority, 
expressly clarifies that the warranty extends to corporeal immoveable property. This 
pattern is evident throughout the sources.  
  Secondly, several sources conflate the implied warranty of soundness and the 
implied warrandice of title. Thirdly, only in the last forty years have conveyancers 
begun to insert express provisions as to quality in missives of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property.  
 The contradictory nature of the sources means that we cannot determine 
whether or not the implied warranty of soundness applied to contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable property. However, the lack of consensus and the fact that 
many of the conveyancing texts do not address the issue of latent qualitative defects 
at all, suggest that the question may not have been relevant. The fact that, despite the 
                                                
681 The properties in question are a property with fixtures and fittings; a semi-detached villa; and a 
tenement flat. 
682 See: Cuisine, D. J., (ed) Greens Practice Styles Volume III: E3004/3 (Clause 2), E3007 (Clause 3) 
and E3017 (Clause 3).  
683 In relation to structural defects, drainage, gas and electrical systems, central heating system, etc.  
684 Cusine, D. J., and Rennie, R., Missives, 2nd ed: §	  4.82.	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confusion as to whether there was an implied warranty of soundness, eighteenth and 
nineteenth century missives of sale did not contain express provisions as to the 
quality of the subject, suggests that such buyers may have been unconcerned by this 
type of defect.  
 
C. The Warrandice of Title: Conflation, Confusion and 
Dominance 
 
The literature review highlighted that several writers conflated the implied warranty 
of soundness with the implied warrandice of title. The roots of this conflation, and its 
effects on the use of the implied warranty of soundness by buyers of corporeal 
immoveable property, are examined in the following section. The author argues that 
the implied warrandice of title may have affected both the degree to which the 
implied warranty of soundness was utilised by buyers of corporeal immoveable 
property; and the understanding of the warranty in the context of corporeal 
immoveable property.  
 This occurred in two ways. Firstly, through the mistaken belief in some 
quarters that the absolute warrandice was the only implied warrandice which existed 
in a contract of sale, and that it contained within it both a guarantee of title and a 
guarantee of quality. Secondly, through the warrandice of title encroaching upon the 
remit of the implied warranty of soundness.  
 
 1. The Relationship Between the Term “Warrandice” 
 and the Implied Warranty of Soundness 
 
In contemporary Scots law, the term “warrandice” is generally associated with the 
guarantee of title in a transfer of property, particularly corporeal immoveable 
property. However, the term has a much wider meaning. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “warrandice” as: “a guarantee, an undertaking to secure another 
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against risk”. The term is derived from the Anglo-Norman word “warandise” or 
“warantise”; and the Old French word “garantise”.685  
 In Scots law, the term “warrandice” was synonymous with “warranty”: 
 
 Warrandice is the name given to certain warranties which are implied 
by law into certain transactions. A warranty...is an obligation imposed 
by contract…..In warrandice, the guarantee always relates either to the 
title to a piece of property or to the property’s quality, its fitness for a 
particular purpose.686 
 
For the sake of clarity, this thesis has consistently referred to the guarantee of quality 
as “the implied warranty of soundness”. Historically however, the term “warrandice” 
was used to describe the implied warranty of soundness.  
 This is illustrated in case law, academic writings and case reports. The term is 
used in this context in Ralston v. Robertson (1761), where the existence of the 
implied warranty of soundness was first judicially acknowledged. In relation to the 
inferior quality of the horse, the pursuer pleaded that, “it is founded in the implied 
warrandice of the contract, that the seller is to make up to the buyer the loss accruing 
to him from faults which were unknown”;687 and that he was “entitled upon the 
implied warrandice of the contract to re-payment of the price”.688 The Bench found 
that, “when a man sells a horse for full value, there is an implied warrandice, both of 
soundness and title”.689 In Ralston v. Robb, the Lord Ordinary recognised the 
defender’s “claim of warrandice against the seller that his goods shall be marketable, 
and fit for sale”.690 In a case involving the sale of rotten oranges, the magistrates’ 
judgement refers to an “implied warrandice of the fruit being in a sound state and a 
merchantable commodity”.691 In a case relating to the sale of defective seed, the 
Second Division found that the seller was liable to the buyer “according to the 
implied warrandice of the bargain between them”.692 In one 1842 case concerning a 
                                                
685	  “Warrandice, n.”	  in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Date Accessed: 15 October 2014).	  
686 Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 153 (emphasis own).	  
687 16 June 1761, M. 14238 at 14239.	  
688 Ibid at 14239.	  
689 Ibid at 14240.	  
690 9 July 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6.	  
691 Parker and Finnie v. E and R Paterson, 7 March 1816, Hume 707 at 708.	  
692 Hill v. Pringle (1827) 6 S.C. 229 at 232.	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horse alleged to be of unsound quality, the Lord Justice-Clerk observed that, “the 
pursuer had unnecessarily undertaken to prove express warrandice. By the law of 
Scotland, sale implied warrandice”.693 
 The use of the term warrandice to describe the implied warranty of soundness 
is not limited to case law. Of the academic writers, Stair (who only recognises 
liability for latent defects where there is an express warranty to this effect or where 
the seller is guilty of dolus), Erskine and Forbes do not refer to the warranty of 
soundness as a warrandice. However, several others do. Bankton writes that: “in sale 
of goods and lands, absolute warrandice is implied, viz. That the seller has good right 
to the same, and shall warrant the purchaser against all evictions…and further, as to 
goods, that they labour under no latent insufficiency”.694 Hume uses the term 
“warrandice” to describe both the implied guarantee of title and the implied 
guarantee of quality. In his discussion of the seller’s “obligation of warrandice of the 
thing sold”,695 he explains that, “under the notion of warrandice two things are 
included”. The first is the obligation “to defend the buyer in the right of the subject, 
or...repay him the price and damages”;696 and the second, is “[t]hat the commodity 
shall be fit and serviceable for the uses whereto it hath been sold”.697 Throughout his 
discussion of the implied guarantee of quality, he refers to it as a “warrandice”. 
Similarly, Mungo Brown explains that the seller is bound “by the obligation of 
warrandice...[under which he must] in the first place...warrant the vendee against 
eviction of the thing sold; and, in the second place...warrant it as being free of certain 
faults”.698 In his discussion of the contract of sale, More uses the word “warrandice” 
to describe both the guarantee of title and the guarantee of quality.699  
 Bell, on the other hand, limits the use of the term “warrandice" to the 
guarantee of title. In the second edition of his Principles, he writes: “[i]f the fault be 
latent, although the buyer should see the commodity, there is an implied 
                                                
693 M’Bey v. Reid (1842) 4 D. 349. These examples are only some of the instances in which the 
warranty of soundness is referred to as a warrandice.	  
694 Bankton, Institutes: I.19.8 (in the section comparing Scots law to English law) (the last emphasis is 
my own). 	  
695 Hume, Lectures: II.38.	  
696 Ibid: II.38.	  
697 Ibid: II.40.	  
698 Brown, Treatise: 240.	  
699 More, Lectures: 153ff.	  
 
  122 
warranty”.700 “Warrandice” on the other hand, “is a collateral obligation on the seller, 
implied in sale, and consequent on eviction”.701 The distinction he makes between 
the terms is even more evident in the third edition of the Principles, where in his 
discussion of the implied warranty that the thing will be fit for its avowed purpose, 
he explains that “[T]his is called warranty in England; it is not the same with our 
warrandice”.702  
 Morison’s Dictionary also indicates that the term "warrandice" could be used 
to denote the implied guarantee of quality. In two late eighteenth century cases 
relating to latent defects in the things sold - Brown v. Laurie703 and Durie v. 
Oswald704 - the reporter writes that “the seller was liable in repetition of the price 
upon the implied warrandice”. The report of another case regarding the quality of the 
thing sold states that the horse was bought “under an express warrandice of 
soundness”.705 In Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay, the defenders are described as  
arguing that they were entitled to the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris 
because the “contract [bore] warrandice, that the bear [would be] sufficient and 
marketable ware”.706 
 The Session Case Reports also refer to the implied guarantee of soundness as 
“warrandice” on occasion. The 1843 volume of the Session Cases lists Whealler v. 
Methuen,707 a case involving the sale of badly-cured red herrings, under the 
keywords “Sale - Warrandice”. Similarly, M’Bey v. Reid708 and Hill v. Pringle709 
(both cases concerning latent qualitative defects) are listed under the keywords “Sale 
- Warrandice” in the volumes of the Session Cases which report them. 
 
 2. The Two Warrandices 
 
                                                
700 Bell, Principles (2nd ed): §	  97.	  
701 Ibid: §	  121.	  
702 Bell, Principles (3rd ed): §	  94.	  
703 16 June 1791, M. 14244.	  
704 29 June 1791, M. 14244.	  
705 Jardine v. Campbell, 9 July 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 6, Note 1.	  
706 Seaton v. Carmichael and Findlay, 28 Jan 1680, M. 14234.	  
707 Whealler v. Methuen (1843) 5 D. 402. 	  
708 (1842) 4 D. 349.	  
709 (1827) 6 S 229.	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Thus, there were two warrandices in Scots law: the implied warrandice of soundness 
and the implied warrandice of title. The implied warrandice of soundness is a 
guarantee of quality, the content of which is set out in chapter three. It relates to the 
contract of sale. 
 In sales of corporeal immoveable property, the implied warrandice of title 
(known as “absolute warrandice”710) in a contract of sale guarantees that: (1) the 
seller has a good title to the subject;711 and that the property is not burdened with any 
subordinate real rights which affects its possession or value,712 or any unknown real 
conditions.713 Since ownership of the property does not pass to the buyer until the 
disposition is registered, it follows that breach of the contractual implied warrandice 
of title is not dependant on judicial eviction.714 
 There is no relationship between the implied warrandice of soundness and the 
implied warrandice of title. They are two distinct warrandices, which are entirely 
separate from each other. The warrandice of title, or absolute warrandice, does not 
address the quality of the thing sold.  
 
 3. The Dual Use of the Term “Warrandice” and Its 
 Impact  
 
The literature review highlighted that several writers conflated the implied warranty 
of soundness with the implied warrandice of title. Bankton715 and Montgomerie 
Bell716 suggest that the absolute warrandice contains a guarantee of quality in it. In 
his statement that property burdened with a servitude rendering it unfit for the 
buyer’s avowed purpose will incur the warrandice “equally as if the property has 
been evicted from the buyer”,717 More conflates aspects of the implied warrandice of 
                                                
710 Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 708, 709. 
711 Bankton, Institute: I.19.24; Brown, Treatise: 242; Bell, Principles (4th ed): §	  114.	  
712 Brown, Treatise: 259; Hume, Lectures: II.40.	  
713 Urquhart v. Halden (1835) 13 S. 844.	  
714 Reid agrees with this conclusion. See: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: 
Property: §	  707.	  
715 Bankton, Institutes: I.19.8 (in the section comparing Scots law to English law). For exact quote, see 
page 106 above.	  
716 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 208; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 219. For 
exact quote, see page 107 above. 
717 More, Lectures, Vol I: 154f. For exact quote, see page 111 above.	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title and the implied warranty of soundness. As we shall see in the next section, this 
conflation between the implied warrandice of title and the implied warranty of 
soundness is also mirrored in some of the case law.718 The use of the term 
“warrandice” to describe two separate, distinct implied guarantees in a contract of 
sale, may explain this conflation.  
 It may have led to the mistaken belief that there was only one implied 
warrandice which contained two guarantees (one of title, and the other of quality) 
within it. In turn, this conflation may have affected the use of the implied warranty of 
soundness by buyers of corporeal immoveable property. As we shall see with the 
case law in the next section, some may have invoked the absolute warrandice in the 
mistaken belief that it contained a guarantee of quality. 
 
 4. The Longevity of the Absolute Warrandice 
 
Bankton and Montgomerie Bell both indicate that a guarantee of quality was 
contained within the absolute warrandice. In the section after this, we will see that 
the same mistake was made by the buyers in Mackenzie v. The Representative and 
Trustees of Winton and Morison719 and Gordon v. Hughes.720 This conflation has 
been attributed to the fact that the term “warrandice” denoted two entirely separate 
implied guarantees.  
 However, why do all these sources believe that the one warrandice which 
does exist is the absolute warrandice, rather than the warrandice of soundness? The 
answer may lie in the absolute warrandice’s long history in Scots law. One of the 
first records of the absolute warrandice is in Regiam Majestatem's discussion of the 
contract of sale.721 In contrast, the implied warranty of soundness was a much newer 
creation. Arguments relating to it first appear in late seventeenth century case law;722 
and its existence was not judicially affirmed until 1761.723 Thus, the implied 
                                                
718 See discussion at page 137ff and 155ff. 	  
719 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48.	  
720 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428.	  
721 Regiam Majestatem: III.11. 
722 See page 21. 
723 Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 14238. 
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warrandice of title predated the implied warrandice of soundness by several 
centuries. The fact that eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists were much more 
familiar with the absolute warrandice may have led them to believe that this was the 
only warrandice which existed.  
 
 5. The Special Significance of the Absolute Warrandice 
 to Corporeal Immoveable Property 
 
The conflation between the implied warranty of soundness and the implied 
warrandice of title did not prevent buyers from correctly invoking the implied 
warranty of soundness in respect of qualitatively defective corporeal immoveable 
property. However, in the next section, we will see that in Mackenzie v. The 
Representative and Trustees of Winton and Morison and Gordon v. Hughes, this 
conflation may have led the buyers to mistakenly invoke the implied warrandice of 
title in relation to latently defective corporeal immoveable property.   
 The discrepancy may be explained by the dominance and special significance 
of the warrandice of title in the context of corporeal immoveable property. While all 
sellers were bound to a contractual implied warrandice of title,724 case law 
demonstrates that historically, this was especially emphasised and stringently 
enforced when it came to corporeal immoveable property. The special significance 
the warrandice had in regard to sales of corporeal immoveable property is 
highlighted in even early texts. Regiam Majestatem for example, states that “the 
seller and his heirs are bound to warrant the subject of the sale to the buyer and his 
heirs if it is immoveable”.725 Though the text goes on to explain that the same rule 
applies to moveables where necessary, the wording of the passage indicates that this 
guarantee of title was especially significant to contracts of sale for immoveable 
property. 
                                                
724 Note that, in the context of a contract of sale for corporeal moveable property, the more appropriate 
term is "implied warrandice against eviction". This is because under the Scots common law, eviction 
was a prerequisite for the implied guarantee of title in contracts of sale for corporeal moveable 
property to be breached. See Swan v Martin (1865) 3 Macp. 851. 
725 Regiam Majestatem: III.11. 
 
  126 
 The warrandice of title was implied in all contracts of sale, regardless of the 
type of property involved. However, the implications of this rule differed depending 
on whether the property concerned was corporeal moveable or corporeal 
immoveable. As Hume explained: 
 
 This doctrine...[drew] a certain consequence after it in the case of 
[immoveable property], which is owing to this: that no one can 
maintain himself in the right of heritage but by means of a set of valid 
written instruments or title deeds. To discharge this part of the 
obligation, the seller has therefore not only to put the buyer in 
possession of the tenement, but has to deliver him also a written and 
regular conveyance of the tenement, and further, has to furnish him 
with a sufficient progress of titles to the subject - such a progress...as 
shall maintain his right against all pretenders - which if the seller 
cannot do but exhibits a progress that is plainly defective, or at best is 
doubtful, the buyer is not obliged to accept it, and run the hazard of 
eviction, on the faith of the seller's personal obligation of warrandice. 
If he pleases, he may entirely throw up the bargain, and refuse at all to 
take the subject.726 
 
In contrast, the warrandice of title had much simpler implications in contracts of sale 
for corporeal moveables: 
 
 ...in sale of moveables, possession presumes property; and, in the 
rapid intercourse of trade, the buyer cannot be allowed to stop the 
bargain, on pretence of want of title, or on mere doubts as to a 
possible challenge.727 
  
 A study of case law relating to the implied warrandice of title demonstrates a 
pattern of heavy use by buyers of corporeal immoveables, and very little use by 
buyers of corporeal moveables. For example, Morison's Dictionary lists a total of 
ninety-seven cases on the implied warrandice of title. Dating between 1549 and 
1806, the majority of these cases deal with corporeal immoveable property, while 
several deal with incorporeal property. Cases relating to corporeal moveable property 
                                                
726 Hume, Lectures: II.38. 
727 Bell, Principles (2nd ed): §114.  
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are noticeably lacking, with the present author only being able to identify two.728 The 
same pattern is evident in Mungo Brown's discussion of the implied warrandice of 
title in his Treatise.729 Though his approach is unified,730 and the discussion applies 
to sales of all types of property, almost all the case law he cites deals with the 
warrandice's application to corporeal immoveable property. No cases featuring 
corporeal moveable property are cited.  
 It is clear from the case law, that though the warrandice of title applied to all 
sales, it was heavily used by buyers of corporeal immoveables and almost completely 
ignored by buyers of corporeal moveables. This was largely due to the formality of 
transfer and emphasis on title in sales of corporeal immoveable property. The 
obligation to supply the buyer with a sufficient progress of title, coupled with the 
requirement that the transfer be effected through the registration of a written 
conveyance, meant it was easier to prove that the title the buyer had derived was not 
absolutely good. In contrast, under the Scots common law, the transfer of most 
corporeal moveable property was effected without any need for a written 
conveyance: all the seller had to do was give possession of the subject to the buyer. 
As a result, there was typically no progress of titles or written record of who owned 
the property. Since possession presumed ownership, it would have been difficult for 
a third party to prove that they had a superior right to the subject.  
 The lack of written titles or written documents in sales of most corporeal 
moveable property may also have rendered it more difficult to trace the seller and 
bring an action of warrandice against him in some cases. It is much easier for the 
seller of clothes at a fair to disappear with the proceeds of the sale than it would be 
for the seller of an estate to do the same.  
 Apart from this, another reason the warrandice of title was so heavily utilised 
in sales of corporeal immoveable property would have been because of the 
importance placed on ownership of land. Ownership of land and estates was of 
paramount importance because it afforded significant social, political and economic 
                                                
728 Lyon v. Dunlop, 6 July 1620, M. 16572 concerns the sale of a naig (i.e. a horse); Harper v. 
Buchan, 10 June 1629, M. 16576 concerns the sale of a bark. 
729 Brown, Treatise: 240ff. 
730  See page 13. 
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benefits.731 As a result, ensuring that their title was absolutely good would have been 
very important to buyers of corporeal immoveable property. 
 Thus, though all contracts of sale contained an implied warrandice of title, 
buyers of corporeal moveable property did not generally raise actions based upon it, 
in practice. This is in stark contrast to the situation with corporeal immoveable 
property. Here, the case law featuring actions based on the warrandice of title is 
copious. The warrandice of title was specially emphasised and heavily utilised in 
sales of corporeal immoveable property.  
 When seen in this context, it is understandable that the dual use of the term 
warrandice may have led some buyers of latently defective corporal immoveable 
property to incorrectly base their action on the implied warrandice of title. Nor is it 
strange that the same issue did not arise in relation to corporeal moveable property. 
The warranty of soundness was widely used by buyers of corporeal moveable 
property, and the warrandice against eviction was not. In contrast, there is no actual 
case law in which the warranty of soundness is correctly invoked by buyers of 
corporeal immoveable property;732 but the warrandice of title was heavily 
emphasised and widely used. It is no surprise that some buyers of latently defective 
corporeal immoveable property may have brought an action based on the implied 
warrandice of title, in the mistaken belief that it contained a guarantee of quality.  
 
 6. The Absolute Warrandice and Undisclosed Real  
 Conditions 
 
Forbes suggests that undisclosed servitudes fell within the scope of the implied 
warranty of soundness. Gloag argues that the seller’s duty to deliver a subject which 
is totus teres atque rotundus amounts to an implied warranty of quality. More 
conflates aspects of the implied warranty of soundness and the implied warrandice of 
title when discussing undisclosed servitudes.  
                                                
731 See page 170ff.  
732 See discussion from page 134 onwards. 	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 Both Roman and South African law allow undisclosed servitudes to be 
actioned under the aedilitian edict.733 However, Scots law has never treated 
undisclosed real conditions as an issue of quality. There is no case law in which 
buyers brought actions based on the implied warranty of soundness in respect of 
undisclosed real conditions. Nor is there evidence of the Bench suggesting that this 
would be the appropriate course of action in such situations.  
 For much of Scotland's legal history, the position regarding what relief buyers 
had in respect of undisclosed real conditions was murky. The implied warranty of 
soundness was not judicially recognised until 1761. The implied warrandice of title 
was a guarantee that the title the buyer received from the seller was absolutely good. 
This meant that no one would be able to lawfully challenge the buyer’s title, because 
no third party possessed a greater right than the buyer. The most straightforward way 
in which the buyer’s title can be legally challenged is where the property bought had 
not truly belonged to the seller. Very early on however, the warrandice of title also 
recognised situations where the buyer's ownership could be challenged despite the 
seller having had a good title to the subject. This occurs where the property has been 
used as security for a debt and the buyer's title could be lost as a result of the creditor  
selling the property to secure payment of the debt. Two early examples are found in 
Grieve v. Hepburn734 and Dewar v. Aitken.735 Grieve concerned a buyer who was 
pursued with a “poinding of the ground, or a part thereof” in respect of an annual rent 
which burdened his property. The facts of Dewar were similar: the pursuer had 
bought a house which had a heritable bond over it, and was subsequently “called in 
an action of mails and duties”. In both cases, the court found that the sellers were 
liable to the buyers upon the warrandice of title. It is easy to see why: in each of 
these cases, the debt was secured against the property, the result being that if the debt 
was not paid, the creditor had the right to sell the property to secure payment of the 
debt. 
                                                
733 See page 115f.  
734 (1635) M. 16579. 
735 (1780) M.16637. 
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 The 1614 case of Falconer v. The Earl Marshall736 on the other hand, was 
something of an anomaly. In this early example, an undisclosed servitude was found 
to be a breach of the implied warrandice of title. This decision was strange because 
the circumstances of the case did not satisfy the requirements for a breach of the 
implied warrandice of title. The undisclosed servitude posed no threat to the buyer’s 
actual title to the property. However, the law on the matter was still far from settled. 
In a subsequent case, Sandilands v. Earl of Haddington,737 the seller successfully 
argued that the clause of warrandice did not extend to servitudes, as these did not 
result in the buyer being evicted from his title to the property. The Lords agreed and 
found that the buyer did not have recourse to warrandice, though the report cautioned 
that they “did not determine, that no thirlage could infer warrandice at this time, nor 
yet that all servitudes would infer warrandice”. This was followed by Paton v. 
Gordon,738 in which the court held that a “servitude and moss-live...did not import a 
contravention of the warrandice”.  
 Thus, though Roman and South African law have found undisclosed real 
conditions to be a contravention of the aedilitian edict, Scots law moved in a 
different direction from very early on. Though the legal position on the matter was 
not settled until the mid-nineteenth century, early case law demonstrates several 
attempts - one successful - by buyers to argue that undisclosed servitudes and other 
real conditions were title issues. This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers the 
context of this development. At the time these cases were brought to court, the 
implied warranty of soundness was not yet judicially recognised in Scots law. 
Convincing the court that the undisclosed servitude was a breach of the implied 
warrandice of title may have been a buyer's only chance at relief.  
 Despite these early attempts, the law on the matter remained uncertain until 
the mid-nineteenth century. With the exception of Falconer, the court generally 
rejected the argument that undisclosed real conditions were a breach of the 
warrandice of title; but it never went so far as to state that they could not be. These 
                                                
736 21 July 1614, M. 16571. 
737 (1672) M. 16599. 
738 (1682) M. 14170.  
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attempts eventually came to fruition with the decision in Urquhart v. Halden,739 after 
which undisclosed real conditions have been consistently viewed as a breach of the 
warrandice of title.  
 Undisclosed real conditions are a convergence point at which the line 
between the implied warrandice of title and the implied warranty of soundness 
becomes blurred. Including these legal defects within the scope of the implied 
warrandice of title may be explained on the basis that they place restrictions on the 
buyer's ownership - he is no longer able to exercise full use of his property.  
However, this is arguably also the case with a horse which has running thrush: the 
buyer there is also prevented from using his property to the fullest extent. In both 
cases, the buyer’s actual title to the subject remains good. For the absolute 
warrandice to be breached, the buyer must be in danger of losing his title. The 
explanation of “partial eviction” is a legal fiction used to justify the buyer being able 
to sue the seller under the warrandice of title. In reality, the buyer continues to hold 
ownership over the property. However, a building restriction such as the one in 
Loutitt's Trustees or a negative servitude of the type in Urquhart, would certainly 
render the property of less worth than the price paid for it. In some cases, it may also 
render the subject unfit for its avowed purpose. Thus, while the buyer's title remains 
intact, the quality of his purchase decreases as a result of the undisclosed real 
condition. As such, it is easy to see why Gloag argues that the duty to deliver the 
property totus teres atque rotundus amounts to an implied warranty of quality. 
 Yet, while undisclosed real conditions may affect the quality of the thing sold 
rather than the buyer's title to it, it is not difficult to see why Scots law allowed such 
legal defects to be actioned under the implied warrandice of title. There was support 
for this position in the writings of Grotius.740 In addition, the decision to find 
recourse for undisclosed real conditions under the implied warrandice of title dates to 
a time when there were no other options available. The implied warranty of 
soundness’ late development in Scots law may, on this occasion, have been a 
contributing factor in buyers disregarding it as an option. That these buyers 
continued (unsuccessfully until 1835) to seek relief via the implied warrandice of 
                                                
739 (1835) 13 S. 844. 
740 See discussion at page 126. 	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title even after the implied warranty of soundness had been fully recognised by Scots 
law is equally understandable. The implied warranty of soundness was not generally 
used by buyers of corporeal immoveable property. As a result, it may have been a 
relatively obscure remedy to the category of buyers we are looking at. Furthermore, 
because it had developed exclusively in the context of corporeal moveable property, 
there was no judicial precedent for it covering legal defects, even when those defects 
affected the quality of the thing sold. 
 The remedies offered under the implied warrandice of title may also have 
been more attractive to some buyers. The implied warranty of soundness offered only 
one remedy: the actio redhibitoria by which the contract could be terminated.741 The 
implied warrandice of title offered a greater choice of remedies. The main two were 
rescission and (where the breach was curable) specific implement.742 Where mutual 
restitution was no longer possible, the buyer could claim a reduction in the price 
instead.743 It is possible that the extra remedies available under the warrandice of title 
attracted some buyers. Generally, undisclosed real conditions do not render a 
property useless to the buyer, or even unfit for all its ordinary purposes. An 
undisclosed real condition can lower the value of a property without the 
consequences of it being severe enough, or the purchase being rendered useless 
enough, for the buyer to desire a termination of the contract. As a result, buyers may 
have continued to seek relief under the implied warrandice of title because the 
options of specific implement and (in very limited circumstances) retention and 
damages were more appealing.  
 The decision to regard undisclosed real conditions as a breach of the 
warrandice of title, expanded that guarantee’s role in Scots law. It did so at the 
                                                
741 See page 72f. 
742 Hume, Lectures: II.38ff. See also: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: 
Property: §	  711; Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 166.	  
743 Bald v. Scott and The Globe Insurance Company (1847) 10 D 289; See also: Reid et al., “Transfer 
of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  711; Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 166f.  
Though as Reid points out, “since a claim on missives is typically made before payment of the price 
and transfer of the property…this exception only rarely comes into operation”. See: Reid, 
“Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 166. 
Until 1894, these same remedies were also available at the conveyance stage. However, the decision 
in Welsh v. Russell ((1894) 21 R. 769) found that the only remedies competent for breach of the 
implied warrandice of title in the disposition, were specific implement and damages. For further 
information, see: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  712; Reid, 
“Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 167f.	  
 
  133 
expense of the implied warranty of soundness, under which such legal defects may 
otherwise have been actioned, because they arguably affect the quality of the thing 
bought.  
 
 7. Concluding Thoughts 
 
The term “warrandice” was used to describe two separate implied guarantees in a 
contract of sale: the guarantee of quality and the guarantee of title. This dual use is 
likely to have led to some sources incorrectly conflating the two implied guarantees.  
Conflation with the absolute warrandice may have played a role in the warranty of 
soundness’ lack of use by buyers of latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property. Its dominance, early inception and the special emphasis placed on it in the 
context of corporeal immoveable property, may have contributed to a belief in some 
quarters that it was the only warrandice available in a contract of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property. This in turn may have led buyers of latently defective 
corporeal immoveable property to unsuccessfully seek relief under it. It may also 
have prevented some such buyers from seeking relief under the mistaken belief that 
no such relief was available for latently defective corporeal immoveable property.  
 The absolute warrandice also stole some of the remit of the implied warranty 
of soundness. Following a series of (largely unsuccessful) attempts by buyers over 
the centuries, undisclosed real conditions in purchased land have been regarded as a 
breach of the implied warrandice of title since 1835. This peculiarity is most 
probably the result of a combination of factors, such as the warranty of soundness’ 
late development in Scots law, the warrandice of title’s dominance in the context of 
corporeal immoveable property, and the limited number of remedies available for 
breach of the implied warranty of soundness. Whatever the reason, the absolute 
warrandice can be said to have expanded its scope in the context of corporeal 
immoveable property, at the expense of the implied warranty of soundness. 
 
D. Analysis of Case Law 
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 1. Mackenzie v. Representative and Trustees of Winton 
 and Morison744 
 
In 1809, the defenders sold a house they had built to Charles Ross, “in consideration 
of the ground rents and other obligations therein and £2,600”.745 This house, No 31 
Abercrombie Place, was sold by Ross to Mackenzie for £2,600 in 1818. Around 
1835, Mackenzie discovered that the original construction rendered the house 
severely defective and dangerous. He wrote to the defenders, requesting that they pay 
for the repair work and suggesting that they have the house inspected to satisfy 
themselves that the repairs were necessary.746 Receiving no response, he went ahead 
with the repairs himself. He subsequently raised an action requesting that the 
defenders be found liable for £ 292:15:7 1/2, the total expense of the repairs plus 
damages for the inconvenience of being deprived of the use of his house for over 
four months while the repairs were taking place.747 The case never came to judgment. 
The parties came to an agreement on the eve of the trial, by which the defenders 
agreed to pay the pursuer £180, “in the same manner as if a verdict had been given 
for that amount”.748 
 This case concerns the sale of latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property. However, the case is difficult to analyse due to incomplete records. The 
only existing records are the process papers lodged in the National Archives of 
Scotland749 and a page-long report in the Scottish Jurist of the subsequent action 
Mackenzie brought to recover expenses.750 Session papers for the case could not be 
located. The case came before the Outer House in February 1836, before advancing 
to the First Division in March. However, the author has been unable to find any 
record of the Outer House decision. These limitations mean that information on the 
legal process is scant. Judgments at any stage are untraceable, and while the process 
                                                
744 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48.	  
745 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835.	  
746 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835. 	  
747 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835. 	  
748 Mackenzie v. Representative and Trustees of Winton and Morison (1838) 11 The Scottish Jurist 91.	  
749 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48.	  
750 Mackenzie v. Representative and Trustees of Winton and Morison (1838) 11 The Scottish Jurist 91.	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papers contain detailed transcripts of the arguments and evidence presented by the 
parties, they leave gaps in our knowledge.  
 
(a) Mackenzie’s Right to Sue the Defenders 
 
The summons indicates that Mackenzie based his action on the contract of sale:  
 
 ...by contract of sale dated [1809]….the building area therein described  
 together with the house No 31 Abercromby  Place [was sold by Winton,  
 Morison, Nisbet, and Gordon to Charles Ross]....the said Winton, Nisbet,  
 Gordon and Morison by the said contract of sale bound and obliged  
 themselves to  warrant at all hands and against all deadly as at 25 April  
 1807, and [Winton and Morison] bound and obliged themselves and their 
 heirs and successors to warrant the same at all hands quod ultra....Mr.  
 Ross...sold and disponed [the property] and bound himself his heirs and  
 successors to warrant the same at all hands and against all mortals and also 
 made and constituted the Pursuers and his heirs and assignees his (the same 
 Charles Ross’) cessioners and assignees in and to the writs and title deeds of 
 said subjects.751 
 
 However, while Mackenzie’s action appears to be based on the contract of 
sale, it was not brought against Ross, from whom he had bought the property. 
Instead, Mackenzie sued the original sellers. If his action was contractual, then it is 
difficult to determine what standing he had to do so.  
  A contract creates personal rights rather than real rights. As such, it can only 
be enforced against the other party to it. Mackenzie did not have a contract of sale 
with Winton and Morison. He had a contract of sale with Ross. Ross on the other 
hand, did have a contract of sale against the defenders.  
 A similar scenario occurred in Dickson and Company v. Kincaid. Here, 
Dickson bought latently defective seed from Kincaid and sold it on to a third party, 
Cauvin. Cauvin did not raise an action against Kincaid. He raised a successful action 
against Dickson, from whom he had bought the seed. Dickson, in turn, raised a 
successful action against Kincaid, and recovered the damages paid to Cauvin. This is 
                                                
751 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Condescendence for Mackenzie, 6 March 1837 
(emphasis own). See also: Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 May 1837; Summons, 22 
December 1835.	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the correct way to pursue a contractual claim. The last buyer in the chain pursues the 
seller immediate to him, and that seller in turn pursues the author of his own right.  
 Mackenzie’s right to bring an action against the original sellers is questioned 
several times by the defenders. In the Outer House, Winton’s Representative and 
Trustees argue: 
 
 The action seems to be laid entirely on the clause of warrandice contained in 
 the contract of sale. But supposing that clause of warrandice to cover the  
 ground of action, which it does not…the pursuer could have no claim  
 against the defenders, but ought to have directed his summons against Mr. 
 Ross, who disponed the subjects to the pursuer, and alone became bound in 
 warrandice to him.752 
 
The same point is emphasised in their pleas in law;753 and in the pleas in law for 
Morison’s Trustees in the Inner House.754  
 These arguments may have been compelling. The process papers contain a 
supplementary summons claiming expenses and damages from Ross’ son.755 This is 
dated November 1836, a year after the original summons was issued to the defenders. 
Robert Ross responded by issuing a minute, “declaring that he did not represent his 
father...and had accordingly lodged a renunciation to be heir to him”.756  
 Thus, Mackenzie’s action continued to be against Winton and Morison alone; 
and in his Revised Condescendence, he responded to their arguments above by 
claiming: 
 
 As the house in dispute was delivered by the builders to the purchaser in an 
 insufficient and dangerous state the defenders are liable for any loss and  
 damage which may have been sustained in consequence thereof. And the  
 pursuer is equally entitled to recover damages as the original purchaser.757 
 
                                                
752 Ibid, Defences for Winton, Outer House, 10 February 1836.	  
753 Ibid, Pleas in Law for Winton, 10 February 1836.	  
754 Ibid, Pleas in Law for Morison, First Division, 2 March 1836.	  
755 The papers indicate that he was being held liable for the same amount as the defenders. 	  
756 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Supplementary Summons, Mackenzie v. Ross, 
30 November 1836. 	  
757 Ibid, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 May 1837.	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What gives him this equal entitlement is not explained. It is unlikely the action was 
delictual because the pleadings (discussed below) detail a case based on warrandice 
and sale, rather than negligent building. The pleadings suggest the action had a 
contractual basis. However, the lack of a contract between Mackenzie and the 
defenders makes it difficult to see how such an action would be feasible. Mackenzie 
is unlikely to be relying on an assignation of writs758 because 1) this is contained in 
the conveyance rather than the contract and thus cannot assign the contractual rights 
on which Mackenzie is relying; and 2) it pertains to the warrandice of title rather than 
the warranty of soundness.759  
 Another explanation is that Ross may have assigned his contractual right of 
action against the defenders to Mackenzie. The question put before Lord Cockburn, 
in which Mackenzie is described as standing in Ross’ right,760 may be an indication 
of this. However, if that is so, Mackenzie’s argument that he is “equally entitled” to 
recover damages is puzzling. If the right to recover damages had already been 
assigned to Mackenzie, then Ross’ right would have been transferred to him. 
Mackenzie would not be “equally entitled”: he would be the only one entitled. 
Furthermore, if the right of action had already been assigned to him, it is difficult to 
explain why he issued a summons to Ross’ son midway through his action against 
the defenders. 
 
(b) The Basis of the Action: Warrandice 
 
The process papers describe the question which came before Lord Cockburn in the 
First Division of the Court of Session: 
 
 Whether in [consequence761] of the warrandice in the said contract of sale the 
 defenders wrongfully failed to deliver the said house in the state and  
 condition required by the warrandice to the injury and damage of the said 
 Charles Ross and the pursuer as standing in his right?762 
                                                
758 Which would allow him to sue the sellers from whom Ross had bought the property. 	  
759 See: Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.3.46.	  
760 See quote immediately below. 	  
761 The word here is indecipherable. A rough approximation based on context is provided.	  
762 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48.	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From this, it appears that the action was based on warrandice. However, there is 
some confusion as to the exact nature and relevance of the warrandice Mackenzie 
was invoking.  
 The defenders appear to believe that the warrandice invoked is the guarantee 
of title. An excerpt from the defences for Winton’s Trustees and Representative 
argues that, “[t]he clause of warrandice in the contract of sale of 1809 plainly 
applies, like all similar clauses of warrandice, to the feudal title and right of property 
of the subjects disponed”.763 They argue: 
 
 It is specially denied that the clause of warrandice in the foresaid contract of 
 sale applies to the sufficiency of the house erected on the said area, or that 
 there was any warrandice, either express or implied, given, or meant to be 
 given, as to the particular manner in which the house was finished or as to its 
 strength or durability, as compared with other houses.764 
 
 Their claim that Mackenzie is relying on the warrandice of title is given 
credibility by his summons, which states that Winton, Morison and Ross “bound 
[themselves, their] heirs and successors to warrant the same at all hands and against 
all mortals”.765 The phrase “against all mortals” or “against all deadly” is a 
translation of the Latin phrase “contra omnes mortales”, which was used in the 
warrandice of title clause in older deeds”766. The claim is also given credibility by 
Mackenzie’s argument that the defenders knew their building work was defective 
because the disposition for another house they built contained the following 
exception to the clause of warrandice: 
 
  ...and we bind and oblige the heirs and representatives of the said deceased 
 George Winton to warrant the same at all hands and against all deadly, 
 declaring always that the said purchasers accept of the house as in the state 
 and condition in which it was at the time it was sold to them without any after 
                                                
763 Ibid, Defences for Winton, Outer House, 10 February 1836. 	  
764 Ibid, Defences for Winton, Outer House, 10 February 1836.	  
765 Ibid, Summons, 22 December 1835. The quote is taken from the description of the warrandice 
given by Ross. The description of the warrandice given by Winton and Morrison contains slightly 
different wording. 	  
766 Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 154. 	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 claim of any sort on us or the representatives of the said George Winton upon 
 the ground of insufficiency in the building timbers therein or otherwise.767 
 
 On the other hand, Mackenzie specifically mentions latent qualitative defects 
in conjunction with the warrandice he is invoking. His Summons, Condescendence 
and Revised Condescendence, state that: 
 
 ...the actual state and condition of the house was not known to the pursuer at 
 the time he purchased it, but…he made the purchase under the full  
 conviction and belief that it had been completed in a proper and workmanlike 
 manner and relying on the warrandice of the builders.768 
 
If Mackenzie’s complaint was that the house was latently defective, why did he base 
his action on the implied warrandice of title? It is submitted that the answer lies in 
the fact that there were two separate guarantees, both of which could be referred to as 
“warrandice”. This may have led Mackenzie to mistakenly believe that there was 
only one warrandice - the more familiar absolute warrandice - that contained both a 
guarantee of title and a guarantee of soundness. As a result, he incorrectly based his 
action on the implied warrandice of title.  
 
(c) Mackenzie’s Action and the Implied Warranty of 
Soundness 
 
The wording in the process papers for this case is reminiscent of an action under the 
implied warranty of soundness. In the summons, Mackenzie alleges that: 
 
 ...the said Charles Ross, and thereafter, the pursuer, purchased the said house, 
 and took possession of the same, in the full confidence that it had been  
 erected and delivered over to them as a substantial workmanlike and  
 sufficient building, in all parts. That it now appears  that the said house, in its 
 original construction was insufficient and that it had been put together in an 
 imperfect and unworkmanlike manner; that the floors were of a dangerous 
 construction and that the beams and joists were defective and quite  
                                                
767 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 
May 1837; Condescendence for Mackenzie, 6 March 1837.	  
768 Ibid, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 May 1837; Condescendence for Mackenzie, 6 
March 1837 (emphasis own). See also: Summons, 22 December 1835.	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 inadequate to support the floors; that the roof timbers were defective and  
 weak and that the house also, in other respects, was made over to the said 
 Charles Ross and thereafter to the Pursuer in a dangerous and unsafe state.769 
 
The wording used indicates a claim made under the implied warranty of soundness. 
The house is described as being severely defective in several important respects and 
thus rendered “dangerous and unsafe”. The defective quality would have breached 
the implied warranty of soundness in two ways. A house which is described as 
“dangerous and unsafe” will not be fit for its ordinary uses. However, the process 
papers do not indicate that the pursuer complained that the house was unfit for its 
ordinary uses.  
 Arguably, such a house may also be of a quality incommensurate with the 
price paid. The pursuer’s summons and arguments do not mention this; however, the 
defenders’ pleas do:  
 
 Some houses...are erected in a less, and some in a more, elegant and  
 substantial manner, and the prices at which they are sold are   
 proportioned accordingly. The price paid for the house in question was  
 considered to be its value, just as it stood....If the sums which the pursuer  
 alleges would have been necessary to have completed the house to his  
 satisfaction had been originally laid out on it, the price, it is evident, would 
 just have been so much the more, and there would be no equity in giving the 
 pursuer a better article than that which he and his author purchased.770 
 
Similarly, the Defender’s Statement of Facts states: 
 
 It is true that the house was not originally finished in the style and manner 
 recommended by [the builder and architect consulted by Mackenzie], but it 
 was not sold as a house of a first rate description. The price paid for it was not 
 such as to have afforded a remunerating profit to the builders or mere  
 reimbursement of the actual cost, supposing it to have been finished in the 
 way recommended. But, at the time at which it was sold, it was in all respects 
 a perfectly sufficient and marketable article with reference to the price which 
 was given for it, compared with the price of other houses, as well as the same 
 as of a superior class.771 
 
                                                
769 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835 (emphasis own). See also: Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 
26 May 1837; Condescendence for Mackenzie, 6 March 1837.	  
770 Ibid, Defences in the Outer House, 10 Feb 1836. 	  
771 Ibid, Defender’s Statement of Facts, 1837.	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Thus, one of the arguments made by the defence is that the quality of the house 
delivered was commensurate with the price paid for it. This choice of defence makes 
sense if the action was based on the implied warranty of soundness, because the 
warranty was breached where the quality of the thing was not commensurate with the 
price paid.772  
 Due to incomplete records, the exact basis of the action cannot be ascertained. 
Based on the information given, the defects sound severe enough to breach the 
implied warranty of soundness. The supporting pleas and arguments for both parties 
are also reminiscent of a claim based on the implied warranty of soundness. For 
example, the pursuer highlights that the insufficiencies had existed at the time the 
house was sold to Ross:  
 
 ...the defects arose entirely from the unsubstantial and imperfect manner in 
 which the house had been originally built by the said George Winton and  
 Thomas Morrison and…it did not arise from the lapse of time or from any 
 cause subsequent to the date of the sale to [Ross].773 
 
In setting out the case, Mackenzie provides reports by an architect and builder, both 
of whom had inspected the house and concluded that, “the house, in its original 
construction, was finished in a manner wholly insufficient and unsubstantial, and put 
together in the most imperfect and unworkmanlike manner”.774  
 The defenders counter argued that: “the purchaser was bound to have satisfied 
himself of the sufficiency of the house, prior to accepting a disposition, and paying 
the price”;775 and that, at the time of the sale, “[Ross] had ample opportunity to 
satisfy himself as to the house’s sufficiency and suitableness for his purpose....[and 
he] deliberately accepted [it] as in all respects answering the conditions of the 
bargain”.776 They argued that both Ross and the pursuer “chose to stand by their 
bargain” and “exercised all manner of acts of proprietorship” over the house, 
                                                
772 E.g. Hill v. Pringle (1827) 6 S. 229. See discussion at page 37ff. 	  
773 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 
May 1837; Condescendence for Mackenzie, 6 March 1837. See also: Summons, 22 Dec 1835.	  
774 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835. 	  
775 Ibid, Defenders’	  Pleas in law, Outer House, 10 Feb 1836.	  
776 Ibid, Defences, First Division, 2 March 1836. See also: Defenders’	  Pleas in law, Outer House, 10 
Feb 1836.	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“changing and altering it in various material respects from its original state”.777 “At 
any rate”, they countered, “the present claim is excluded by the period of 26 years 
since the original sale, during which the house has served all the purposes for which 
it was intended, without any complaint as to its sufficiency”.778  
 In response, the pursuer argued that: “the actual state and condition of the 
house was not known to [him] at the time [of purchase], as he wholly relied on the 
warrandice of the builders...and it was not till last summer that he was strongly led to 
suspect that the house was insufficient”; and that on these suspicions being 
confirmed, he had made an immediate complaint to the defenders.779 “It is no 
objection to the...claim,” he argues, “that the house was possessed for a considerable 
time without complaint”, since the insufficiency was latent and he had made his 
complaint as soon as it was discovered.780  
 These arguments are suggestive of a claim made under the implied warranty 
of soundness. Mackenzie argued that: 1) the defect existed at the time of the sale; 2) 
the defect was latent; and 3) he had intimated his objection timeously once the defect 
was discovered. The defenders argued that: 1) the original buyer had had the 
opportunity to thoroughly examine the house before buying and had made his 
purchase after having satisfied himself as to its sufficiency; and 2) a tenure of 
twenty-six years meant that both the original and subsequent buyers had implicitly 
accepted the thing as it was. As demonstrated in chapter three, such arguments are 
commonly invoked by parties to an action under the implied warranty of soundness.  
 Equally however, several of the choices Mackenzie made in this case fall 
outwith the remit of an action based on the implied warranty of soundness. These are 
the remedy requested, the references to the implied warrandice of title781 and the 
people against whom he chose to raise his action.782 
 
(d) Mackenzie’s Remedy 
                                                
777 Ibid, Revised Answers and Pleas for the Defenders, 14 June 1837.	  
778 Ibid, Revised Answers and Pleas for the Defenders, 14 June 1837.	  
779 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835.	  
780 Ibid, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, 26 May 1837.	  
781 Discussed at page 137ff. 	  
782 Discussed at page 135ff. 	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The remedy requested by Mackenzie was reimbursement of the expenses of repairing 
the defects, and damages for being deprived of his home for the four months during 
which repairs were being made.783 This remedy is not within the remit of the implied 
warranty of soundness. A buyer claiming under the warranty had only one remedy 
open to him: the actio redhibitoria.784 He could return the thing to the seller, and 
receive back the price paid, plus damages for any loss suffered in using the defective 
thing.785  
 The defenders’ criticism of the remedy requested may indicate that 
Mackenzie’s action was based on the implied warranty of soundness. Winton’s 
representative and trustees argued that: 
 
 The only competent remedy, supposing the house to have been insufficient, 
 would have been a restitutio in integrum; but as that cannot now be given, 




 ...no offer or demand was made [by Ross], or the Pursuer, that the   
 Contract of Sale and Disposition of the house should be rescinded, or set  
 aside, on any ground whatever, or that there should be a restitutio in  
 integrum by repayment of the price and interest on the one hand, and  
 redelivery of the house on the other.787 
 
 These passages argue that there is only one remedy available for a complaint 
of the sort made by Mackenzie: restitution of the subject to the seller in exchange for 
repetition of the price. The pursuer responded by arguing that he did not seek 
rescission and restitutio in integrum because, “no tender was ever made by the 
Defenders [sic] to pay back the price on obtaining redelivery of the house”.788 The 
                                                
783 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Summons, 22 Dec 1835.	  
784 See page 72f.	  
785 See page 72ff. 	  
786 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Defences for Winton, Outer House, 10 February 
1836.	  
787 Ibid, Revised Answers for Winton, 14 June 1837. A similar argument is also found in the Defences 
for Morison, First Division, 2 March 1836. 	  
788 Ibid, Revised Condescendence for Mackenzie, Answers to the Statement of Facts for Winton’s 
Trustees, 26 May 1837. 	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remedy described as being appropriate is similar to the actio redhibitoria. As this 
remedy was the only one available for breach of the implied warranty of soundness, 
it is submitted that the passages above may suggest that Mackenzie was arguing that 
the implied warranty of soundness had been breached.  
 The remedy Mackenzie asked for was not within the remit of the implied 
warranty; but it is not difficult to see why he would have preferred it to the actio 
redhibitoria. The case demonstrates the shortfalls of this single remedy system.  
At the time Mackenzie uncovered the complaint, he had owned the house for 
seventeen years. By this point, giving up his ownership of the house may have been 
inconvenient. Whatever his reasons, Mackenzie appears to have been unwilling to 
part with the house. Though he states that he did not seek rescission and repetition 
because this was not offered by the defenders, the argument is inconsistent with the 
facts at hand. In cases of insufficiency, it is up to the buyer to convey his rejection 
and demand the actio redhibitoria. The details given do not suggest that Mackenzie 
ever asked for this remedy. Instead, upon discovering the defects, he wrote to the 
defenders asking that they pay for the repairs. Once he had made the repairs and 
brought the action against the defenders, the actio redhibitoria would have been 
inadequate. A man who has gone to the expense of repairing defects does not do so 
because he wants to return the property to the sellers.  
 The remedy requested may have been outwith the remit of the implied 
warranty of soundness; however, this incident is not unique. There are several cases 
pertaining to the warranty’s application to corporeal moveables, in which the buyer 
requested or was granted a remedy other than the actio redhibitoria.789 In Adamson 
v. Smith, the buyer initially “brought an action of damages”.790 In Dickson and 
Company v. Kincaid,791 the buyer was granted reimbursement of the damages he had 
been ordered to pay the party he subsequently sold the seed to. In Stevenson v. 
Dalrymple792 the Lord Ordinary initially ordered that the buyer pay a reduced price 
in respect of the portion of defective kelp he had already used. 
                                                
789 See the discussion at page 93ff.	  
790 14 May 1799, M. 14244.	  
791 (1808) F.C. 57.	  
792 28 June 1808, F.C. M.App. 1, Sale No. 5.	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 The requesting or granting of remedies other than the actio redhibitoria are 
breaks from the norm which may be symptomatic of a doctrine which is still being 
developed. Such a development would not have been unique to the Scots law 
warranty. In France, the judiciary successfully developed a third remedy, the 
astreinte, to supplement the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris granted 
by the Code Napoléon.793 It is submitted that, though Mackenzie asks for a remedy 
which is not the actio redhibitoria, this fact alone does not indicate that his action 
was not based on the implied warranty of soundness. His request is not unique: it is 




The circumstances in Mackenzie suit an action based on breach of the implied 
warranty of soundness. The defect complained of was within the warranty’s scope, 
and many of the arguments and pleas on both sides were ones commonly used by 
parties to an action under the warranty. While the requested remedy is not the actio 
redhibitoria, this is not unique to Mackenzie. However, Mackenzie did not base his 
case on the contractual implied warranty of soundness; nor did he raise his action 
against the party who sold him the house.  
 His action is based on the contract of sale, but not brought against the seller. 
Instead it is brought against parties who have no contractual relationship with 
Mackenzie. The complaint made is that the house purchased contains latent 
qualitative defects. Yet the action is inappropriately based on the implied warrandice 
of title. This second error may be explained by the fact that the dual use of the term 
warrandice and the special significance of the absolute warrandice in the context of 
corporeal immoveable property, could have led the buyer to conflate the implied 
warrandice of title and the implied warranty of soundness.  
 Mackenzie v. Representative and Trustees of Winton and Morison is a bizarre 
case. It was based on the wrong action and brought against the wrong party. As such, 
                                                
793 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 537. Cites: Cass.-civ., 11 avril 1933. S. 1933.1.263.	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it is difficult to understand how the case made it to the Inner House of the Court of 
Session.  
 
 2. Rutherford v. Edinburgh Co-operative Building Co.  
 (Limited)794 
 
In 1871, Rutherford, a spirit dealer, sought to purchase a house which was being built 
from a building association. The contract of sale was completed in March, followed 
by a disposition granted in May and executed in June.795 Rutherford obtained 
possession shortly after the house was completed in April 1871, and “found that the 
cellar was not at all properly drained [and that] on the contrary, water to the depth of 
about three feet accumulated therein”.796  
 In January 1873797 - almost two years later - Rutherford raised an action to 
have the contract reduced.798 He claimed that he had bought the property to use as a 
spirit shop, that the defenders had been aware of this intention and had known of the 
defect beforehand. Furthermore, he argued that the sellers had known that a usable 
cellar was essential to the running of such a business on the premises.799 He made 
two pleas. First, that he had entered the contract under essential error “in regard to a 
material particular affecting the value of the subjects sold”;800 and second, that he 
had been “under essential error as to the subject sold, induced through 
misrepresentation or fraudulent misrepresentation or undue concealment on the part 
of the defenders”.801 The remedy sought was reduction of the disposition802 with 
repetition of the price paid (£520), plus an additional £150 for damages suffered.803 
The Lord Ordinary’s interlocutor was in agreement with the defender’s plea that the 
                                                
794 (1873) 11 S.L.R. 28.	  
795 Ibid at 28f. 	  
796 Ibid at 28.	  
797 Ibid at 29.	  
798 Ibid at 28.	  
799 Ibid at 28.	  
800 Ibid at 28.	  
801 Ibid at 28f. 	  
802	  The disposition is described as "embodying" the contract - this may explain why the case is 
referred to as an action to have the contract reduced. See footnote 798 above.	  
803 Ibid at 28.	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pursuer’s statements were neither relevant nor sufficient “to support the conclusions 
of the summons”.804 
 The Lords dismissed the action as being irrelevant.805 The Lord Justice-Clerk 
indicated that: “[t]here was no error in essentials here at all”.806 Lord Benholme 
opined that a plea of essential error would only be competent if the pursuer proved 
that the subject was unsuitable for the express purpose for which it had been 
bought.807 The plea of misrepresentation found even less favour, with the Lord 
Ordinary stating that it was difficult to believe that the defenders knew of the defect 
when the buyer took possession of the premises fairly shortly after it had been 
erected, paid the bulk of the price a month or two later upon execution of the 
disposition and had remained in possession without complaint for almost two 
years.808 Both the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lord Cowan stated that they could not find 
any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the defenders.809 
 It is unclear why the pursuer chose to found his claim on irrelevant pleas. The 
circumstances in this case provided an opportunity to invoke the implied warranty of 
soundness. The defect was alleged to be latent and fell into one of the categories 
covered by the warranty: that of rendering the purchase unfit for its avowed purpose. 
The remedy requested by the buyer - rescission of the contract, repetition of the price 
with interest and damages for loss suffered as a result of the defect - resembles the 
Scots law actio redhibitoria. However, despite circumstances which were suited to 
such a claim, the warranty is not mentioned. The judgments of Lord Cowan810 and 
the Lord Justice Clerk811 suggest that the seller may have been found liable for the 
expenses incurred in “putting this part of the house into a state fit for occupation”812 
had the buyer based his claim on a different action. However, they cannot be alluding 
to the implied warranty of soundness, because it did not normally allow a remedy of 
pure damages.  
                                                
804 Ibid at 29.	  
805 Ibid at 29 (Lord Ordinary; Lord Justice Clerk), 30 (Lord Cowan; Lord Benholme).	  
806 Ibid at 29.	  
807 Ibid at 30.	  
808 Ibid at 29.	  
809 Ibid at 30.	  
810 Ibid at 30.	  
811 Ibid at 29f.	  
812 Ibid at 29 (Lord Justice Clerk).	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 A possible reason for the warranty’s absence in the pleas and judgements may 
be the significant gap of time between the buyer discovering the defect and raising an 
action. In order to make a claim under the implied warranty of soundness, the buyer 
had to reject the thing as soon as possible, or within a reasonable time of the defect 
being discovered.813 Rutherford paid the bulk of the price after he had moved in and 
become aware of the defect.814 His failure to reject the subject within a reasonable 
period of time may have precluded him from using the warranty. However, the case 
law demonstrates that what amounted to a “reasonable time” was determined on a 
case by case basis.815 A pursuer such a Rutherford, who appears to be desperate for a 
ground to base his claim on, should have been eager to risk a claim under the much 
more relevant and suitable implied warranty of soundness.  
 The fact that Rutherford had been given “every opportunity of informing 
himself as to the nature and worth, advantages and disadvantages, of the subjects in 
question before he purchased them”816 may also have been damning to the 
warranty’s competence. However, while such circumstances may have dissuaded the 
judges from mentioning the warranty as a possible alternative ground of action, it is 
unlikely to have had the same effect on the desperate Rutherford.   
 The fact that the common law implied warranty of soundness had been 
largely replaced by section five of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 
1856 in relation to corporeal moveable property817 may also have played a factor.  
A plea entered by the defenders, to the effect that they were “entitled to absolvitor in 
respect of the provisions of section 5 of the Act 19 and 20 Vict. cap. 60 [i.e. the 1856 
Act]” suggests that there may have been a mistaken belief that the Act applied to 
sales of corporeal immoveable property. This may, in turn, indicate that there was no 
established tradition of using the common law implied warranty of soundness in the 
context of corporeal immoveable property.  
                                                
813 See page 61ff. 	  
814 (1873) 11 S.L.R. 28 at 29 (Lord Ordinary).	  
815 See page 61ff. 	  
816 (1873) 11 S.L.R. 28 at 29 (Lord Ordinary).	  
817 See page 18. 	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 Alternatively, the warranty may not have been mentioned in the pleas and 
judgements because it did not apply to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable 
property. A passage from Lord Cowan’s judgement states that:  
 
 The only defect in the contract alleged as a ground of action is one as to  
 which the purchaser was bound before entering into the contract to satisfy 
 himself. He should have ascertained particularly the state of the cellar before 
 he bought the house, and we can only presume that in such a matter he took 
 due precautions.818  
 
This statement suggests that Lord Cowan may believe that contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable property do not contain an implied warranty of soundness. 
Unfortunately, the judgement does not detail why he holds this view. Nor does the 
case report indicate whether or not the other members of the Bench held the same 
view.  
 
 3. M’Killop v. Mutual Securities Ltd819 
 
In 1935, M’Killop sought to purchase a shop (which was then under construction) 
from the defenders. Occupancy and a disposition were obtained in 1936; but in 1942, 
a latent structural defect rendered the premises dangerous and necessitated partial 
reconstruction.820 M’Killop sued the defenders for damages for breach of contract, 
averring that, “under [the contract of sale, she] was...entitled to premises in good and 
merchantable order and condition, free from latent defects of a material kind”.821  
 However, the pursuer’s argument was not that a contractual implied warranty 
of soundness had been breached. Instead, it was that: 
 
The contract on which the pursuer relied was a contract for (a) the 
building and (b) the sale of the shop. The defenders, on the averments, 
were in breach of their obligation to do the building properly and with 
                                                
818 (1873) 11 S.L.R. 28  at 30.	  
819 M’Killop v. Mutual Securities Ltd. 1945 S.C. 166.	  
820 Ibid at 167.	  
821 Ibid at 167 (emphasis own).	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proper materials. Such an obligation was an implied condition of the 
contract.822 
 
The court held that the missives of sale had contained an implied collateral 
agreement of construction which had been breached. This was despite the fact that 
the defenders had not themselves built the shop, having instead contracted the task 
out. Lord Moncrieff justified the judgement on the basis that it would have been 
untenable for M’Killop to make her claim against the builder, because she “[had] no 
relation by contract or otherwise with [the builder], and...her claim is a claim 
founded upon contract against the only party who was in contractual relation with 
her”.823 
 This case is interesting in that its circumstances should have fallen within the 
scope of the implied warranty of soundness. M’Killop had contracted to buy a shop 
which, seven years later, was found to possess a material latent defect. The defect 
related to the north pediment of the property, and was so dangerous that it required 
demolition and reconstruction. The circumstances seem ideal for a claim based on 
breach of the implied warranty of soundness. Instead, M’Killop’s lawyers contested 
that the missives of sale had contained an implied, collateral contract of construction 
which had been breached. This indicates one of two things: either they did not think 
there was an implied warranty of soundness in this sale transaction; or they could not 
or did not want to invoke the implied warranty.  
 The pursuer might have been unable to invoke the implied warranty of 
soundness because the missives had been superseded by the disposition, rendering 
any implied warranty contained within the contract of sale useless. Such a motive is 
hinted at in Lord Moncrieff’s judgement: 
 
The question at issue...rais[ed] these alternatives, either that the 
contract was purely one of sale and that, when the pursuer took a 
conveyance following upon the contract, it was without warranty as to 
the quality of her purchase, or,...that the defenders in terms of their 
contract not only agreed to sell the shop when completed but 
undertook also to build it for her.824 
                                                
822 Ibid at 169.	  
823 Ibid at 174.	  
824 Ibid at 170.	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This passage suggests that an implied warranty of quality attended the contractual 
stage, but not the disposition stage of the transaction. If this is so, then the motivation 
for founding the claim on an implied contract of construction would have been that 
“any collateral obligation [related to the proper construction of the shop] would not 
be discharged by the taking of a formal disposition and subsequent possession of the 
subject”.825 
 An equally viable motivation for relying on a contract for construction may 
have been the remedy desired: £250 in respect of the loss and damage which arose 
out of having to partially reconstruct the premises. The only remedy available under 
the implied warranty of soundness would have been the actio redhibitoria, under 
which the pursuer would have had to return ownership of the shop to the defenders in 
order to recover the purchase price and any direct loss she had suffered. The Scots 
law implied warranty of soundness would have afforded M’Killop no remedy 
whereby she could have continued to retain ownership of the shop while recovering 
the loss and damage she had suffered. Since she had already paid for the partial 
reconstruction of the property, it is likely that she wanted to keep the shop and 
continue trading from it. 
 
 4. Holms v. Ashford Estates Ltd826 
 
In 1999, the pursuers bought a flat and parking space from the defenders. The 
parking space, space no 42, was priced at £15,000. The plans seen by the defenders 
showed only three parking spaces (space numbers 40-42), which were all adjacent to 
each other. The plan did not show any restriction to access in front of no 42. The 
disposition contained a clause of warrandice of title and a servitude right of access 
from the road and in the common car parking area.  
 When the defenders took possession, they discovered that there was another 
parking space in front of no 42. This space (no 43), was owned by a third party (M) 
and restricted access to space no 42. When a car was parked in no 43, the pursuers 
                                                
825 Ibid.	  
826 2006 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 70; 2006 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 161; 2009 S.L.T. 389.	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could not get their car in or out of no 42. The pursuers had not known of the 
existence of no 43 prior to taking possession: it was not shown in the plans; and 
when they had visited the site, no 43 was obscured by building materials, debris and 
a portacabin. Having unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the matter privately over a 
number of years, the pursuers brought an action for breach of the warrandice in the 
disposition against the sellers.  
 They argued that they had effectively been evicted from their parking space 
since they could not access it if space no 43 was in use. They further claimed that 
their servitude right of access was void as it was incompatible with M’s right of 
ownership in space no 43, since it would deprive her of any practical use of her 
parking space.  
 On appeal, the Inner House of the Court of Session disagreed in an opinion 
delivered by Lord Eassie. It found that the servitude right of access was not 
incompatible with ownership, on the ground that: “no warranty of fitness for purpose 
is generally implied in the sale of heritage, the rule being that of caveat emptor”.827 
The servitude right of access was valid because while it prevented M from parking a 
car in the parking space, it did not prevent her from using the space for other 
purposes, such as “setting out…potted plants and a seat whereby to enjoy the fresh 
air and sunshine”.828  
 There are several criticisms to be made of the Court’s finding that an implied 
warranty of fitness for purpose did not exist in sales of immoveable property. Firstly, 
it is unclear whether the court is referring to the contract of sale or the subsequent 
disposition. The pursuer’s action was based on the warrandice in the disposition; but 
the Court here is referring to M’s purchase. Secondly, the Court does not analyse the 
issue before coming to the conclusion that an implied warranty of fitness does not 
exist in such sales. This is not surprising: the presence of an implied warranty of 
fitness for purpose was not a central issue in this case. However, the problem with 
the Court’s approach is that the question of whether an implied warranty of 
soundness existed in relation to contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property 
is not settled. If the Court was referring to the warranty in the context of the contract 
                                                
827 2009 S.L.T. 389 at 400 (Lord Eassie). 
828 Ibid at 401 (Lord Eassie). 
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of sale, then it was necessary to analyse the issue before coming to a conclusion. The 
court also fails to cite any authority in support of its statement.  
 The circumstances in Holms highlights the utility of the implied warranty of 
soundness in contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property. In the case, one of 
the subjects of the sale, the parking space, was unfit for its ordinary and avowed 
purpose: that of parking a car. Its unfitness did not relate to any absence of title, but 
to a physical inability to get a car in or out of the space when parking space no 43 
was occupied. The defect was a defect in quality, rather than in title. It was also a 
latent defect in that it was not, and could not reasonably have been, known to the 
seller at the time of purchase.  
 Yet the buyers did not base their action on the implied warranty of soundness. 
It is not difficult to see why. The uncertainty on whether the warranty extends to 
corporeal immoveables has led to a general assumption that it does not. Furthermore, 
the warranty is implied into the missives of sale. The property and parking space had 
been purchased in 1999, and the case first brought to the sheriff court in 2006. Since 
it is standard practice to stipulate that the missives cease to have effect after a certain 
period of time,829 it is possible that the buyers could no longer rely on any implied or 
express provisions in the contract.  
 
 5. Gordon v. Hughes and Others830 
 
In the early nineteenth century, Gordon entered into a contract of sale for an estate 
owned by Hughes. A key motivation behind this purchase was that the owner of the 
estate was entitled to an electoral vote - a privilege which Hughes and his 
predecessors had enjoyed.831 This was expressly stipulated in the offer: “It being 
understood that [Gordon] is also to have the superiority of as much of the estate as 
will make up a freehold qualification in the county of Ayr”.832  
 However, after the conveyance had been completed, it was found that the 
estate did not come with a right to vote. Gordon informed Hughes of this, requesting 
                                                
829 See page 164f. 	  
830 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428. 
831 Ibid at 435. 
832 Ibid at 428.	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that the latter maintain him in the peaceable possession of the “freehold 
qualification”.833 Hughes did not respond, and Gordon’s name was removed from the 
roll.  
 Gordon raised an action against the defenders, requesting that they maintain 
him and his heirs and successors “in the peaceable possession of the said freehold 
qualification, and the right of standing upon the roll, and voting in the election of 
Members of Parliament”, and pay all costs, damages and expenses associated with 
the complaint.834 Failing that, Gordon requested the return of L. 1000 Sterling, “as 
the price and value of the said freehold qualification, with the legal interest thereof 
from the date of eviction”.835 
 Gordon based his challenge on the warrandice of title in the conveyance. In 
other words, he was arguing that the loss of the right to a freehold qualification 
amounted to an eviction of part of the subject. This argument was problematic, 
because Gordon’s ownership and possession of the estate remained intact: what he 
had lost was the incidental right to vote which he had believed came with that 
ownership. 
 In their judgements, Lords Robertson, Glenlee and Bannatyne836 indicated 
that the decision to invoke the warrandice of title was inappropriate, because “the 
subject ha[d] not been evicted”.837 Lord Robertson articulated his concerns at length: 
“what has been evicted, or has anything been evicted? Does he not possess the whole 
of the subject that was conveyed to him? I apprehend that he does”.838 No part of the 
solum had, he argued, been evicted by someone with a preferable right to it: “[t]he 
subject sold was the dominium directum, and the dominium utile of this estate, and 
the purchaser is in possession of both at this moment”.839 Indeed, the decision to 
award the pursuer the requested diminution in price was quashed at appeal because 
“an action upon the warrandice [of title]” cannot be brought “unless the pursuer 
                                                
833 Ibid at 431. “Freehold qualification” was the term used in the case.  
834 Ibid at 431.	  
835 Ibid at 431.	  
836 Ibid at 432-434, 436, 439. 
837 Ibid at 434 (Lord Bannatyne). 
838 Ibid at 432. See also: 433 (Lord Robertson). 
839 Ibid at 439 (Lord Robertson). 
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proves that he is evicted of something express, or necessarily implied, in the 
warrandice”.840 
  
(a) Relationship to the Implied Warranty of Soundness 
 
The case report makes a brief allusion to the implied warranty of soundness. In 
response to the defenders’ protests that the actio quanti minoris was not recognized 
in Scots law, the pursuer argued that the rejected remedy was the one associated with 
laesio enorm and not the one used “when the subject, or a material part of it, is 
wanting altogether”:841 
 
 And accordingly, our law books expressly sanction the claim for reparation, 
 on account of  latent insufficiency or defect....In these circumstances, the  
 pursuer is entitled to reparation for the total loss of an entire part of his  
 subject, for it is vain to say, that it is at all like a loss by earthquake, or other 
 casus fortuitus: It was an inherent defect from the beginning, though not then 
 known to exist. But, to put an end to all dispute as to this head, the defender 
 may have back the property at the price which it cost, and the money laid out 
 on it, or pay damages, just as he chooses.842 
 
This is supplemented with references to discussions of the implied warranty of 
soundness in Bankton, Forbes and Stair.843  
 In some ways, the circumstances of the case fit the criteria for a claim under 
the implied warranty of soundness. The fault was latent and existed at the time the 
contract was entered into.844 The fault also rendered the thing bought unfit for its 
avowed purpose, one of the complaints which resulted in the warranty being 
breached. The missives of sale indicated that the land was bought on the 
                                                
840 Hughes & Hamilton v. Gordon, June 15 FC rev (1819) Bligh 287. The appeal was on a narrow 
point of law in relation to eviction and supersession. It leaves the rest of the judgement untouched. 	  
841 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 432 (emphasis own).	  
842 Ibid at 432.	  
843 The reference is to “Stair, 1.9.10”. In the second edition of Stair’s Institutions, this refers to the 
discussion on the warranty in the title on reparation. Note however, that Stair did not recognise an 
implied warranty of soundness. See analysis at page 21f.	  
844 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 430f, 432. 
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understanding that ownership of it would furnish the buyer with a freehold 
qualification entitling him to vote in elections.845 
 However, while the pursuer mentioned the warranty in his arguments, this is 
not what he based his claim on. His case rested on an alleged breach of the 
warrandice of title. Likewise, though several judges stated that the warrandice of title 
was inapplicable to the case, and ventured to suggest a more appropriate basis for 
Gordon’s claim, they did not mention the implied warranty of soundness. Instead, 
two suggested that Gordon should have claimed restitutio in integrum on the grounds 
of an error in substantialibus.846 Lord Glenlee described both parties as having been 
in “innocent mutual error” as to the existence of the freehold qualification.847 A 
further suggestion was that since the seller had been in good faith, the subsequent 
discovery that the estate did not come with a right to vote should be treated as a case 
of casus fortuitous, with the burden of loss falling entirely on the buyer.848 Both 
Hume and Brown849 treat the case as an example of the doctrine that abatement can 
be awarded where “some part or article of the estate covenanted for had not at all 
been delivered”.850 
 If the case fit the criteria for a claim under the implied warranty of soundness, 
why was this warranty not invoked? There are several possible explanations. One is 
that the warranty did not apply to sales of corporeal immoveable property. However, 
this is not the only possible explanation.  
 Another possibility is that Gordon conflated aspects of the implied 
warrandice of title with that of the implied warranty of soundness. He based his 
claim on the implied warrandice of title in the mistaken belief that it contained a 
guarantee of quality within it. This would explain why he mentions latent defects in 
the passages above; and why he inappropriately based his claim on the implied 
warrandice of title.  
 Another factor to consider is that Gordon and Hughes expressly stipulated 
that a freehold qualification came with ownership of the estate. The case report 
                                                
845 Ibid at 428, 435, 438. 
846 Ibid at 433f (Lords Meadowbank and Glenlee). 
847 Ibid at 438 (Lord Glenlee).	  
848 Ibid at 438, 439 (Lord Meadowbank).	  
849 Brown, Treatise: 328. 
850 Hume, Lectures: II.48. 
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indicates that the existence of a right to vote was stipulated in the offer.851 The 
presence of an express warranty of quality will displace the application of the 
implied warranty of soundness.852 
 However, Gordon’s arguments do not mention any breach of an express term. 
In contrast, several judges - Lord Bannatyne, Lord Glenlee and the Lord Justice-
Clerk - do mention that the presence of a right to vote had been expressly mentioned 
in the contract.853 Indeed, despite misgivings about whether the missives had been 
superseded and the admissibility of the actio quanti minoris in Scots law, the 
presence of the express term appears to have compelled the Second Division to 
award Gordon a reduction in the price. The presence of an express term may have 
contributed to the bench’s failure to mention or consider the implied warranty of 
soundness.  
 The fact that this was a legal rather than a physical defect may also have 
contributed to the failure to apply the implied warranty of soundness. In principle, 
the civilian-derived implied warranty of soundness is not necessarily limited to 
physical defects. In both Roman law and current South African law, undisclosed real 
conditions can fall within the warranty’s scope.854 Forbes appears to suggest the 
same thing in relation to the Scots implied warranty of soundness.855 A study of the 
Scots case law on the implied warranty of soundness also demonstrates a scope wider 
than mere physical defects.856 Nevertheless, there are no actual cases in Scots law in 
which the warranty is used to address legal defects. This may have contributed to the 
reluctance to use the implied warranty of soundness in this case.  
 It should be noted that in this particular case, the pursuer’s decision to base 
his action on the implied warrandice of title could not have been influenced by the 
remedy sought. Gordon’s preferred remedy was an abatement in price. This would 
not have been available under the implied warranty of soundness, which only offered 
the remedy of termination. However, in 1815 an abatement in the price was not 
                                                
851 See: 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 428.	  
852 See, for example, Geddes v. Pennington (1814) F.C. 606.	  
853 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 434, 435, 437.	  
854 See page 115f. 	  
855 See page: 109f. However, Forbes’	  position was not adopted by Scots law. See discussion at page: 
128ff.	  
856 See analysis at page 54f. 	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generally available for breach of the implied warrandice of title either. Breach of the 
implied warrandice of title in the contract or the disposition allowed the buyer to 
either terminate the contract or - where the breach was curable - request specific 
implement.857 Only where mutual restitution was impossible could the buyer claim a 
deduction of the price.858 The case report for Gordon does not contain any arguments 
to the effect that mutual restitution was not possible. Thus, the remedy desired by 
Gordon could not have been secured even if his action for breach of the warrandice 
of title had been successful.  
 
 6. Other Cases 
 
In his argument that Scots law allowed reparation for latent defects in the thing 
sold,859 Gordon cited four cases related to the sale of corporeal immoveable property. 
These are: MacNeil v. Maclean;860 Hannay v. Creditor of Bargally;861 Lloyds v. 
Paterson862; and Gray v. Hamilton.863 However, none of these cases were based on 
the implied warranty of soundness.  
 The facts of MacNeil are very similar to Gordon. The defender purchased 
lands from the pursuer in the mutual belief that they came with a right to vote. The 
case report and session papers do not clarify whether this was a term in the missives 
of sale; however, they do indicate that gaining a right to vote played a key part in the 
decision to purchase the lands. It was subsequently discovered that a right to vote did 
not come with the lands, and the defender successfully sought a reduction in the 
price. The case report and the session papers are unclear on the exact basis of the 
action. However, the implied warranty of soundness is not mentioned. This is not 
surprising, since the case pre-dated Ralston v. Robertson (the first case in which the 
implied warranty was judicially recognised) by four years.  
                                                
857 Hume, Lectures: II.38ff. See also: Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: 
Property: §	  711; Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 166.	  
858 Bald v. Scott and The Globe Insurance Company (1847) 10 D 289;  See also: Reid et al., “Transfer 
of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  711; Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 166-
167.	  
859 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 432. 	  
860 23 June 1757, M. 14164; Campbell Collection (Advocates Library), Volume 4, Paper 89.	  
861 26 January 1785, M. 13334.	  
862 13 February 1782, M. 13334.	  
863 23 January, 1801, M. App “Sale”	  2.	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 Hannay v. The Creditors of Bargaly involved the judicial sale of an estate 
which consisted of fewer acres than specified in the sale advertisement. The case 
appears to have been based on a mistake in the extent of the land sold. The implied 
warranty of soundness was not mentioned. Lloyds involved the sale of a split-coal 
and lease to lands nearby. Shortly after the price was paid, the owners of the land 
under lease “claimed the property of it”. As a result, the buyers asked for a 
proportional deduction of the price paid. The action was based on the warrandice 
against eviction. In Gray v. Hamilton, the purchaser discovered that the farm he had 
bought consisted of fewer acres than described. The case concerned a mistake in 
quantity. The implied warranty of soundness was not mentioned.  
 
 7. Concluding Thoughts 
 
There is significantly less case law featuring sales of latently defective corporeal 
immoveable property. Even more interestingly however, those buyers of latently 
defective corporeal immoveable property who did bring actions against the seller, did 
not base those actions on the implied warranty of soundness. The reasons as to why 
this was the case will be explored in the next section.  
 
E. Why was the Implied Warranty of Soundness Not Utilised 
by Buyers of Latently Defective Corporeal Immoveable 
Property? 
 
The literature review concluded that there is a lack of consensus in the sources as to 
whether or not the implied warranty of soundness applies to corporeal immoveable 
property. This suggests that the question may not have been relevant.  
 Turning to case law, the author was unable to find any precedent for 
excluding the application of the implied warranty of soundness from contracts of sale 
for corporeal immoveable property. The theory that the implied warranty was not 
relevant in the context of corporeal immoveable property is however supported by 
the fact that there are very few reported cases in which buyers sought redress in 
respect of latently defective corporeal immoveable property; and in the cases which 
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do exist, the buyer’s action is not based on the implied warranty of soundness. Why 
is this?  
 Earlier in this chapter, the author argued that part of the reason lies in a 
tendency to conflate the implied warranty of soundness with the implied warrandice 
of title; and the special significance of the implied warrandice of title to sales of 
corporeal immoveable property. However, these are not the only reasons. The next 
section examines several other possible factors. These are: 1) the large gaps in time 
between sale and discovery of the defect in sales of corporeal immoveable property; 
2) the impact of the supersession rule; 3) the patterns and motivations behind 
landownership in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and 4) the inadequacy of 
the remedy provided under the warranty. 
 
 1. Time Constraints 
 
Corporeal immoveables and corporeal moveables differ in the length of time it takes 
for latent defects to come to light. Case law relating to corporeal moveable property 
reveals that the average timescale between sale and rejection is short, generally 
ranging between a few weeks and a year. At the former end of the scale is Ralston v. 
Robertson (immediately after sale);864 Ralston v. Robb (one day);865 Jardine v. 
Campbell (ten days);866 and Gilmer v. Galloway (six weeks).867 The longest 
identified timescale between sale and rejection for a case which was successfully 
actioned under the warranty is twenty-two months, but this is exceptional.868 The 
second longest identified timescale is six months.869  
 Supplementing such cases are others where the seller escaped liability 
because the buyer had not communicated his rejection in time. Some examples are: 
Murdoch v. Richardson870 (four years); Brisbane v. Merchants of Glasgow871 (one 
                                                
864 16 June 1761, M. 14238.	  
865 9 July 1808, F.C. M. App. 1, Sale No. 6.	  
866 15 January 1806, F.C. M. App. 1, Sale No. 6, Note 1.	  
867 (1830) 8 S 420.	  
868 Grant and M’Ritchie v. Dumbreck, 11 December 1792, Hume 673.	  
869 Hill v. Pringle, (1827) 6 S 229.	  
870 23 July 1776, Brown’s Supplement 5: 583.	  
871 28 November 1684, M. 14235.	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year); Stevenson v. Dalrymple872 (three weeks); Newman, Hunt and Co. v. Harris873 
(nine months); and Bennoch v. M’Kail874 (thirty-seven days). 
 These timescales are in direct contrast to those in cases regarding latent 
defects in corporeal immoveable property. Of these, one of the shortest timescales 
between sale and rejection - two years in Rutherford - is much greater than the 
average timescale in cases involving corporeal moveable property. Nevertheless, two 
years is short when compared to the six to seven years in M’Killop and the twenty-
six years in Mackenzie. On average, the timescale between sale and discovery of the 
defect in corporeal immoveable property is drastically longer. Could this have 
contributed to the warranty’s disuse in sales of corporeal immoveable property, 
either due to requirements imposed by the warranty in regard to how quickly 
rejection must be made, or general Scots law rules on the negative prescription of 
actions?  
 In theory, the answer is no: neither the requirements imposed by the warranty, 
nor those imposed by the rules of negative prescription would have precluded such 
buyers from claiming under the implied warranty of soundness. Under the Scots law 
warranty, the timescale within which rejection had to be made was fluid, decided on 
a case-by-case basis. To bring a successful claim under the warranty, the buyer of a 
defective product was required to reject the item within a reasonable time of the 
defect being discovered. Whether this occurred after one week or twenty-six years of 
the original sale did not matter: only the rapidity with which the thing was rejected 
once the defect was discovered was material.875  
 However, there is a possibility that the average timescale within which most 
corporeal moveables had to be rejected for the buyer’s action to be successful, 
functioned as a deterrent to buyers of corporeal immovable property. The lawyer for 
a buyer of corporeal immoveable property, discovered to be defective five years after 
the purchase, might consult the case law on a warranty developed exclusively in the 
context of corporeal moveables and draw the incorrect conclusion that his client was 
outwith the required timescale for a claim under the warranty. Thus, there is a remote 
                                                
872 28 June 1808, F.C. M. App. I, Sale No. 5.	  
873 22 December 1803, Hume 335.	  
874 27 January 1820, Brown’s Synopsis 2195.	  
875 See page 62. 	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possibility that a lack of understanding as to how the warranty worked could have 
prevented buyers of corporeal immoveable property from invoking it.  
 The Scots law rules on the negative prescription of actions could only have 
affected the warranty’s use in exceptional cases. According to the Prescription Act 
1617: “...all actions competent of the law, upon heritable bonds, reversions, contracts 
or others whatsoever...shall be pursued within the space of forty years after the date 
of the same”. Thus, a buyer had to invoke the implied warranty of soundness within 
forty years from the date the contract of sale was entered into.876 Once this time 
period elapsed, the seller’s obligation was extinguished. 
 The negative prescription period was so lengthy that most buyers of corporeal 
immoveable property are unlikely to have been prevented from using the warranty 
because they were outwith the prescription period by the time they uncovered the 
defect. The longest identifiable lapse of time between the sale of a corporeal 
immoveable and discovery of the latent defect is twenty-six years:877 well within the 
prescription period. 
 In the early twentieth century, section 17 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 
1924 reduced the period of negative prescription to twenty years. However, this 
reduction is unlikely to have deprived many buyers of corporeal immoveable 
property of a remedy under the warranty. In much of the case law regarding latently 
defective corporeal immoveable property in this chapter, the lapse of time between 
sale and discovery of the defect falls within this twenty year period.  
 The rule on the negative prescription of rights and actions is unlikely to have 
been a significant factor in the warranty’s lack of use by buyers of corporeal 
immoveable property. Similarly, the warranty’s requirement of timeous rejection  
would not have hindered most buyers of latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property from using the warranty. However, because the warranty evolved in the 
context of corporeal moveable property, the existing case law did not directly address 
the issue of longer timescales between the sale and discovery of the defect. This may 
have given buyers of latently defective corporeal immoveable property the mistaken 
impression that they were outwith the timescale for a claim under the warranty.  
                                                
876 The wording in the legislation suggests that the clock begins to run from the date of the contract. 	  
877 Mackenzie v. Representative and Trustees of Winton and Morison (1838) 11 The Scottish Jurist 91.	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(a) A Brief Note on Durability 
 
It is unclear whether the implied warranty of soundness could be used to remedy 
defects which affected the durability of the thing sold. The case law does not address 
this issue. This is almost certainly because the implied warranty of soundness was 
developed exclusively through case law relating to corporeal moveable property. 
Many corporeal moveables - particularly those which feature in the case law, such as 
seed, animals, kelp, cured herring and guano - have a much shorter life-span than 
most corporeal immoveable property. The question of whether the warranty could be 
used to address defects which affected the durability of the product sold was never 
addressed because the need to do so did not arise.  
 This is problematic when it comes to latent defects in corporeal immoveable 
property. The case law analysed earlier in this chapter indicates that there was a 
longer lapse in time between conclusion of the contract and discovery of the defect in 
sales of houses and buildings. Thus, a buyer could purchase a building and use it for 
several years before discovering that it possessed a serious latent defect which 
required repairs. A house may be immediately fit for its ordinary purposes, but five 
or ten years down the line, the buyer may nevertheless discover that it contains a 
dangerous latent defect. Admittedly one may argue that if the latent defect renders 
the house dangerous (as in Mackenzie and M’Killop), the house was never fit for its 
ordinary purposes. However, the seller may argue that the fact that the buyer has 
occupied the house for several years indicates that it was fit for purpose during this 
time. Ultimately, this issue may be one of durability. The question is not whether the 
defect renders the thing unfit for purpose immediately after the sale, but whether that 
thing becomes unfit for purpose later, as a result of defects which existed when the 
thing was sold.  
 An insufficiency is classed as a “latent defect” so long as it existed when the 
property was bought. Whether it is discovered within six weeks of the sale or after 
thirteen years is immaterial. Unlike in Roman law, the Scots law warranty did not 
require the buyer to reject the thing within a certain period of time relative to when 
the contract of sale had been made. It merely required the buyer to reject the thing 
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within a reasonable time of the fault being discovered. As a result, discovering a 
latent defect some ten years after the sale should not, in theory, preclude a buyer 
from making a claim under the warranty. 
 However, is it fair to allow buyers to invoke the warranty in regard to latent 
defects which only manifest themselves several years after the sale? Should a buyer 
be allowed to claim under the warranty when he has already owned and used the 
property for five years without any problems arising, even if the defect complained 
of existed, undetected, when that property was sold to him? What if the period of 
ownership had been fifteen years instead of five? On the one hand the building has 
been occupied and used without any apparent problems for that whole period of time. 
On the other hand, the buyer still has to address the defects, as leaving them 
unremedied may be dangerous and could potentially reduce the worth of the property 
or render it unmarketable.  
 The unfairness in allowing a buyer in such circumstances to successfully 
invoke the implied warranty of soundness lies in the only remedy available under 
that warranty. Under the actio redhibitoria, the property would have been restored 
back to the seller, while the buyer received back the price he had paid, with interest 
added. This produces an unfair result, as it means that the buyer will have had free 
use of the property for a number of years. A solution to this is perhaps presented by 
Brown, who writes that the actio redhibitoria allows the vendor “to have restitution 
of the thing sold with its fruits”.878 However, it is unclear whether the situation 
considered here would fall within the definition of “fruits”. Moreover, whether this 
rule was actually followed in practice is uncertain, because no other Scots source 
touches on the matter.  
 In practical terms, the dilemma is unlikely to arise in modern Scots law. 
Under the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, an action arising out of a 
contract of sale for land does not prescribe for twenty years.879 However, it is current 
practice to include a clause in the missives of sale stipulating that they will expire 
after a certain period of time - generally two years.880 This means that at the end of 
                                                
878 Brown, Treatise: 307.	  
879 s 7.	  
880 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 70, 320.	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the two years, an action for breach of the implied warranty of soundness in the 
missives of sale will no longer be available to the buyer.  
 
 2. The Supersession Rule 
 
Reid argues that one of the reasons buyers of corporeal immoveable property did not 
make use of the implied warranty of soundness, was because the warranty was 
implied at the contract stage, but was “not carried forward into the disposition”.881 
This is relevant because:  
 
 A buyer will not be able to identify latent defects until after, and typically 
 some years after, he takes entry. But entry usually coincides with delivery of 
 the disposition and the consequent supersession of the missives. His warranty 
 is therefore useless.882  
 
Reid is referring to the Scots law principle that an accepted disposition supersedes 
the missives of sale, so that the missives cease to have legal effect. However, as Reid 
himself admits,883 this argument is only tenable for the time period after 1883. The 
supersession rule in the form described above was first set out that year by Lord 
Watson in Lee v. Alexander.884  
 The rule that an accepted disposition supersedes the missives of sale is an 
application of the prior communings rule. This is a principle derived from the law of 
evidence, which decrees that: 
 
 Previous or contemporaneous conversations or communings, and all that  
 passes in the course of correspondence or [negotiation] leading to the  
 contract, are entirely superseded by a written agreement. The parties having 
 agreed to reduce the terms of their contract to writing, the document is  
 constituted as the only true and final exposition of their admissions and  
 intentions. It is the only instrument of evidence which law will recognise as 
 the interpreter of their intentions; and nothing which does not appear in the 
 written agreement will be considered as a part of the contract.885  
                                                
881 Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 165. 	  
882 Ibid: 165. 	  
883 Ibid: 165f.	  
884 (1883) 10 R. (HL) 91.	  
885 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (5th ed): 433	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The prior communings rule can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century.886 
However, the supersession rule was not developed until much later.  
 Only in the early nineteenth century did courts begin to contemplate the 
application of the prior communings rule to the relationship between the missives of 
sale and the subsequent disposition.887 Once the disposition was executed and 
accepted, did the missives, as prior communings, cease to have application? Or did 
the missives continue to have effect in relation to those matters which were 
unaddressed by the disposition?  
 The matter was considered in Gordon v. Hughes, a case discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Here, the pursuer demanded an abatement in the price on the basis that 
the estate had been purchased on the incorrect understanding that it would allow him 
a right to vote. His claim was based on the warrandice of title in the disposition. 
Lords Robertson and Meadowbank indicated that they could not look beyond the 
accepted disposition.888 They were outvoted by the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords 
Bannatyne and Glenlee, who believed that the missives and other prior communings 
could be consulted in this case.889 The Lord Justice-Clerk qualified that this was 
because the disposition expressly referenced the missives of sale. Lord Glenlee 
indicated that while the disposition generally superseded all prior communings, the 
missives could be consulted in this case because the right to vote was not a clause 
commonly inserted into the disposition. However, this decision was reversed at the 
House of Lords appeal, which found that as the action was based on the warrandice 
clause in the disposition, and the missives were not specifically mentioned in the 
disposition, they could not be consulted.890  
 The matter remained unresolved until the end of the nineteenth century. In 
Davidson v. Magistrates and Town Council of Anstruther Easter, the Lord Ordinary 
stated that generally, the accepted disposition superseded all prior communings, 
including the missives of sale. However, a particular prior writ could be consulted in 
                                                
886 E.g.: Wauchope v. Hamilton (1574) M. 12299.	  
887 Reid, K. G. C. “Prior Communings and Conveyancing Practice: Winston v. Patrick in Context”	  
(1981) 26 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland: 415.	  
888 1815, 18 Faculty Decisions 428 at 433. 	  
889 Ibid at 434 (Lord Bannatyne), 434f (Lord Justice-Clerk), 436f (Lord Glenlee). 	  
890 Hughes & Hamilton v. Gordon, June 15 FC rev (1819) Bligh 287 at 311 (Lord Redesdale).	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relation to an ambiguity in the disposition, if that writ was referenced in the 
disposition.891 In Leith Heritages Co. v. Edinburgh and Leith Glass Co., the Lord 
Ordinary found that the missives of sale could be consulted, despite the fact that the 
disposition had been executed and accepted.892 Lord Gifford agreed, though there is 
some indication that this might have been because the missives were referred to in 
the disposition893. Lord Ormidale agreed that the missives could be consulted, 
because the disposition was ambiguous on the matter in question.894 The law on this 
matter remained unsettled until the 1883 case of Lee v. Alexander.  
 The warranty was first judicially acknowledged in 1761. The supersession 
rule does not explain why there are no cases featuring the warranty between 1761 
and 1883. During this period of time, there was no recognised rule that the 
disposition superseded the missives in their entirety.  
 The rule that the accepted disposition completely supersedes the contract of 
sale was propounded by Lord Watson in Lee v. Alexander895 and refined in Orr v. 
Mitchell.896 However, this rule did not apply “to conditions of the contract which 
would not, in the ordinary course of business, find any place or mention in a 
conveyance intended merely to transfer or complete the right to property passing 
under the contract”.897  
 As per the rule, any warranty of soundness implied at the contractual stage 
would cease to have legal effect once the disposition is accepted.898 This is 
referenced in Lord Moncrieff’s judgement in M’Killop, a case in which the buyer 
                                                
891 (1845) 7 D. 342 at 346.	  
892 (1876)  R. 789 at 794.	  
893 Ibid at 794, 796.	  
894 Ibid at 797. 	  
895 (1883) 10 R. (HL) 91 at 96.	  
896 (1893) 20 R. (HL) 27 at 29. See also: Edinburgh United Breweries Ltd. v. Molleson (1894) 21 R 
(HL) 10.	  
897 Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 368. See: Jamieson v. Welsh (1900) 3 F. 176; Bradley v. Scott 
1966 (Sh Ct) 25; M’Killop v. Mutual Securities Ltd. 1945 S.C. 166.	  
898 However, there is a theoretical argument which could combat this. The disposition does not contain 
any implied guarantees as to quality. Nor does it impliedly exclude the contractual warranty, as far as 
we are aware. In cases where the disposition contained no express terms regarding the quality of the 
subject sold, the contractual implied warranty of soundness may arguably fall within the exception 
described above. It could continue to have effect on the basis that it was not a condition which was 
ordinarily mentioned in the disposition. Whether this argument would have succeeded is unclear: no 
one appears to have tried it.  	  
 
  168 
sought to gain a remedy for structural defects in the building purchased by claiming 
that there was an implied collateral construction agreement in the missives: 
 
 …either…the contract was purely one of sale, and…when the pursuer took a 
 conveyance following upon the contract, it was without warranty as to the 
 quality of her purchase, or… the defenders in terms of their contract not only 
 agreed to sell the shop when completed but undertook also to build it for  
 her.899 
 
In the period subsequent to 1883, the supersession rule would have been an 
impediment to the use of the contractual implied warranty of soundness by buyers of 
latently defective corporeal immoveable property. 
 The supersession rule was broadened in the 1980 case of Winston v. 
Patrick.900 The court in this case “did not regard the supersession rule as being 
confined to matters within the proper province of a disposition. It regarded it as a 
rule of quite general scope, subject to a few exceptions”.901 However, the 
supersession rule was repealed by s 2(1) of the Contract (Scotland) Act 1997 in 
relation to unimplemented terms in a preceding contract. Thus the rule itself should 
no longer be an impediment to buyers of latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property who wish to invoke the implied warranty of soundness. In practice however, 
most missives of sale now contain an express clause which provides for its expiration 
after two years.902  
  
 3. Landownership: Patterns and Motives in Eighteenth 
 and Nineteenth Century Scotland 
 
The Scots implied warranty of soundness was first judicially acknowledged in 1761. 
Its application to corporeal moveable property was considerably lessened by the 
passing of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856. It was completely 
disapplied in relation to corporeal moveable property by the Sale of Goods Act 1893. 
                                                
899 1945 S.C. 166 at 170 (emphasis own).	  
900 1980 S.C. 246	  
901 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Three Bad Rules in Contract Law: §	  3.8.	  
902 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 70, 320.	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The implied warranty of soundness is invoked in numerous cases relating to sales of 
corporeal moveable property in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 However, it does not appear to have been properly invoked in any cases 
featuring corporeal immoveable property during this same time period. Part of the 
reason for may lie in the overall volume of land transactions and the motivations 
behind landownership during this time period. This idea is analysed in the following 
section.  
 It should be noted that this study has limitations. There is very limited 
literature on this topic; and what literature that does exist focuses on rural Scotland. 
This means that the section comes with a handicap, in that we cannot establish what 
the patterns and motivations in urban landownership were like. 
 
(a) The Volume of Land Transactions  
 
Our records of the overall volume of land transactions in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Scotland are incomplete. In a freedom of information request to the Registers 
of Scotland, the author asked for information regarding the total number of titles, the 
volume of land ownership and the number of transactions in specific years between 
1750 and 2005. The Keeper did not hold any records on the volume of properties 
owned by the same person. In respect of the total number of titles and the volume of 
transactions, the Keeper only held records for 2005.903 Academic sources are able to 
fill some of the gaps. However, it is unclear whether the figures provided by these 
sources are in respect of the overall volume of land transactions in Scotland, or are 
exclusive to rural land transactions. 
 At the start of the seventeenth century, there were 10,000 landowners.904 This 
number had fallen to 9,500 at the beginning of the eighteenth century;905 and 8,500 
by the mid-eighteenth century.906 In the early nineteenth century, the number of 
                                                
903 Statement by Gillian Martin (Personal email correspondence, 12 September 2013). 	  
904 Callendar, Landownership in Scotland: 10. Note that Callendar does not clarify what he means 
when he uses the term "landowners". He is likely to be referring only to rural landownership. 	  
905 Ibid: 59.	  
906 Ibid: 59.	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landowners was somewhere around 8,000907 or 7,000.908 Overall however, the 
nineteenth century did see an increase in landowners, albeit largely in the number of 
small landowners.909 Furthermore, landownership was concentrated. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, only 0.5% of Scotland’s population were 
landowners.910 Even in 1872, 90% of the land was owned by 1,500 landowners.911 
This pattern of concentrated landownership survived into the twentieth century.912  
 These figures compare starkly with those provided by the Keeper for 2005. In 
2005, there were 2.6 million land and property titles in Scotland. In that year alone, 
187,000 Land Register transactions and 30,000 Sasine Register transactions were 
processed.913  
 Regardless of whether the figures above related only to rural transactions, 
they indicate that the volume of land transactions (only a proportion of which would 
have been sale transactions) in eighteenth and nineteenth century Scotland was very 
low. This low volume of sale transactions will have had an effect on the use of the 
implied warranty of soundness by buyers of corporeal immoveable property. 
Probability dictates that the chances of a situation actionable under the warranty 
arising is proportional to the volume of sale transactions there are. In eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Scotland, the volume of sale transactions relating to land and 
buildings was much lower than the volume of sale transactions relating to corporeal 
moveable property. This low volume is likely to have contributed to the warranty’s 
lack of use in relation to corporeal immoveable property. 
 
(b) Motives in Rural Landownership 
 
The motives behind the purchase of land in rural eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Scotland would also have contributed to the warranty’s lack of use by such buyers. 
                                                
907 Ibid: 59.	  
908 Devine, Clearance and Improvement: 42.	  
909	  Callendar, Landownership in Scotland: 60.	  
910 Callendar, Landownership in Scotland: 59; Devine, Clearance and Improvement: 42.	  
911 Callendar, Landownership in Scotland: 78ff.	  
912 Ibid: 79.	  
913 Statement by Gillian Martin (Personal email correspondence, 12 September 2013). Unlike, the 
figures above, the figures provided here refer to all land ownership, whether urban or rural. 	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During these centuries, ownership of land brought political, social and economic 
benefits. As such, most latent defects will not have concerned buyers of land in the 
same way that they would today; and even where they did, termination would have 
been undesirable.  
 For eighteenth and nineteenth century landowners, economic affluence alone 
was not an incentive to buy land. Instead, “the possession of [an] estate had its 
unique attractions in the social and political power it offered”.914 For the wealthiest 
section of the population, land ownership meant the power to manipulate national 
elections and shape national policy. Only those who owned land or superiorities 
valued at a certain amount and held directly from the Crown, could vote in or stand 
for parliamentary elections.915 The electoral pool was small, so a few extra votes 
could determine the outcome.916 As there was no limit to the number of votes a 
single person could cast, the practice of local magnets buying land to gain extra votes 
was endemic.917 Manipulating the franchise allowed large landowners to either 
secure a seat in parliament,918 or have considerable influence over their elected 
Member.919 
 Lesser landowners also derived great social and political muscle from their 
ownership of land. Landowners had complete local and regional control. Roles such 
as heritable stewartries, sherriffdoms, regalities, Lord Lieutenanatships, 
Commissioners of Supply and Justices of the Peace were only open to landowners 
and peers.920 Landowners were also responsible for the administration of poor relief, 
examining the local schoolmaster and nominating church ministers.921 The social 
prestige and political power accorded to landowners were significant incentives in 
acquiring and maintaining land.  
 Ownership of land also brought economic benefits. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, land and landowners were at the heart of the economy, as 
                                                
914 Campbell, “The Landed Classes”: 99.	  
915 Timperley, “Landholding in Eighteenth-Century Scotland”: 137.	  
916 Campbell, “The Landed Classes”: 94.	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agriculture was the livelihood of most Scotsmen.922 Scotland was a rural country 
even in 1830, when the growth of heavy industries had only just begun.923  
 Landowners reaped economic benefits in several ways. Agricultural rents 
were the main source of their income during the period between 1760 and 1830.924 
Landowners also reaped financial benefits from the industrial sector, to which they 
were vital in the early stages. Initially, the industrial economy strengthened their 
position, as it gave rise to new agricultural opportunities and revenues.925 Industries 
provided a use for “raw material, power or surplus labour found on [their] estates”;926 
and they benefitted from the growth of new settlements and existing towns by being 
able to lease lands “in and around these developments”.927 The landowners were in a 
strong economic position in the first phases of industrialisation. Only from the 1830s 
did the rise of heavy industry begin to diminish the economic position of 
landownership.928 
 The social prestige, political power and economic affluence derived from the 
ownership of land in the eighteenth and nineteen centuries will have contributed to 
the warranty’s lack of use by buyers of corporeal immoveable property in this time 
period. The diverse benefits attached to the ownership of land, coupled with the 
remedy available under the warranty would have dissuaded such buyers from 
invoking that warranty. 
 Political power and social prestige derived from land ownership were central 
motives behind land purchases. These types of buyers are likely to have been 
untroubled by the discovery of a latent defect, because their chief intent in 
purchasing land had been achieved. Even where they were concerned, the implied 
warranty of soundness, with its remedy of termination, would have been unsuitable.  
 What of those buyers who purchased lands for economic reasons? The 
warranty is unlikely to have been suitable even in these cases. Land could be 
                                                
922 Timperley, “Landholding in Eighteenth-Century Scotland”: 138. See also: Lenman, B., An 
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harnessed for many different types of economic activities, such as agriculture, leases, 
thirlage,929 livestock. Since the only remedy available under the warranty was 
termination, a latent defect would have hindered an economic income being derived 
from any of the many possible avenues before a buyer would resort to the implied 
warranty. 
 Thus, a significant deterrent to the warranty’s use by buyers of land would 
have been that termination was the only remedy available under it:  
 
 ...all landowners had strong reasons for not selling land. Apart from the  
 potential income it offered in the profitable decades before the 1870s,  
 landownership still conferred many other social, political and economic  
 advantages. The loss of land was synonymous with failure in a fuller sense 
 than just financial. As in all previous centuries, the landowners’ imperative 
 was the continued possession of their estates.930 
 
The various social, political and economic benefits derived from landownership 
would have made termination an undesirable remedy. Had the implied warranty 
afforded a remedy of damages or a reduction of the price, it would have stood a 
much greater chance of being utilised by buyers of lands or estates. 
 The privileges attached to land ownership puts the requested remedy in 
Gordon into context. The buyer had specifically bought the estate to gain the right to 
vote. However, when he discovered that the property did not come with a freehold 
qualification, he did not seek to terminate the contract: he requested a reduction in 
price. His choice in remedy highlights the points made above. Gordon’s purchase did 
not secure him the entitlement to vote which he had coveted; however, proprietorship 
of it came with other desirous benefits, such as social prestige, influence in local and 
regional matters, and economic advantages. As such, it is easy to see why he 
preferred a remedy that allowed him to retain ownership of the land he had bought. 
                                                
929	  In Scots law, thirlage was: " [a]condition of servitude or state of obligation, in which the tenants of 
certain lands, or dwellers in certain districts, are bound to restrict their custom to a particular mill, 
forge, or the like. In later times, spec. the obligation to grind their corn at a particular mill (orig. that 
of the lord or his assignee), and pay the recognized consideration (multure), or at least to pay the dues 
in lieu thereof". Definition taken from: "Thirlage, n." in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Date 
Accessed: 1 August 2015).	  
930 Callendar, Landownership in Scotland: 72.	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 Ownership of land came with a diverse array of privileges. This circumstance 
meant two things: first, that a latent defect was unlikely to render the land useless or 
even a bad investment; second, that the only remedy available under the warranty 
would have been unsuitable since buyers would have wanted to retain their 
ownership. In such circumstance, the implied warranty of soundness would not have 
benefited such buyers, and would have been unused as a result. 
 
(c) Concluding Thoughts  
 
The low volume of land sale transactions in the eighteenth and nineteenth century is 
a factor in the warranty’s lack of use by buyers of corporeal immoveable property. In 
relation to sales of rural land during this same period, the benefits accrued by 
ownership of such land and the remedy available under the warranty would have 
prevented such buyers from using the warranty.  
 These circumstances would shift during the twentieth century. The volume of 
sales featuring corporeal immoveables would increase; and the political, social and 
economic benefits tied to the ownership of land would dissipate. Why was the 
warranty not used then? One answer might be that, as the warranty had never been 
used in sales of corporeal immoveable property during the time it was active, the 
legal profession forgot that it could be when the need for it began to arise.  
 At the beginning of this discussion, the author noted that the available 
literature focuses on rural Scotland and omits the urban experience. It is difficult to 
determine the level of impact this had on the overall picture. The urban population 
burgeoned from the mid-eighteenth century; but Scotland was still a rural nation in 
1830.931 One academic estimates that only an eighth of the population was urban in 
1750.932 This fraction grew during the next century as the rural population steadily 
“[lost] people to the expanding cities and colonies for many decades”.933 However, 
the balance only shifted in the 1830s and 1840s.934 While this does not mean that 
sales of urban lands and homes were non-existent during much of the period we are 
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interested in, it does suggest that the volume of sales for urban properties would have 
been relatively low during this time. Nevertheless, the lack of literature on the urban 
experience means we must guard against seeing the trends and motives discussed 
above as applying to all corporeal immoveable property. 
 
 4. An Insufficient Remedy 
 
As previously mentioned,935 the warranty’s lack of use in sales of corporeal 
immoveable property may have been linked to the remedy available under it. The 
aedilitian edict from which the Scots warranty is derived afforded two remedies: the 
actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris.936. Scots law rejected the actio quanti 
minoris.937 Thus, the only remedy available under the Scots implied warranty was the 
actio redhibitoria.  
 Scots law’s rejection of the actio quanti minoris reduced the utility of the 
implied warranty of soundness. As a legacy of this rejection, the warranty only 
allowed buyers to return the defective thing and receive back the price. The 
unsatisfactory nature of this may be hinted at in Adamson v. Smith, where the pursuer 
initially brought an action of damages against the defender, before later restricting 
these damages to the price paid with interest;938 and in Stevenson v. Dalrymple, 
where the initial remedy given in relation to the portion of kelp which had been used 
up was the actio quanti minoris.939 The unconventional remedy granted in the 1808 
case of Dickson and Company v. Kincaid940 (reimbursement of the damages the 
buyer had had to pay to the third party to whom the seed had subsequently been sold) 
may be a sign that Scots law was beginning to realise the warranty’s limitations in 
regard to remedies, and evolving to meet this need. 
 The lack of a remedy apart from termination has already been cited as a 
reason why eighteenth and nineteenth century buyers (who gained a variety of 
                                                
935 See page 173. 	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benefits from the mere ownership of land) would have chosen not to pursue an action 
under the implied warranty of soundness.941 The benefits brought by ownership of 
land were not the only reason a remedy of termination would have been unsuitable to 
buyers of corporeal immoveable property. The inconvenience of the remedy itself 
would have played a factor. With corporeal moveable property, the availability of 
just one remedy would not have been ideal. However, while the buyer of a latently 
defective corporeal moveable thing might be put to the inconvenience of having to 
find a replacement at short notice, rejection and repetition can generally be effected 
without too much difficulty in this class of property. With corporeal immoveables 
however, the case is drastically different.  
 Take the sale of a house. Typically, the buyer of a house will have made an 
examination of the property before agreeing to buy it; indeed, the general practice in 
more recent times is to instruct a chartered surveyor to make a valuation and report 
of the condition of the property.942 As long as the person who examined the property 
(whether that is the buyer himself or a third party he has contracted) is not guilty of 
negligence, a defect which is latent enough to not be discovered at this stage may 
remain undetected until after the buyer has moved in. The case law discussed earlier 
indicates that there could be a lapse of years between the buyer moving in and the 
defect being discovered. Where this is the case, a claim based on the implied 
warranty of soundness would subject the buyer to unwanted inconvenience. The 
property would have to be re-conveyed to the seller; and more crucially, the buyer 
would be exposed to the inconvenience of permanently moving out of the property 
and finding alternative accommodation. Thus, though a defect severe enough to 
invoke the warranty of soundness would require a remedy of some sort, the actio 
redhibitoria would have been undesirable as a general rule.  
 However, this is only one possible scenario. What about those buyers who 
complete the contract, but then discover a latent defect in the property before the 
conveyance has occurred, and prior to moving in? In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, there could be a considerable gap between missives and settlement, so the 
buyer was more likely to discover a defect between these two stages than he would 
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now be. Arguably, the remedy of termination would be appealing to buyers at this 
stage, because they would not yet have moved in or established connections in the 
area. The only foreseeable reasons a buyer in this situation might want to go through 
with the sale regardless, would be if: 1) that particular property was essential to him; 
2) a replacement property could not be found; or 3) where the social, economic 
and/or political benefits of owning the property outweighed the disadvantages 
attached to the latent defect.  
 The Rutherford case is also a testament to the fact that not all buyers of 
latently defective corporeal immoveable property found the remedy of termination 
undesirable. Rutherford, who had already owned the property for two years before he 
brought his action, argued that the latent defect in the property made it useless for his 
purposes as a spirit dealer and asked that the disposition be reduced. The case 
illustrates that buyers of corporeal immoveable property do sometimes find the 
remedy of termination agreeable, even where they have occupied the property for a 
number of years before the defect comes to light.  
 It is submitted however, that as a general rule, the actio redhibitoria would 
only have been acceptable where the buyer had not already moved in; where the 
building was so defective that it required significant construction work (although, 
both M’Killop and Mackenzie are a testament to the fact that even then, a buyer may 
want to retain ownership of the property and be reimbursed for repairs and 
inconvenience); where the property was rendered irrevocably unfit for its intended 
purpose; or where the inconvenience caused by the latent defect outweighed the 
economic, political and social benefits of owning the property.  
 The type of defects which afflict corporeal immoveable property may also 
have rendered the actio redhibitoria undesirable. The nature of the defects which 
afflict the subjects of sale transactions differ between corporeal moveables and 
corporeal immoveables. In the sale of corporeal moveables, the typical defects 
contested under the warranty are horses who are too old or ill to work,943 seed which 
does not produce the desired kind of crop or which is too spoilt to produce any 
                                                
943 Ralston v. Robb, 9 July 1808, F.C. M. App. 1, Sale No. 6; Ralston v. Robertson, 16 June 1761, M. 
14238; Brown v. Laurie, 16 June 1791, M. 14244.	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crop,944 ale which has been spilt and lost because it was inadequately packed,945 or 
something which renders the thing irrevocably unfit for its intended purpose.946 The 
situation is less fatalistic when it comes to latent defects in corporeal immoveable 
property. With houses, buildings and land, the types of defect which breach the 
warranty are generally repairable, though the cost of doing so may sometimes be 
considerable. As a result, such buyers may have preferred a remedy of damages. This 
preference is evident in the remedies requested in both M’Killop and Mackenzie.  
 In M’Killop,947 the remedy requested was £250 to reimburse the pursuer for 
the loss and damage suffered from having to demolish and re-erect the property’s 
structurally defective north pediment. While the insufficiency complained of (a latent 
structural defect which rendered the premises so dangerous that it had to be partially 
reconstructed) fell within the scope of the warranty, M’Killop chose to base her 
claim on the breach of an implied collateral contract of construction. Her choice of 
action made perfect tactical sense. The relief she wanted was reimbursement of the 
loss and damage suffered in remedying the defect. Had she based her claim on the 
implied warranty of soundness, the only remedy open to her would have been the 
actio redhibitoria: she would have had to reconvey the property to Mutual Securities 
Ltd., and received back the sum she had paid for it, plus reimbursement for any 
foreseeable losses which had been suffered. However, the fact that she had run an 
established shop from the property for six years and had already gone to the trouble 
of partially reconstructing the structure to repair the defect, may be taken as 
indications that she wanted to retain her title to it. Thus, while her claim would have 
fallen within the warranty’s scope, an action based on the warranty would not have 
given her the remedy she wanted.  
 In Mackenzie, the buyer of “an insufficient house”948 with dangerously 
defective beams, joists and roof-timbers originating from the original sellers’ sloppy 
                                                
944 Baird v. Aitken and Others, 13 February 1788, M. 14243; Dickson and Company v. Kincaid, 
(1808) F.C. 57; Hill v. Pringle (1827) 6 S 229.	  
945 Baird v. Pagan and Others, 14 December 1765, M. 14240.	  
946 Stevenson v. Dalrymple, 28 June 1808, F.C. M. App. I, Sale No. 5; Whealler v. Methuen, (1843) 5 
D. 402.	  
947 1945 S.C. 166.	  
948 (1838) 11 The Scottish Jurist 91 at 91(Lord Mackenzie). 	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building-work,949 sought a remedy which was neither the actio redhibitoria nor the 
actio quanti minoris. He asked for £242 for the expense of repairs, plus an additional 
£50 in damages “for the inconvenience of being deprived of the use of [the] house 
for four months while the repairs were taking place”.950 This is understandable: 
Mackenzie had owned (and most probably lived in) the house for seventeen years by 
the time the defect was discovered, and he had already undertaken the necessary 
repairs: he would not have wanted the actio redhibitoria. 
 A study of comparative law may also suggest that the unsatisfactory nature of 
this one-remedy system contributed to the warranty not being used by buyers of 
corporeal immoveable property. A restriction to one remedy and a lack of use in 
sales involving corporeal immoveable property are two elements unique to the Scots 
law implied warranty of soundness. In France and South Africa, the same civilian 
law derived warranty recognises both the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti 
minoris as remedies.951 Indeed, France goes one step further in that a buyer of 
defective goods is able to avail himself of the astreinte, through which he could 
require the seller to repair the subject.952 In both these jurisdictions, the implied 
warranty of soundness is utilised by buyers of corporeal immoveable property.953 
 The actio redhbitoria was of limited use in sales of corporeal immoveable 
property. In most cases, the defect, though severe, could be fixed, or did not render 
the land or property useless to the seller. Termination and redelivery would be 
undesirable and inconvenient. Thus, the actio quanti minoris or a remedy of damages 
would have been more appropriate. The fact that the sole remedy available under the 
Scots law warranty was the actio redhibitoria would have dissuaded most buyers of 
latently defective corporeal immoveable property from basing their claims on the 
implied warranty. In order to secure the more flexible remedies they desired, these 
buyers would have sought to base their actions on other claims. It is suggested that 
                                                
949 National Archives of Scotland: CS46/1838/12/48, Summons, 22 Dec 1835	  
950 Ibid, Summons, 22 Dec 1835. 	  
951 France - Article 1644, the Code Napoléon (both the 1804 and current versions). South Africa - 
Kerr, Law of Sale and Lease: 113, 127; SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd. v. Park Rynie Whaling Co. Ltd. 
1916 AD 413.	  
952 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 537. 	  
953 France - Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 530; South Africa - Glaston House (Pty) Ltd. v. Inag 
(Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 842 (A); Knight v. Hemming 1959 1 SA 288 (FC); Van der Merwe v. Meades 
1991 2 SA 1 (A).	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over time, this practice of not harnessing the warranty of soundness for pragmatic 
reasons became the norm. Thus, as the warranty of soundness fell into almost 
complete disuse in regard to corporeal immoveable property, some jurists and 
academics began to espouse the belief that the warranty did not apply to sales of such 
property.  
 Of course, one could argue that necessity, had it existed, would have driven 
the law. In other words, if buyers of corporeal immoveable property had wanted to 
use the implied warranty of soundness, the law would, over time, have evolved to 
offer more appropriate remedies under it. The beginnings of such an attempt are seen 
in the case law regarding the warranty’s application to corporeal moveables. There 
are a few cases954 in which the buyer either requested, or the judge granted, a remedy 
that was not the actio redhibitoria. The low volume of cases in which the parties 
experimented with a remedy other than the actio redhibitoria is a testament to the 
fact that the single remedy system did not cause severe problems to the warranty’s 
use in corporeal moveable property. The situation was different when it came to sales 
of corporeal immoveables: here, the problems caused by the single remedy of 
termination were more pronounced. Why then, is there no case law (apart from 
possibly Mackenzie) in which buyers of latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property pushed for the warranty to grant a remedy other than termination?  
 The author believes that the answer lies in the fact that the warranty was not 
widely used by buyers of corporeal immoveable property. An inadequate remedy is 
only one of several factors identified in this thesis as having contributed to a lack of 
case law in which the warranty was applied to corporeal immoveable property. A 
lack of case law meant that there was neither a need nor an opportunity for the 
warranty to develop remedies which were more suitable to buyers of corporeal 
immoveable property. 
 
F. Concluding Thoughts 
 
                                                
954 Adamson v. Smith 14 May 1799, M. 14244; Stevenson v. Dalrymple 28 June 1808, F.C. M. App. I, 
Sale No. 5; Dickson and Company v. Kincaid (1808) F.C. 57.	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The literature review demonstrated that there is no consensus as to whether or not the 
implied warranty of soundness extended to contracts of sale for corporeal 
immoveable property. Respected authorities such as Hume and Bankton take 
opposing views on the matter. Other authorities like Erskine and Bell do not address 
the issue. Most conveyancing texts do not discuss the issue of latent qualitative 
defects at all. Sample styles for missives of sale indicate that express provisions 
relating to the quality of the subject did not become the norm until the latter part of 
the twentieth century.  
 This suggests that the question of whether or not the implied warranty of 
soundness applied to corporeal immoveable property was not relevant. This is likely 
to have been because cases featuring latently defective corporeal immoveable 
property did not generally arise; and buyers did not base their actions on the implied 
warranty of soundness when they did arise.  
 There are several reasons why buyers of corporeal moveable property may 
not have used the implied warranty of soundness. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, there was a low volume of sale transactions involving corporeal 
immoveable property. This would have lessened the chances of actions alleging a 
breach of the implied warranty, in the context of corporeal immoveable property, 
arising. Additionally, the social, economic and political benefits attached to the 
ownership of land may have meant that some buyers of this type of property were 
unconcerned by latent qualitative defects. Factors such as a tendency to conflate the 
implied warranty of soundness and the implied warrandice of title; the dominance 
and special significance of the implied warrandice of title in the context of corporeal 
immoveable property; the supersession rule; and the unsuitability of the only remedy 
available under the warranty, will also have prevented buyers of latently defective 
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Chapter V - The Implied Warranty of Soundness in the 





For the purposes of this thesis, there are three classes of property: corporeal 
moveable property, corporeal immoveable property, and incorporeal property.955 
Having previously examined the implied warranty of soundness in the context of the 
first two types of property, the present chapter studies its application to contracts of 
sale for incorporeal property. A unified common law of sale would mean that the 
same contractual principles should apply956 to all three types of property. In seeking 
to answer this overarching question, the chapter examines the application and 
practical relevance of the warranty in the context of contracts of sale for incorporeal 
property. 
 Incorporeal property is property that does not have a physical existence. 
Copyright, patents, trademarks, shares and claims are all examples of incorporeal 
property. Incorporeals are an increasingly important class of property. The most 
valuable assets owned by a company are likely to be its incorporeal property.  
Despite this, the law regarding incorporeal property in Scotland is underdeveloped. 
The contract of sale for incorporeal property is no exception: legal sources, both past 
and present, are largely silent on this matter.  
 The implied warranty of soundness was developed in relation to corporeal 
property. Its Romanist ancestor was developed to address defects in slaves and beasts 
of burden.957 In Scots law, the warranty's origins lie in the context of defects in 
corporeal moveable property, such as horses and seed.958 With a few exceptions,959 
                                                
955 See page 3. 
956 Or have previously applied, in the case of corporeal moveable property. 
957 See chapter three. 
958 Ibid.	  
959 An example of a non-physical qualitative defect in Scots law is a horse which was a poor worker - 
M’Bey v Reid (1842) 4 D. 349. Examples of non-physical defects in Roman law include a runaway 
slave (D.21.1.1.1, D.21.1.17); and a suicidal slave (D.21.1. 21.3). 
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the warranty was generally used to address defects of a physical nature. Can a 
warranty that was largely used to address physical defects in property that had a 
physical presence be of any practical relevance to incorporeal property, which does 
not have a tangible presence? The following chapter seeks to provide a meaningful 
answer to this question.  
 This chapter will first conduct a literature review of academic writings on the  
contract of sale for incorporeal property and the application of the implied warranty 
of soundness in this context. It will demonstrate that existing sources do not directly 
address the issue. The chapter will then consider the warranty’s application to the 
only type of incorporeal property discussed in these sources: claims. Due to the lack 
of literature in this area, the final part of this chapter will then consider whether the 
implied warranty of soundness would be of practical relevance to contracts of sale 
for incorporeal property. This is explored through the prism of five specific types of 
incorporeal property: shares, goodwill, computer software, copyright and patents.  
 In undertaking this study, the writer acknowledges that there is a debate in 
Scots law as to whether incorporeal rights can be owned. Reid argues that they 
can,960 while Gretton argues that they cannot.961 To facilitate the analysis in this 
chapter, we will work on the premise that Reid’s position is correct.  
 
B. The Sale Transaction in the Context of Incorporeal 
Property 
 
Under the Scots common law, a sale transaction involves two stages: 1) the contract 
of sale; and 2) the conveyance. In contrast to corporeal moveables and corporeal 
immoveables, much less is known of the sale transaction process in the context of 
incorporeal property. 
 
 1. Stage 1: The Contract 
 
                                                
960 Reid, K. G. C., “Rights and Things” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 16.  
961 Gretton, G. L. ‘Owning Rights and Things’ (1997) 8 Stellenbosch Law Review 176-182; Gretton, 
G. L. ‘Ownership and its Objects’ (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift 802. 
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The first stage is the contract of sale,962 wherein the seller agrees to assign the 
property to the buyer for a stated price. Only personal rights and obligations arise at 
the conclusion of the contract of sale. A contract of sale for incorporeal property does 
not have to be in writing,963 unless it concerns an interest in land.964    
 Unlike with corporeal moveable and corporeal immoveable property, the 
distinctness of the contract of sale as a stage is often overlooked in sales of 
incorporeal property. The contract of sale may sometimes be completely omitted;965 
or be incorporated into the transfer agreement,966 blurring the separation between 
contract and conveyance. This is part of a pattern in which the importance of the 
contract stage in sale transactions varies across different types of property. In a sale 
of corporeal moveable property, the contract is vital; with corporeal immoveable 
property, where the conveyance involves a disposition which functions as a second 
written contract, the contract of sale is somewhat important. With incorporeals, the 
contract is of so little importance that it can be omitted or amalgamated into the 
conveyance.  
 
 2. Stage 2.1: The Conveyance: Assignation 
 
In a sale of incorporeal property, the conveyance is in two parts. The first part is 
known as the assignation. This is a deed of conveyance in which the seller transfers 
the property to the buyer.967 The assignation is analogous to the disposition in a sale 
of corporeal immoveable property.968 As a general rule, assignations of incorporeal 
moveables do not need to be in writing.969 
 
                                                
962 Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership”	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  653; McBryde, Contract 
(3rd ed): 302, 321; Bank of Scotland Cashflow Finance v. Heritage International Transport Ltd. 2003 
S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 107 at 110. 	  
963 s 1(1), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.	  
964 s 1(2)(a)(i), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 	  
965 McBryde, Contract (3rd ed): 321.	  
966 Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  654; Anderson, R. G., 
Assignation: §	  10-02; Wood, R. B., ‘Special Considerations for Scotland’	  in N. Ruddy, S. Mills and 
N. Davidson (eds) Salinger on Factoring, 4th ed: §	  7-31 (in relation to claims).	  
967 Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): III.5; Bankton, Institute: III.1.	  
968 Reid, K. G. C. “Unintimated Assignations”	  1989 Scots Law Times (News): 268. 	  
969 s 11(3)(a), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. There are some exceptions to this rule, as 
we shall see later in this chapter. 	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 3. Stage 2.2: The Conveyance: Intimation / Registration / 
 Possession 
 
The assignation itself does not transfer ownership of the incorporeal property to the 
buyer. Ownership in the incorporeal property only passes to the buyer upon 
intimation (in the case of personal rights)970 or registration or possession (in the case 
of real rights).971  
 
 4. Observations 
 
This chapter is only concerned with the first stage of the transaction: the contract of 
sale for incorporeal property. As mentioned earlier, in a sale of incorporeal property, 
the contract of sale may be skipped, with the parties proceeding straight to the 
assignation instead. However, there will still be a contract of sale by conduct972 in 
such cases. Since it is a default rule, any existing implied warranty of soundness 
would apply to such a contract.  
 The impact of the supersession rule on the relationship between the contract 
of sale and the subsequent assignation has not been adequately explored. However, it 
is assumed that section 2 of the Contract (Scotland) Act 1997, applies to such 
situations. Under these provisions, a contractual implied warranty of soundness 
would not be extinguished by the assignation, unless: 1) the parties agree that this 
will be the case;973 or 2) the assignation contains stipulations regarding latent 
qualitative defects in the subject. 
                                                
970 Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership”	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  653. See also: Reid, K. G. 
C. “Unintimated Assignations”	  1989 Scots Law Times (News): 269; Gloag, W. M. and Irvine, J. M., 
Law of Rights in Security, Heritable and Moveable: Including Cautionary Obligations: 476-478; 
Liquidator of Union Club v. Edinburgh Life Assurance Co. (1906) 8 F. 1143 at 1145 (Lord President); 
Gallemos Ltd. (In Receivership) v. Barratt Falkirk Ltd. 1989 S. C. 239 at 240; Bankton, Institute: 
III.1.6; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.5.1, 3; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): III.1.6; Hume, Lectures: III.4; 
Bell, Principles (4th ed): §	  1461-1462. A claim is an example of a personal right. 	  
971 Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership”	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  653; Stair, Institutions (2nd 
ed): III.1.8, 11; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.5.6. An unregistered conveyance is an example of a real 
right which requires registration. A teind is an example of a real right which requires possession.	  
972 This concept is briefly discussed in: von Bar, C. and Clive, E. (eds) Principles, Definitions and 
Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, Volume I: II.-4:211. 
973 s 2(2), Contract (Scotland) Act 1997. 
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 Knowing whether the implied warranty of soundness applies to contracts of 
sale for incorporeal property is important for two reasons. First, the existence of such 
a warranty would offer the buyer a basic level of protection in regard to latent 
qualitative defects. Secondly, if such an implied term does exist, the seller should be 
aware of it as he might want to contract out of it. This latter point is particularly 
important in a sale of assets upon a bankruptcy, where the seller is less likely to be 
aware of qualitative defects in the subject. 
 
C. Literature Review 
 
The following section contains a literature review of how the sources treat the 
contract of sale for incorporeal property and the implied warranty of soundness in 
that context. In reading it, two points must be remembered. The first is that the 
warrandice in claims is not specifically covered here: it will be treated in a separate 
section. The second is that the literature review does not contain any case law, 
because none relating to the warranty of soundness in the context of incorporeal 
property appears to exist.  
 
 1. Early Texts974 
 
Incorporeal property is not mentioned in the discussions of the contract of sale in 
Regiam Majestatem,975 and Hope’s Practicks.976 It is briefly mentioned in the title on 
sale in Balfour’s Practicks977 in the context of the buying of the patronage of a 
kirk978 and the buying of maills.979 All three texts do not recognise the existence of 
an implied warranty of soundness.  
                                                
974 Note: Sinclair’s Practicks has been excluded form this analysis as it does not contain a discussion 
of the contract of sale, in the context of incorporeal property, or otherwise.  
975 Regiam Majestatem: III.10ff 
976 Hope, Major Practicks.: II.4. 
977 Balfour, Practicks: 209ff. 
978 Ibid: 210. 
979 Ibid: 211. 
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 Regiam Majestatem does not contain a discussion on assignation; but 
Balfour’s Practicks and Hope’s Practicks do.980 Both these titles on assignation 
focus on the conveyance of incorporeal property: nothing is mentioned in relation to 
the contract of sale for incorporeal property. 
 
 2. The Institutional Writers 
 
(a) Stair, Bankton and Erskine 
 
The titles on the contract of sale in Stair’s Institutions,981 Bankton’s Institute982 and 
Erskine’s Institute983 each contain references to incorporeal property. Stair cites a 
case featuring incorporeal property;984 both Bankton and Erskine discuss the 
possibility of selling the hope or expectation of something985 (such as fish which 
have not been caught yet); and Bankton also discusses patents and copyright986 and 
the illegality of selling shares of imaginary stock.987  
 Stair believed that the seller was only liable for latent defects where he had 
given an express warranty to that effect or was guilty of fraud.988 However, both 
Erskine and Bankton recognised the existence of an implied warranty of soundness 
and discussed it in their titles on sale. While Erskine takes a unified approach in his 
title on the contract of sale,989 incorporeal property is not specifically mentioned in 
his discussion of the implied warranty of soundness.990 Bankton expressly confines 
the implied warranty of soundness to “goods” (i.e. corporeal moveable property).991 
                                                
980 Ibid: 169f; Hope, Major Practicks.: II.12. 
981 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.10.63ff; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): I.14. 
982 Bankton, Institute: I.19.  
983 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.1ff. 
984 Lawder v. Goodwife of Whitekirk, 15 February 1637, M. 1692, cited at Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): 
I.14.1. 
985 Bankton, Institute: I.19.8; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.3.  
986 Bankton, Institute: I.19.11f. 
987 Ibid: I.19.9.  
988 See analysis at page 21f.  
989 See page 10f. 
990 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.3.10.  
991 Bankton, Institute: I.19.8 (from the section comparing Scots law to English law). For the exact 
quote and an analysis, see page 106f.  
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 Stair, Bankton and Erskine also discuss incorporeal property in their titles on 
assignation.992 In both the second edition of Stair’s Institutions and Bankton’s 
Institute, the title on assignation is located in Book III, the part dealing with the 
transfer of property.993 In contrast Erskine’s title on assignation is placed in the part 
of the book which deals with contracts, obligations and succession.994 All three 
writers begin their discussion by asserting that they are dealing with the transmission 
of rights or obligations;995 and the contents of each of the discussions focus 
exclusively on the conveyance of incorporeal property. The implied warranty of 
soundness is not mentioned in any of the three titles on assignation.  
 All three texts also have discussions on specific types of incorporeal 
property.996 However, these discussions do not contain any substantive information 




 (i) Bell’s Principles 
 
The main text997 on the contract of sale in Bell’s Principles998 takes a unified 
approach.999 Incorporeal property is mentioned several times. Reference is made to 
the fact that contracts of sale for copyright must be in writing,1000 and that the hope 
of something can be the subject of a sale.1001 The discussion on the warrandice of 
                                                
992 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): II.23.1-23; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): III.1.1-23; Bankton, Institute: 
III.1; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.5. 
993 Walker, D. M., ‘Introduction’ in Viscount Stair, J. Dalrymple, The Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland, (ed) D. M. Walker, 2nd ed: 18. 
994 McBryde, W. W., ‘Introduction to the 1989 Reprint’ in Erskine, J., An Institute of the Law of  
Scotland, (ed) J. B. Nicholson, 8th ed. (pages unnumbered). 
995 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): II.23.1; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): III.1.1; Bankton, Institute: III.1.1; 
Erskine, Institute (1st ed): III.5.1. 
996 E.g.: Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.9, Bankton, Institute: II.7; Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.17; Stair, 
Institutions (2nd ed): II.7 (servitudes). Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.10; Stair, Institutions (1st ed): 
I.18; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.8 (teinds). Stair, Institutions (1st ed): II.19; Stair, Institutions (2nd 
ed): II.9 (tacks). 
997 As opposed to the section dealing with principles unique to the sale of lands.  
998 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 41ff; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 85ff.  
999 See page 13ff. 
1000 Bell, Principles (3rd ed): § 89; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 89. 
1001 Bell, Principles (3rd ed): § 91; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 91. 
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title1002 cites a case relating to incorporeal property,1003 but a note below the 
discussion also directs readers to a passage on the warrandice in debts further on in 
the book.1004 On balance, the discussion on the contract of sale appears to extend to 
incorporeal property. Incorporeal property is not expressly mentioned in the passage 
on the implied warranty of soundness.  
 Incorporeal property is also discussed in several other places in the Bell’s 
Principles. Specific types of incorporeal moveable property (e.g. debts, stock, patents 
and copyright) are discussed in one section,1005 while specific types of incorporeal 
immoveable property (e.g. the right of salmon fishing, the right of ferry) are 
discussed in another.1006 The discussions, which focus on the general nature of these 
types of property, do not cover contracts of sale. Assignation is treated in a further 
section, in the context of the written transfer of debts.1007 This section relates 
exclusively to the conveyance of debts, and the contract of sale is not discussed. The 
warranty of soundness is not mentioned in any of these sections. 
 
 (ii) Bell’s Commentaries 
 
While Bell’s Commentaries contains a chapter on the contract of sale,1008 this focuses 
on corporeal moveable property.1009 Incorporeal property is not mentioned. 
Assignation is covered in a separate section on the transfer of debts.1010 However, the 
discussion is limited to the conveyance, and the contract of sale is not discussed.  
The implied warranty of soundness is not mentioned in this section. From the fourth 
edition onwards, there is also a separate section1011 discussing particular types of 
                                                
1002 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 47.1; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 122. 
1003 Plenderleith v. The Representatives of the Earl of Tweeddale and the Duke of Queensferry, 31 
January 1800, M. 16639. 
1004 Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 122. This note first appears in the third edition. See: Bell, Principles 
(3rd ed): § 126 
1005 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 324ff; Bell, Principles (4th ed.): § 1338ff. 
1006 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 152ff; Bell, Principles (4th ed.): § 638ff. 
1007 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 346; Bell, Principles (4th ed.): § 1454, § 1459ff. 
1008 Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (3rd ed.): 283ff; Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (4th ed.): 346ff; Bell, 
Commentaries, Vol I (5th ed.): 434ff.  
1009 See page 15. 
1010 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (3rd ed.): 81ff; Bell, Commentaries, Vol II (4th ed.): 21ff. 
1011 Bell, Commentaries, Vol I (4th ed.): 64-75. 
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incorporeal property.1012 This section contains some brief allusions to sale; however, 
the contract of sale itself is not discussed.  
 
 (iii) Bell’s Inquiries 
 
Bell’s Inquiries focuses predominantly on corporeal moveable property. However, 
incorporeal property is discussed on occasion. For example, the text indicates that the 
hope of something can be sold;1013 and that writing is required in sales of patent 
rights and copyright.1014 The Inquiries contains a discussion of the implied warranty 
of soundness,1015 but incorporeal property is not expressly mentioned therein.  
 
 3. Other Important Texts 
 
(a) Mungo Brown 
 
Mungo Brown’s A Treatise on the Law of Sale takes a unified approach to the 
contract of sale.1016 Brown deals most commonly with corporeal moveable and  
corporeal immoveable property; however, incorporeal property is mentioned several 
times throughout the Treatise.1017 It is noteworthy that, while the discussion on the 
warrandice of title cites two cases relating to incorporeal property,1018 no reference is 
made to the warrandice debitum subesse.1019 Brown discusses the implied warranty 
of soundness at length. However, only case law relating to corporeal moveable 
property is cited in the discussion: incorporeal property is not mentioned.  
                                                
1012 Such as government stock, shares, insurance, patents, copyright, honours and dignities and 
alimentary funds.  
1013 Bell, Inquiries: 17. 
1014 Ibid: 24. 
1015 Ibid: 50ff. 
1016 See page 13. 
1017 For example, he mentions that the hope of something can be sold. See: Brown, Treatise: 11.  
1018 Brown, Treatise: 249, 267; The cases cited are Plenderleith v. The Representatives of the Earl of 
Tweeddale and the Duke of Queensferry, 31 January 1800, M. 16639 (involves teinds and illustrates 
the point that warrandice does not extend to future augmentations of stipend, unless this is expressly 
stated) and Inglis v. Anstruther and the Representatives of Anstruther, 26 February 1771, M. 16633 
(involves the granting of a commission and relates to the question of whether expenses can be claimed 
if eviction does not occur). 
1019 This is the implied warrandice given in the sale of a claim. See page 197ff. 
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(b) Forbes, Hume and More 
 
The discussions on the contract of sale in Hume’s Lectures,1020 Forbes’ Great 
Body1021 and More’s Lectures1022 take a unified approach.1023 All three discussions 
mention incorporeal property. Forbes and More discuss the sale of a hope or 
expectation.1024 Hume draws an example from the assignation of a lease,1025 cites a 
case involving a bond1026 and mentions that buying shares in imaginary companies is 
illegal.1027 More states that shares in joint-stock companies require a written title1028 
and that the warrandice in claims is debitum subesse.1029 Thus, incorporeal property 
falls within the scope of these chapters.  
 There is a discussion on the implied warranty of soundness in each of these 
three chapters.1030 Hume and Forbes indicate that the warranty applies to both 
corporeal moveables and corporeal immoveables.1031 More’s discussion suggests that 
the warranty may extend to corporeal immoveable property; however, this is the 
result of a conflation with the implied warrandice of title.1032 Incorporeal property is 
not expressly mentioned in any of these discussions. 
 All three books contain a chapter on assignation.1033 These discussions relate 
exclusively to the conveyance of incorporeal property and the contract of sale is not 
touched on.1034 The books also contain discussions on specific types of incorporeal 
                                                
1020 Hume, Lectures: II.1ff. 
1021 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 825ff. 
1022 More, Lectures, Vol I: 132ff. 
1023 See analysis at page 9, 11f, and 16.  
1024 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 827; More, Lectures, Vol I: 133ff. 
1025 Hume, Lectures: II.11.  
1026 Ibid: II.26. 
1027 Ibid: II.26. 
1028 More, Lectures, Vol I: 144.  
1029 Ibid: 156. 
1030 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 831ff; Hume, Lectures: II.40ff; More, Lectures, Vol I: 
153ff. 
1031 Hume stipulates this, while Forbes uses examples involving both corporeal immoveables and 
corporeal moveables.  
1032 See discussion begining on page 119.  
1033 Hume, Lectures: III.1ff; More, Lectures, Vol I: 367ff; Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 
1151ff. 
1034 In Hume’s case, this is in spite of the fact that his chapter on assignation is located in the part 
which deals with the law of obligations or personal claims (Part Two), rather than the part which deals 
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property;1035 but these discussions do not mention the implied terms in a contract of 
sale.  
 
(c) Miscellaneous Texts 
 
Kames’ Elucidations,1036 Ross’ Lectures,1037 Gloag’s Law of Contract1038 and 
McBryde’s Contract1039 all contain a chapter1040 on assignation. Once again 
however, the discussions within these chapters relate to the conveyance. The contract 
of sale is briefly mentioned in McBryde’s chapter;1041 however, the implied terms in 
such contracts are not discussed. The implied warranty of soundness is not 
mentioned in any of these three chapters. 
 The second edition of Gloag’s Law of Contract contains a separate section 
entitled “Implied Terms as to Quality of Performance”.1042 The implied warranty in 
the sale of debts (debitum subesse) is discussed here.1043 However, the discussion 
relates to the warrandice of title, rather than quality. 
 Mackenzie’s Institutions contains a chapter on the contract of sale1044 and a 
chapter on assignation.1045 However, both chapters are brief and perfunctory. The 
chapter on sale does not mention incorporeal property. The chapter on assignation 
not mention the contract of sale.  
                                                                                                                                     
with real rights (Part Three). See: Paton, G. C. H., ‘Preface’ in Baron Hume, D., Baron David Hume’s 
Lectures 1786-1822: Vol II, (ed) G. C. H. Paton: v; Paton, G. C. H., ‘Preface’ in Baron Hume, D., 
Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822: Vol III, (ed) G. C. H. Paton: v.  
1035 E.g.: More, Lectures, Vol I: 349ff, Hume, Lectures: IV.38ff (copyright and patents); More, 
Lectures, Vol I: 593ff,  Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1247, fos. 691ff, Hume, Lectures: III.262ff 
(servitudes); More, Lectures, Vol II: 31ff (teinds). 
1036 Lord Kames, H. Home, Elucidations Respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland, 2nd 
ed: 7ff. 
1037 Ross, W., Lectures on the Practice of the Law of Scotland: Volume I, 1st ed: 176ff; Ross, W., 
Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of Scotland: Volumes I, 2nd ed: 176ff. 
1038 Gloag, Law of Contract (1st ed): 452ff; Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 413ff, 428ff. 
1039 McBryde, Contract (3rd ed): 301ff. 
1040 Or two, in the case of the second edition of Gloag’s Law of Contract. 
1041 McBryde, Contract (3rd ed): 302ff, 321ff.  
1042 Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 309ff. 
1043 Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 314ff. 
1044 Mackenzie, Sir G., The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 1st ed: 232ff. This remains true of 
subsequent editions. 
1045 Ibid 261ff. This remains true of subsequent editions.  
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 Ross Anderson’s Assignation contains a brief discussion of the relationship 
between contract and conveyance,1046 but there is no substantive discussion on 
contracts of sale for incorporeal property: the book deals exclusively with the 
transfer. Incorporeal property is also discussed in Gloag and Henderson’s Law of 
Scotland;1047 but again, the contract of sale is not covered.  
 
 4. Conveyancing Texts1048 
 
The discussions on the contract of sale in the conveyancing texts1049 focus 
exclusively on missives or minutes of sale for lands. Incorporeals are not mentioned, 
save for some cursory references to those associated with lands, such as salmon 
fishings,1050 goodwill1051 and teinds.1052 The implied warranty of soundness is not 
touched on in these chapters, either in relation to lands or incorporeals.  
 The exception to this is the fourth edition of Gretton and Reid, which 
mentions in a footnote that the traditional view that there is no implied warranty of 
soundness in a sale of land “can be challenged on the basis…that…the sale of land is 
simply part of the general law of sale and…that under that general law, the physical 
state of the property may be warranted”.1053 As Gretton and Reid subscribe to the 
                                                
1046 Anderson, R. G., Assignation: §10-01ff. 
1047 Gloag and Henderson (1st ed): chapters 17, 25, 26, 34, 36-38; Gloag and Henderson (13th ed): 
chapters 30, 32-36. 
1048 For the purposes of this analysis, the writer has consulted the first and last editions of each of the 
key conveyancing textbooks.  
1049 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 827ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 922ff; Bell, Lectures on 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 647ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 695ff; Wood, Conveyancing: 
195ff; Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 334ff; Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 334ff; Bell, Treatise on 
Conveyancing (1st ed) 127ff; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 141; Craigie, Heritable Rights 
(1st ed): 33ff; Craigie, Heritable Rights (3rd ed): 246; Napier, Conveyancing: 469 (Lectures 36 and 
37); Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed): 26ff; Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 43ff; 
Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol II (1st ed): 4ff (Note: The second edition of Halliday’s Conveyancing 
does not contain a chapter on the contract of sale, except in relation to corporeal moveable property); 
Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 92ff; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 158ff; Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 
56ff; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 173ff; McDonald, Conveyancing (1st ed): 97ff; McDonald, 
Conveyancing (7th ed): §28.1ff. 
1050 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 658ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 707; 
Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol II (1st ed): 23; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 179. 
1051 Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol II (1st ed): 30f. 
1052 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 671; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 722; 
Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 180. 
1053 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 74, footnote 56.  
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theory of a unified common law of sale, it is presumed that they believe the implied 
warranty of soundness also applies to contracts of sale for incorporeal property.  
 Many1054 of the conveyancing texts consulted also contain a discussion(s) on 
assignation.1055 These discussions are located in self-contained chapters, almost all of 
which incorporate the word “assignation” in the title.1056 The topics covered in these 
chapters, the way in which assignation is described therein and - in some cases - the 
locations of these chapters within the books, all indicate that the discussions relate to 
the conveyancing stage. No mention is made of the substantive content of a contract 
of sale in relation to incorporeal property.  
 In most cases, the locations of the chapters on assignation within the books 
do not provide any indication as to whether the discussions relate to the contract 
stage or the conveyancing stage. In several texts, the chapters either do not come 
under larger divisions (such as parts or books),1057 or the titles of the sections which 
contain the chapters on assignation do not shed any light on the question.1058 
However, the locations of the discussions in Russell, Menzies and Halliday indicate 
that their discussions relate to the conveyancing stage. Russell’s chapter is located 
within the title “Of the Transfer and Transmission of Rights”;1059 Menzies’ is placed 
in part two of his book, entitled “The Writings Employed in the Constitution, 
Transmission and Extinction of Personal or Moveable Property”;1060 and Halliday’s 
                                                
1054 The exceptions are: McDonald, Conveyancing (1st ed); McDonald, Conveyancing (7th ed); Bell, 
Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed); Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed.; 
1055 Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 173ff; Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 173ff; Wood, 
Conveyancing: 577ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 231ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 266ff; 
Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 280ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 295ff; 
Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 155ff; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 236ff; Napier, 
Conveyancing: 195ff (Lectures 16 and 17); Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 11ff, 237ff, 320ff; Burns, 
Conveyancing (4th ed): 132ff, 379ff, 555ff; Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed): 289ff; Gretton 
and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed): 383ff; Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 210ff; Halliday, 
Conveyancing (2nd ed): 332ff. 
1056 The only exception is the chapter in Halliday’s Conveyancing, which is entitled “Transfer of 
Incorporeal Moveable Rights Absolutely and in Security”. Note: While Burns’ Handbook does not 
contain a chapter dedicated to assignation, the topic is discussed at several places. See: Burns, 
Handbook (1st ed): 18ff, 69ff, 83ff; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 44ff, 211ff, 262ff. The same is true of 
Craigie’s Heritable Rights. See, for example: Craigie, Heritable Rights (1st ed): 55ff, 139ff; Craigie, 
Heritable Rights (3rd ed): 434ff, 909ff. 
1057 Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed); Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (4th ed). 
1058 Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed); Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed); Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st 
ed); Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed); Wood, Conveyancing. 
1059 Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed); Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed). 
1060 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed); Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed). 
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is found in a larger chapter, entitled “Transfer of Incorporeal Moveable Rights 
Absolutely and in Security”.1061  
 In almost all1062 of the discussions, assignation is defined as the transfer of a 
right.1063 The contents of the discussions indicate that the chapters are dealing with 
the conveyancing stage of the transaction. The topics covered vary slightly between 
texts; however, recurring topics are: the clauses in a deed of assignation, the status 
and effect of an assignation, warrandice of title in an assignation, intimation, and 
assignation of stocks, shares, patents and copyright. The discussions are concerned 
only with the transfer stage of the transaction. The only discussion which mentions 
the contract of sale is in the second edition of Halliday’s Conveyancing, where the 
discussion on assignation contains a sample style of an agreement for the factoring or 
discounting of debts.1064  
 The warrandice of title is covered in almost all1065 of the discussions on 
assignation.1066 The exact contents of these discussions on warrandice will be 
analysed later in this chapter. For now, it is enough to note a few salient points. The 
first of these is that warrandice is generally discussed in the context of claims.1067 
The second, is that the discussions on warrandice do not allude to either the existence 
or lack thereof of an implied warranty of soundness. The final point, is that none of 
the texts expressly indicate whether the discussions on warrandice apply to the 
                                                
1061 Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed); Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed). 
1062 The term “assignation” is not defined in Burns or Halliday. See: Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 
11ff, 237ff, 320ff; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed):132ff, 379ff, 555ff; Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I 
(1st ed): 210ff; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 332ff. 
1063 Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 173; Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 174; Wood, Conveyancing: 
577; Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 232; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 267; Bell, Lectures on 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 280; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 296; Napier, Conveyancing: 
195 (Lecture 16); Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed): 289; Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing 
(4th ed): 383. 
1064 Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 360ff. 
1065 The exceptions are: Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing (1st ed); Gretton and Reid, Conveyancing 
(4th ed); Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed); Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed). 
1066 Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 175; Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 175; Wood, Conveyancing: 
581ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 238ff; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 275ff; Bell, Lectures 
on Conveyancing (1st ed): 289ff; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 304ff; Craigie, Moveable 
Rights (1st ed): 158ff; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 239; Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 
214, 220; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199, 337, 343; Napier, Conveyancing: 201 (Lecture 17). 
Note: parts of the discussion on warrandice in Napier’s title on assignation are missing. 
1067 Halliday also mentions the warrandice in life assurance, which he says is warrandice of fact and 
deed and debitum subesse (the same as that in claims). See: Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 
220; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 343. 
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conveyancing stage, the contract stage or both. Since the chapters on assignation 
clearly relate to the conveyancing stage, this may indicate that warrandice is 
discussed in the context of the conveyance. This matter will be explored later in this 
chapter.  
 
 5. Analysis 
 
There is very little direct discussion of the contract of sale for incorporeal property in 
the sources. In all of the sources, the chapters on assignation do not contain any 
references to the contract of sale in relation to incorporeal property. In many of the 
conveyancing texts and Bell’s Commentaries, incorporeals are not mentioned in the 
chapters on the contract of sale either.  
 In contrast, the discussions on the contract of sale in Stair, Erskine, Bankton, 
Hume, Brown, Forbes, More and Bell’s Principles do contain some brief references 
to incorporeal property. This indicates a unified treatment: the same discussion 
appears to apply to moveables, immoveables, and incorporeals. However, 
incorporeal property is not mentioned at all in the discussions on the warranty of 
soundness within these chapters.1068  
 It is difficult to determine what this means. On the face of it, this fact should 
be immaterial. If the chapters are taking a unified approach to the discussion of the 
contract of sale, then the warranty can be assumed to apply to all types of property in 
the absence of any express statement to the contrary. However, it is also possible that 
these passages do not mention incorporeal property because, at the time they were 
written, the matter was unclear or had not come up. Considering the relative 
unimportance of the contract of sale in the context of incorporeal property, this latter 
explanation is feasible. 
 What the review of the literature teaches us, is that there is little or no direct 
literature on the contract of sale for incorporeal property in general, and the 
application of the implied warranty of soundness to incorporeal property in 
particular.   
                                                
1068 Excluding Bankton, who limits the application of the implied warranty of soundness to goods. 
 




Discussions of the implied warrandice in sales of incorporeal property focus almost 
exclusively on claims. A claim, a form of incorporeal moveable property,1069 is “a 
personal right to the performance of an obligation”.1070 Claims are also known as 
debts. There is no difference in the two terms, except that the former is viewed from 
the perspective of the creditor, while the latter is viewed from the perspective of the 
debtor. As the present discussion focuses on the asset in these transactions, the term 
“claim” will be favoured in this chapter.  
 The discussion will begin with an analysis of the substantive content of the 
warrandice implied in sales of claims. The reader should be aware that the sources on 
this topic are unclear on whether they are speaking of the contract stage or the 
conveyancing stage. This will be addressed later on. For now, it is important to bear 
this ambiguity in mind while reading the analysis below.  
 
 1. The Warrandice Implied in the Sale of a Claim 
 
Of the early case law relating to the warrandice in sales of claims, only two can be 
identified as dealing with the implied - rather than an express - warrandice. The first 
is the 1621 case of Waitch v. Darling,1071 which is described in Morison’s case report 
as finding that there is an implied warrandice of fact and deed in an assignation to a 
bond.1072 The second case is Riddell v. Whyte, where it was found that in assignations 
to claims or decrees, the implied warrandice is “from fact and deed” and should at 
least import “debitum subesse”.1073 Fact and deed warrandice is a guarantee that the 
granter has neither done, nor will do, anything to prejudice the title granted.1074 
                                                
1069 Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 1338. 
1070 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions: xvi (Glossary). 
1071 9 January 1621, M. 16573. 
1072 The actual report of the case is brief and vague. It says only that “[t]he Lords found [an implied] 
warrandice against the party and his heirs”; and that “the deed was done but sums of money et sine 
causa”.  
1073 9 February 1706, M. 16615. This case concerned the assignation of a decreet for onerous causes.  
1074 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.26. 
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Debitum subesse is described as being a guarantee that the claim exists,1075 is 
valid1076, and due to the cedent by the debtor at the time of the assignation.1077 
 Some academic writings identify the implied warrandice in the sale of a claim 
as debitum subesse.1078 Other writings do not identify the warrandice as such, but 
their descriptions of the implied warrandice in claims are consistent with the content 
of the debitum subesse.1079 A further set of sources state that in the sale of a claim, 
there is an implied warrandice of both debitum subesse and fact and deed.1080 The 
two positions are not contradictory. Past or future acts of the seller which prejudice 
the title granted, fall within the remit of a guarantee that the claim exist, is valid and 
due to the cedent. Thus, debitum subesse encompasses a guarantee of fact and 
deed.1081  
                                                
1075 Wood, Conveyancing: 581; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204; Bell, Lectures on 
Conveyancing (3rd ed): 215; Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 158; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd 
ed): 239; Burns, Conveyancing (1st ed): 537; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 688; Halliday, 
Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129-130; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199; Menzies, 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 150; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 177, 275; Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd 
ed): 314. 
1076 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 216; 
Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129f; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199; Gloag, Law of 
Contract (2nd ed): 314. 
1077 Ferrier v. Graham’s Trustees (1826) 6 S. 818 at 822 (Lord Glenlee); Bell, Lectures on 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 204; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 215; Burns, Conveyancing (1st 
ed): 537; Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 158; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 239; Burns, 
Conveyancing (4th ed): 688; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 29 (the first edition does not include this 
definition); Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129-130; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199; 
Anderson, R. G., Assignation: § 9-03. 
1078 Bell, Commentaries Vol I (5th ed): 644; Wood, Conveyancing: 581; Anderson, R. G., Assignation: 
§9-03; Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 314. 
1079 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1246, fos. 538; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.25; Bell, Principles 
(1st ed): § 346; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 1469; Wilson, W. A., The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd ed: 
289. 
1080 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 239; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 275-276; Bell, Lectures 
on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 215; Halliday, 
Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129-130; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199; Burns, Conveyancing 
(1st ed): 537; Burns, Conveyancing (4th ed): 688; Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 16; Burns, Handbook 
(5th ed): 29; Christie, “Warrandice”: 589. An exception is Robert Bell, who indicates that the 
warrandice in an assignation to claims or personal obligations is from fact and deed only - see: Bell, 
Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed): 58, Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 70 (Note, that it is 
unclear if he is speaking of an implied or express warrandice); Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 158; 
Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 239. 
1081 Note, that fact and deed warrandice is a lesser form of warrandice than debitum subesse.  
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Readers should note that the warrandice debitum subesse is equivalent to the absolute 
warrandice in the sale of lands:1082 both guarantee a good and marketable title.  
 
(a) The Debtor’s Solvency 
 
The report of an anonymous 1671 case indicates that in early Scots law, the seller of 
a claim impliedly guaranteed the debtor’s solvency: 
 
 Of old absolute warrandice in an assignation to debts did import that the  
 debtor was sufficient and responsal; and in case it could not be got of the  
 debtor, then the assigner was liable in warrandice to make it good; but now of 
 late the Lords have found…it signifies no more but that no other body has a 
 better right to that sum than I…and that it is a true debt.1083 
 
Academic texts do not generally mention this earlier position, nor when it 
changed.1084 Ross and Menzies, both of whom date the change to 1671,1085 are 
exceptions. Spottiswood reports that the question of whether the cedent impliedly 
warrants the debtor’s solvency arose in the 1632 case of Macklonaquhen v. Carsan; 
however, the parties came to an agreement between themselves. Spottiswoode argues 
that the law is clear, citing the Roman law rule that the seller does not impliedly 
warrant the debtor’s solvency.1086 However, whether he is expressing an opinion or 
repeating established law, cannot be determined.  
 The case law available to us suggests that the date given by Ross and 
Menzies is approximately correct. The position that there is no implied warranty of 
solvency in the sale of a claim appears to have been established through a series of 
late seventeenth century cases: Hay v. Nicolson1087 (1664), Barclay of  Pearstoun v. 
                                                
1082 See also: White v. Fyfe, November 1683, M. 16607; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed) 204; 
Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 216; Bankton, Institute: II.3.125; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 
1469. 
1083 [Anent Warrandice in an Assignation], 13 February 1671, 2 Brown’s Supplement 519. 
1084 The topic is not mentioned in early writings such as Regiam Majestatem, Hope’s Practicks and 
Balfour’s Practicks. 
1085 Ross, W., Lectures on the Practice of the Law of Scotland: Volume I, 1st ed: 193; Ross, W., 
Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of Scotland: Volumes I, 2nd ed: 193; Menzies, 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 238; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 275. 
1086 4 February 1632, M. 830; Spottiswoode 21. 
1087 16 June 1664, M. 16586. This case involves a gratuitous alienation. 
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Liddel1088 (1671) and Clunies v. M’Kenzie1089 (1672). Though these cases all featured 
express clauses of absolute warrandice, the rule extended to include the implied 
warrandice in assignations of claims.1090  
 However, the decision in Stuart v. Melvill1091 (1678) contradicts the 
precedent set in these cases. Here, the defender had assigned a bond to the pursuer in 
repayment of a debt owed. The assignation had contained a clause of warrandice at 
all hands. The debtor to this bond died six years after the assignation; and having 
failed to recover payment from him, the pursuer brought an action against the 
defender, arguing that the clause of warrandice, “imported the solvency of the Debtor 
the time of the Assignation, and therefore the Cedent must prove at least that he was 
then solvent”.1092 The Lords found that the clause imported the solvency of the 
debtor, but that solvency was presumed unless the debtor was a “notour bankrupt” or 
the assignee could not recover through diligence.1093 
 This decision is at odds with the rule set in Hay, Barclay and Clunies. It 
indicates both that the law in this area was not yet settled; and that there was some 
confusion between the old rule and the new rule. The reference to diligence may be 
related to the fact that the assignee had not attempted to use diligence to secure 
payment, even though the assignee lived for six years after the assignation. The 
reference to solvency being presumed unless the debtor was openly bankrupt, is 
probably an acknowledgement of the fact that it would be difficult for a cedent to 
know that the debtor was insolvent until that insolvency was declared.1094 
 In the longterm, Stuart v. Melvill proved to be an anomaly. The current 
position is that in an assignation of a claim, even for onerous causes, there is no 
implied warranty as to the debtor’s solvency.1095 The rule is taken further, so that 
                                                
1088 24 November 1671, M. 16591; 2 Brown’s Supplement 589. 
1089 5 January 1672, M. 16595. 
1090 See Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589 at 591.  
1091 7 February 1678, 2 Stair 611.  
1092 Ibid at 611.  
1093 Ibid at 612.  
1094 This point is discussed further below.  
1095 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.13.46; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.3.46; Forbes, Great Body: MS 
GEN 1246, fos. 538; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.25; Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 346; Bell, 
Principles (4th ed): § 1469; Bell, Commentaries Vol I (5th ed): 644; More, Lectures, Vol I: 156; 
Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 150, 239; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 177, 275; Wood, 
Conveyancing: 581; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204, 289; Bell, Lectures on 
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even an express clause of absolute warrandice1096 or a guarantee that the sums would 
be “good, valid and effectual”1097 does not extend to a guarantee of the debtor’s 
solvency. These words are insufficient to constitute an express guarantee as to the 
debtor’s solvency. 
 
(b) An Analysis of the Exclusion of the Debtor’s Solvency 
from the Implied Warrandice 
 
The modern Scots law position that the debtor’s solvency is not impliedly guaranteed 
in the sale of a claim, is partly influenced by Roman law. A passage from Ulpian in 
Justinian’s Digest reads: “when a debt is sold…subject to contrary agreement, the 
vendor is not answerable for the debtor’s solvency but only for the fact that he is a 
debtor”.1098 This is followed by a second passage from Paul: 
 
 indeed, even without the reservation, ‘subject to contrary agreement’. But if 
 he be stated to owe a specific sum, the vendor will be liable for that sum; if 
 he be liable for a nonspecific debt or for nothing, he will be liable for the  
 purchaser’s damages.1099 
 
These passages are cited by several Scottish sources in support of the position that 
the debtor’s solvency is not impliedly guaranteed.1100  
                                                                                                                                     
Conveyancing (3rd ed): 215f, 304; Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 18; Craigie, Moveable Rights 
(2nd ed): 42; Napier, Conveyancing: 201 (Lecture 17); Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129f; 
Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 16; Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 29; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199; 
Christie, “Warrandice”: 589; Gloag, Law of Contract (1st ed): 396; Gloag, Law of Contract (2nd ed): 
314; Wilson, W. A., The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd ed: 289; Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in 
S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 717. Note that in the transfer of a negotiable instrument there is an 
implied warranty as to the debtor's solvency. See Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 1469. 
1096 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589; 
Clunies v. M’Kenzie, 5 January 1672, M. 16595; Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1246, fos. 538; 
Bankton, Institute: II.3.125; Russell, Conveyancing (1st ed): 175; Russell, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 
175; Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 151; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 177; Bell, Lectures on 
Conveyancing (1st ed): 204, 289; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 216, 304; Halliday, 
Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129f; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd ed): 199. 
1097 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589; Bell, 
Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204, 289; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 216. 
1098 D.18.4.4. See also: Voet: XVIII.4.14. This position is also adapted by Grotius, see: Grotius, 
Jurisprudence of Holland, Vol I: III.14.12. 
1099 D.18.4.5. See also: Voet: XVIII.4.14. 
1100 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589; Stair, 
Institutions (1st ed): I.13.46; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.3.46; Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.25; 
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 Scotland is not the only jurisdiction to have adopted the Roman position. 
Under the French Civil Code, the seller of “a claim or any other incorporeal right” 
impliedly warrants its existence “at the time of the assignment”;1101 he does not, 
however, impliedly guarantee the debtor’s solvency.1102 Until relatively recently, the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch contained similar provisions.1103 
 Persuasive justification for adopting the rule can be found in the reasoning of 
the Bench in Barclay: 
 
 If it were interpreted otherwise, it would be the seed of infinite pleas, and  
 would prove impracticable, seeing debtors being merchants or their fortunes 
 not consistent in land-rent, they dying or becoming bankrupt long after the 
 assignation, it were impossible for the cedent to discover the true condition of 
 their fortune, and to balance the same with their debts, which might be latent 
 the time of the assignation.1104 
 
It was further reasoned that, “[it] were of dangerous consequence to commerce to 
obligate cedents to mistrust the sufficiency of debtors”;1105 and that where necessary, 
the parties could always include an express guarantee of the debtor’s solvency.1106 
 Stair and Menzies observe that the rule is not contradictory to the principle of 
warrandice, as warrandice relates to the title, rather than the quality of the thing.1107 
They are correct in saying that the matter of the debtor’s solvency is not a title issue. 
The title can be good and the claim due, while in practice, the debtor’s inability to 
pay means that the buyer will find it difficult to secure payment. However, the term 
“warrandice” denotes two separate guarantees: one of title and the other of 
quality.1108 The fact that the debtor is unable to pay affects the quality of the debt 
bought. Thus, the debtor’s solvency is an aspect of the quality of the claim owed. 
                                                                                                                                     
Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1246, fos. 538; The passage is also cited by Spottiswoode, in his report 
of Alexander Mackclonaquhen v. Giles Carsan. See: 4 February 1632, M. 830; Spottiswoode 21. 
1101 Article 1693, Code Napoléon (both the 1804 and current versions). 
1102 Article 1694, Ibid (both the 1804 and current versions). 
1103 § 437 and § 438 BGB. Note: as a result of subsequent amendments, these provisions no longer 
exist. Readers who wish to consult these provisions should see: Forrester, I. S. and Others, (trans) The 
German Civil Code, As Amended to January 1, 1975. 
1104 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591 at 16594.  
1105 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1246, fos. 538. 
1106 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589. 
1107 Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.13.46; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): II.3.46; Menzies, Conveyancing 
(1st ed): 151; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 177. 
1108 See page 123.  
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Therefore, while the rule is not contradictory to the principle of warrandice of title, it 
is contradictory to the principle of warrandice of quality.   
 Most of the sources do not address the question of whether or not a contract 
of sale for incorporeal property contains an implied warranty of soundness. The 
exceptions are Bankton, Menzies and Montgomerie Bell. Bankton expressly limits 
the warranty to sales of goods.1109 Menzies states that the warrandice in claims does 
not extend to the quality of the claim.1110 However, he is speaking of the 
conveyancing stage of the transaction.1111 Bell does not discuss the implied warranty 
of soundness in relation to the warrandice in debts, but does do so in relation to the 
warrandice in corporeal moveable property.1112   
 The denial of an implied guarantee as to the debtor’s solvency should not be 
taken as an indication that the implied warranty of soundness did not apply to sales 
of claims. Solvency is just one aspect of quality; and there are several excellent 
justifications for excluding it from any implied guarantee. One such justification is 
that the debtor’s financial health is liable to fluctuate. A struggling debtor may 
become bankrupt; or, his finances may recover as a result of good business fortune. 
This is an inherent risk in the nature of claims for money, and a default rule which 
placed the burden of this event on the seller, could deter such sales.  
 The seller is also unlikely to know that the debtor is insolvent until 
insolvency is declared. This is unlike the situation in regard to other types of property 
(for example, a horse), where one may argue that a vigilant seller could have made 
himself aware of the defect. To hold a seller liable for the debtor’s insolvency, where 
that debtor had not yet been declared insolvent when the sale occurred, would place 
an onerous burden on the seller. Such a course of action would harm commerce as it 
could dissuade people from selling claims.  
 Furthermore, as one defender argued,1113 once the assignation has taken 
place, only the assignee is able to apply for payment. If, within eight months of the 
                                                
1109 Bankton, Institute: I.19.8 (from the section comparing Scots law to English law). For an analysis, 
see page 106f.  
1110 Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 148; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 175.	  
1111 See page 108f. 
1112 Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 208; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 219. For 
an analysis, see page: 107. 
1113 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589. 
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assignation, the debtor becomes insolvent, the seller should not be liable because he 
had no control over when the buyer chose to apply for payment. Once the claim is 
assigned, only the buyer has control over when he applies for payment. The chance 
that the debtor may become insolvent after the contract of sale has been concluded, is 
a risk undertaken by the buyer - much like a buyer whose horse falls ill post-purchase 
must bear the burden of that loss. This is recognised in other legal systems: the 
French Civil Code, for example, stipulates that where the cedent guarantees the 
debtor’s solvency, “the promise relates to the present solvency, and does not extend 
to the future [unless expressly stipulated]”.1114 The same sentiment is expressed by 
Forbes in his Great Body of the Law of Scotland.1115 
 Thus, there are valid reasons for excluding an implied guarantee of the 
debtor’s solvency in sales of claims, without excluding a general implied warranty of 
soundness. However, in practice, it is difficult to see what such a warranty would 
address, if not the matter of the debtor’s solvency. Most defects affecting sales of 
claims tend to be issues of title. This is likely to be the case even where the claim 
relates to corporeal property. Take the example of a car purchased by Y from Z. Z 
subsequently sells the right to payment of the price to M. However, when M applies 
for payment, Y refuses. He claims that the car is defective within the meaning of s 14 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. He successfully terminates the sale. In this example, 
there is a latent defect in quality in relation to the ancillary property (i.e. the car). 
However, when analysed in the context of the sale of the claim, the defect is one of 
title. The claim does not exist, and M does not have any title to it as a result. M’s 
inability to secure payment is a breach of the implied warrandice that the claim is 
valid and due. Since the debtor’s ability to pay is one of the only issues of quality 
affecting the sale of a claim, the practical result of Scots law’s rejection of an implied 
guarantee in regard to it is that there is no warranty of soundness in sales of claims. 
 
 2. Does the Warrandice Relate to the Contract or the  
 Conveyance in the Sale of Claims?  
 
                                                
1114 Article 1695, Code Napoléon (both the 1804 and current versions). 
1115 Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 1246, fos. 538. 
 
  205 
It is difficult to discern whether discussions of the warrandice in sales of claims - and 
particularly the lack of an implied guarantee regarding the debtor’s solvency - refer 
to the contract stage, the conveyance stage or both. This is partly because many of 
the discussions on the implied warrandice in sales of claims pre-date Savigny’s 
abstract theory. Pre-Savigny,1116 it was possible that sometimes, a principle derived 
from and relating to one stage of the sale transaction could be considered to apply to 
the other stage as well. 
 The general trend, in so far as the academic texts on this issue are concerned, 
is to refer to the “assignation of debts or bonds”.1117 Technically, the term 
“assignation” denotes the transfer stage in sales of incorporeal property. However, 
the term can also be used to describe “the contract to assign”.1118 This makes it 
difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from the use of the term “assignation” in 
this context.  
 It is worth considering where discussions of the implied warrandice in sales 
of claims are located within the various texts. In the conveyancing texts, the passages 
discussing the warranty are placed either in the chapter on assignations,1119 or the 
discussion of warrandice within the chapter on deeds.1120 The discussions in Stair and 
Erskine are located in the section on warrandice within the chapters on infeftment of 
property.1121 Bankton’s discussions are located in the title on assignations1122 and the 
title on fees.1123 The discussion in Bell’s Principles is located in the section on 
                                                
1116	  Savigny's abstract theory was first propounded in the mid-nineteenth century. In Scots law 
however, the pre-Savigny period is considerably more recent, and is better termed as "pre-Reid and 
Gretton". See discussion in Reid et al., “Transfer of Ownership” in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: § 
608, 609, 611. 
1117 E.g. Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.2; Bankton, Institute: III.1.28; Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 346 
and (4th ed): § 1469. 
1118 Anderson, R. G., Assignation: § 1-07.  
1119 E.g. Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 238f; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 266ff; Wood, 
Conveyancing: 581; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (1st ed): 289; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing 
(3rd ed): 304; Craigie, Moveable Rights (1st ed): 158ff; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 239. 
1120 E.g. Menzies, Conveyancing (1st ed): 150f; Menzies, Conveyancing (4th ed): 176f; Bell, Lectures 
on Conveyancing (1st ed): 204; Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 215f; Craigie, Moveable 
Rights (1st ed): 18ff; Craigie, Moveable Rights (2nd ed): 42; Burns, Handbook (1st ed): 16; Burns, 
Handbook (5th ed): 29; Halliday, Conveyancing, Vol I (1st ed): 129f; Halliday, Conveyancing (2nd 
ed): 199. 
1121 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.2; Stair, Institutions (1st ed): I.13.46; Stair, Institutions (2nd ed): 
II.3.46.  
1122 Bankton, Institute: III.1. 
1123 Ibid: II.3. 
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“Written Transference of Moveables”.1124 The passage in Bell’s Commentaries1125 is 
found in the chapter on warrandice, within the book entitled “Of Creditors by 
Personal Obligation or Contract”. Notably, the passage in More’s Lectures is found 
in the discussion on the contract of sale.1126  
 It is also worth noting where the discussions are not mentioned. The titles on 
the contract of sale in Stair, Erskine and Bankton do not allude to the warrandice in 
sales of claims. While the title on the contract of sale in Bell’s Principles has at least 
one reference to a case involving incorporeal property,1127 the warrandice in sales of 
claims is not discussed. Instead, a reference to a discussion of it elsewhere in the 
book is supplied. Brown’s Treatise makes no reference to the warrandice in claims 
anywhere in the book; and this is despite references to several cases involving 
incorporeal property1128 in the chapter on the warrandice of title.  
 The locations of the discussions on the implied warrandice in sales of claims 
may suggest that these discussions relate to the conveyancing stage. However, this is 
not definitive. Most of the discussions date to the pre-Savigny period, so their 
locations do not necessarily mean that they are limited to the conveyancing stage.  
 Determining whether the warrandice relates to the contracting stage is 
difficult, since most discussions on the contract of sale simply do not mention the 
warrandice in claims. This may be because the transaction was of little practical 
importance in the sale of a claim. As the introduction to this chapter highlights, in 
sales of incorporeal property, the contracting stage may be skipped or incorporated 
into the assignation itself. 
 It is possible that the rules of warrandice set out in the discussions of the 
contract of sale applied equally to corporeal moveable, corporeal immoveable and 
incorporeal property. This would explain the lack of any reference to the warrandice 
in claims and is what we would expect of a unified common law in this area. 
                                                
1124 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 346; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 1469. 
1125 Bell, Commentaries Vol I (5th ed): 644. 
1126 More, Lectures, Vol I: 156. 
1127 Bell, Principles (1st ed): § 47.1; Bell, Principles (4th ed): § 122. The reference is to Plenderleith 
v. The Representatives of the Earl of Tweeddale and the Duke of Queensferry (31 January 1800, M. 
16639), a case which deals partially with teinds.  
1128 E.g. Brown, Treatise: 249 (Plenderleith v. The Representatives of the Earl of Tweeddale and the 
Duke of Queensferry, 31 January 1800, M. 16639), 267 (Inglis v. Anstruther and the Representatives 
of Anstruther, 26 February 1771, M. 16633). 
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However, the discussions on the contract of sale focus primarily on corporeal 
moveable and corporeal immoveable property. Incorporeal property is mentioned 
either briefly, or not at all. As a result, it is difficult to definitively determine if, and 
how far, the implied terms set out in discussions of the contract of sale extend to 
incorporeal property.  
 It is impossible to determine whether the discussions of the warrandice in 
sales of claims relate to the contracting stage, the conveyancing stage or both. There 
are two main reasons for this. The first is that there are too many gaps in our 
knowledge of the Scots law underlying contracts of sale for incorporeal property. 
The second, is that many of the discussions are pre-Savigny and as a result, are not 
necessarily restricted to a specific stage of the transaction. 
 
 3. Does the Rule that the Debtor’s Solvency is Not 
 Impliedly Guaranteed Extend Beyond Sales of Claims? 
  
It is unclear whether the rule that the debtor’s solvency is not impliedly guaranteed 
extends further than claims. The old case law from which this rule is derived deals 
with assignations of bonds.1129 Furthermore, judgements in two early cases - one 
featuring the assignation of an annual-rent1130 and the other an apprising1131 - found 
that there was an implied warranty of solvency in assignations of heritably secured 
claims. These decisions contrast with another in which the assignation of a 
comprising1132 was found “to warrant only the validity of the comprising, and the 
reality of the debt”.1133  
 The majority of academic writings on the subject tend to refer to the principle 
specifically in the context of claims of money. There are however, some exceptions. 
                                                
1129 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591, 2 Brown’s Supplement 589; 
Clunies v. M’Kenzie, 5 January 1672, M. 16595; Ferrier v. Graham’s Trustees (1826) 6 S. 818 at 822 
(Lord Glenlee); Reid v. Barclay and Others (1879) 6 R. 1007. 
1130 Burd v. Reid, 9 February 1675, M. 16602. An annual-rent is a yearly sum attached to a piece of 
land, payable by the owner of that land. 
1131 Fyfe v. White, March 1683, M. 16607. Defined in Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.12.1 as “the 
sentence of a sheriff…by which the heritable rights belonging to the debtor were sold for payment of 
the debt due to the appriser, redeemable by the debtor within the term indulged by the law.” 
1132 A comprising is the same as an apprising. See: Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.12.1 
1133 Bowie v. Hamilton, 10 November 1666, M. 16587. 
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These are the judgement in Barclay, which applied the rule to “bond[s], decreet[s] or 
other deed[s] assigned”;1134 Erskine’s reference to “debt[s], decreet[s] or other 
personal right[s]”;1135 Robert Bell’s statement that an assignation of rents does not 
contain an implied guarantee as to the solvency of the tenant1136; and Burns’ 
statement that the implied warrandice in a sale of a debt “or other personal right” is 
from fact and deed and debitum subesse.1137 
 The gaps in knowledge resulting from the undeveloped old law makes it 
difficult to positively identify whether this rule was meant to extend to all 
incorporeal property. The present author argues that it should not be read as a wider 
rule. Solvency is a very specific aspect which, while relevant to sales involving 
claims of money, is not pertinent to sales of other types of incorporeal property. It is 
not, for example, applicable in the sale of a copyright. As a result, the rule that the 
debtor’s solvency is not impliedly guaranteed, should be seen as relating exclusively 
to sales of claims. It should not necessarily be interpreted as applying to all 
incorporeal property, nor should it be taken as an indication that sales of incorporeal 
property do not contain an implied warranty of soundness. 
 
E. Is the Warranty of Practical Use to Contracts of Sale for 
Incorporeal Property?       
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The Romans developed the principle of implied liability to address qualitative 
defects in sales of slaves and beasts of burden.1138 In Scotland, the warranty was 
developed in the context of horses and other corporeal moveable property. Can a 
principle developed in the context of physical property and which is largely 
concerned with physical qualities, be relevant to property which does not have a 
tangible presence?  
                                                
1134 Barclay of Pearstoun v. Liddel, 24 November 1671, M. 16591 at 16594.  
1135 Erskine, Institute (1st ed): II.3.25. 
1136 Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (1st ed): 59; Bell, Treatise on Conveyancing (3rd ed): 70. 
1137 Burns, Handbook (5th ed): 29. 
1138 See page 19.  
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 Comparative law from other jurisdictions which adopted the same civilian 
principle indicates an answer in the affirmative. In Germany, the provision that the 
thing sold must be free of material defects1139 applies to sales of rights.1140 In France, 
the equivalent warranty has been found to apply to contracts of sale for goodwill.1141 
South African law has applied its version of the warranty to shares and the interest in 
a vehicle.1142  
 However, the position taken by Scots law is unclear. The literature review is 
inconclusive, with most sources omitting any express discussion of whether the 
implied warranty of soundness applied to contracts of sale for incorporeal property. 
The only direct discussions on the guarantees implied in a transfer of incorporeal 
property are in relation to claims. What of other types of incorporeal property? 
 In the absence of any literature in this area, the following section looks at 
specific types of incorporeal property, and examines the utility of an implied 
warranty of soundness in contracts of sale for these types of property. Two key 
questions underpin the study. The first is, does incorporeal property suffer from 
qualitative latent defects within the meaning of the implied warranty of soundness? 
The second question is, even if such defects do arise, are commercial interests always 
best served by applying an implied warranty of soundness to such contracts of sale?  
 Five specific types of incorporeal property were picked for this analysis: 
shares, goodwill, computer software, copyright and patents. The author’s selection 
was guided by developments in comparative and domestic law. Goodwill and shares 
were chosen because the same civilian-derived implied warranty of quality has been 
applied to these types of property in French and South African law. Computer 
software was selected because there is evidence that latent qualitative defects can 
arise in relation to this type of property.1143 Copyright and patents were chosen 
because they represent a commercially significant class of incorporeal property: 
Intellectual Property. With the exception of goodwill, which can sometimes be 
                                                
1139 § 434, BGB.  
1140 § 453 BGB. 
1141 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 530, 533 (footnote 217). Cases cited in illustration are: Cass.-
req., 6 fevrier 1894, S.95.1.177; Cass.-civ., 18 janvier 1898, D.98.1.409. 
1142 Phame (Pty.) Ltd. v. Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 at 418f (Holmes J. A.); Janse van Rensburg v. Grieve 
Trust CC 2000 (1) SA 315 (C). 
1143 See: St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
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classed as incorporeal immoveable property,1144 the types of property examined are 
all incorporeal moveable property. This is deliberate: we have already considered the 
confusion surrounding the warranty’s application to types of immoveable property 
(albeit corporeal immoveable property) in chapter four.  
 The analysis will demonstrate two key points. Firstly, the chances of a latent 
qualitative defect arising in incorporeal property are much slimmer than with 
corporeal property. Secondly, even when such a defect arises, it may be difficult for 
the buyer to establish a causal link between the defect and the qualitative 
deterioration of the incorporeal property in some cases.  
 
(a) A Note on Ancillary Property 
 
One of the things this analysis will demonstrate, is that in many cases the incorporeal 
property itself cannot be defective. However, most incorporeal property is closely 
connected to some type of ancillary property. For example, the copyright in a 
computer program (the incorporeal property) is closely related to the computer 
program (the ancillary property); and shares (the incorporeal property) are closely 
related to the underlying company in respect of which they are issued (the ancillary 
property). This ancillary property can suffer from latent qualitative defects which in 
turn affect the quality of the incorporeal property within the meaning of the implied 
warranty of soundness. Thus, before we examine whether the implied warranty of 
soundness would serve a practical purpose in contracts of sale for incorporeal 
property, we must consider whether the warranty’s application should extend to such 
defects. 
 The sources relating to the Scots law implied warranty of soundness do not 
address this question. However, the author believes that the warranty should extend 
to faults in the ancillary property which affect the quality of the incorporeal property 
bought within the meaning of the implied warranty of soundness. This is because the 
ancillary property is essential to the incorporeal property which is the subject of the 
contract. 
                                                
1144 See page 222. 
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 There is also precedent for the implied terms in a contract of sale being 
applied to ancillary property. In Geddling v. Marsh,1145 the plaintiff bought mineral 
water from the defendants. The bottles in which the water was supplied were not part 
of the sale: the plaintiff paid a penny per bottle, this being refunded when the bottle 
was returned. One of these bottles was defective and burst when the plaintiff handled 
it, seriously injuring her. Though the bottle itself was not sold, the court found that s 
14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 could be applied. In a second case,1146 the plaintiffs 
had bought a ton of Coalite from the defendants. When some of this Coalite was put 
in a fire, an explosion occurred. The source of the explosion was not the coal, but an 
explosive embedded in one of the pieces of coal. Though the coal itself was fine, and 
the explosive was not part of the subject matter of the contract, the case was still 
found to be covered under s 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Both these decisions 
were justified on the grounds that section 14 referred to “goods supplied under a 
contract of sale”. That the bottle and the explosive were not the subjects of the sales 
was inconsequential, because they had been supplied under the contract of sale1147. 
These decisions were predicated, in the first case, on the ancillary property being 
essential to the actual subject matter;1148 and in the second case, on the basis that the 
ancillary property affected the quality of the subject-matter.1149 Thus, the law 
recognises that where a fault in the ancillary property affects the subject-matter of the 
contract, it should be covered under the implied guarantee of quality. 
 In South Africa, the aedilitian edict has been applied to property which was 
not the subject matter of the contract. In both Janse van Rensburg v. Grieve Trust 
CC1150 and Wastie v. Security Motors (Pty) Ltd,1151 the edict was found to apply to 
the non-money portion of the pretium. While this is not ancillary property, it does 
indicate that, where equitable, the civilian derived warranty can apply to property 
which is not the subject matter of the contract.  
                                                
1145 [1920] 1 KB 668.  
1146 Wilson and Another v. Rickett Cockerell & Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 QB 598.  
1147 Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668 at 672 (Bray J.); Wilson and Another v. Rickett Cockerell & 
Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 QB 598 at 607 (Denning, L. J.). 
1148 Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668 at 673 (Bailhache J.). 
1149 Wilson and Another v. Rickett Cockerell & Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 QB 598 at 612 (Romer, L. J.), 609 
(Evershed, M. R.). 
1150 2000 (1) SA 315 (C). 
1151 1972 (2) SA 129 (C). 
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 2. Shares 
 
Shares, a type of incorporeal moveable property,1152 are issued by companies to raise 
capital.1153 A share is:  
 
 …the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, 
 for the  purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but 
 also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the  
 shareholders inter se in accordance with [the Companies Act]. The contract 
 contained in the articles of association is one of the original incidents of the 
 share. A share is…an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of 
 various rights contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money 
 of more or less amount.1154  
 
The rights derived from ownership of shares can vary depending on the class the 
shares belong to. The most common rights are: “a right to dividends, a right to capital 
and a right to vote”.1155 Shareholders “carry the risks of profit and loss arising from 
the trading activities of the company, which will be reflected in the market value of 
their shares”.1156 
 Shares are “transferable in accordance with the company’s articles”,1157 and 
so can be the subject of a contract of sale. A contract of sale for shares does not need 
to be in writing.1158 Under the contract, the buyer must pay the price in exchange for 
the seller delivering “a duly executed form of transfer and a certificate (or 
certificates) for the securities in question or, in the case of bearer share warrants, 
delivery of the warrant(s) representing the shares”.1159 Upon conclusion of the 
contract, the seller holds the shares in trust for the buyer1160 until registration occurs. 
                                                
1152 s 541, Companies Act 2006. For an analysis, see: Pretto-Sakmann, A., Boundaries of Personal 
Property: Shares and Sub-shares: 63-85. 
1153 Bennet, D. A., ‘Companies’ in S.M.E.: Companies (Reissue): § 69. 
1154 Borland’s Trustee v. Steel Brothers Co. Ltd. [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288 (Farwell J.). 
1155 Pretto-Sakmann, A., Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-shares: 82. 
1156 Bennet, D. A., ‘Companies’ in S.M.E.: Companies (Reissue): § 70. 
1157 s 544, Companies Act 2006. 
1158 s 1(1), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 
1159 Bennet, D. A., ‘Companies’ in S.M.E.: Companies (Reissue): § 97. 
1160 Stevenson v. Wilson (1907) SC 445, 14 SLT 743. 
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 In respect of such contracts of sale, qualitative defects can be direct, as 
pertaining to the shares themselves; or indirect, as pertaining to the underlying 
company but affecting the shares in some material way. The following analysis 
considers the potential of both direct and indirect latent defects.  
  
(a) Latent Defects in the Shares 
 
A defect that falls within the scope of the implied warranty of soundness must satisfy 
certain criteria. It must fall into one of the categories of defect recognised under the 
warranty;1161 it must have existed at the time the contract was entered into;1162 and it 
must have been unknown to/undetectable by the buyer prior to sale.1163 The final 
criterion makes it difficult for latent defects within the scope of the implied warranty 
of soundness to arise in the shares themselves.  
 Shares are allotted and issued by the underlying company to which they are 
linked. The classes of shares, and the rights attaching to each class, must be set out in 
the company’s articles of association.1164 The articles of association are registered 
with the Registrar of Companies1165 and can thus be viewed by any member of the 
public.1166 When shareholders wish to keep something confidential, they can do so 
by drawing up a shareholder agreement. Shareholder agreements do not have to 
registered, and are private as a result.1167 However, where X is a signatory to a 
shareholder agreement, and subsequently sells his shares to Y, Y is not bound by this 
agreement. Only the signatories to a shareholder agreement are bound to it.1168  
                                                
1161 See discussion in chapter three, from page 26 onwards.  
1162 Gilmer v. Galloway (1830) 8 S 420; Wallwood v. Gray, 16 Feb. 1681, M. 14235; Gordon v. Scott 
and Hutchison, 1791, Brown’s Supplement 5, 585; Brown, Treatise: 297.	  
1163 Gilmer v. Galloway (1830) 8 S 420; Bankton, Institute: I.19.2; Forbes, Great Body: MS GEN 
1247, fos. 832; Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): III.3.10; Hume, Lectures: II.44; Brown, Treatise: 296; Bell, 
Principles (1st ed.): § 44; Bell, Inquiries: 51. 
1164 See: s 9(4)(a) and 10(2), Companies Act 2006. 
1165 s 18(2), Companies Act 2006. 
1166 Davies, P. L. and Worthington, S., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th 
ed: § 3-19, 20. 
1167 s 9, Companies Act 2006; The Law Commission, Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies 
(Report No 142, 1996): § 3.8; Davies, P. L. and Worthington, S., Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law, 9th ed: § 3-31. 
1168 Welton v. Saffrey [1897] A.C. 229 at 331 (Lord Davey); The Law Commission, Consultation 
Paper on Shareholder Remedies (Report No 142, 1996): § 3.3; Davis, P. L. and Worthington, S., 
Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th ed: § 3-31. 
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 Shares cannot, by their nature, suffer from physical defects in quality. They 
can only suffer from legal defects in quality. However, because the legal rights and 
restrictions of any class of shares are set out in the articles of association, the defect 
will never be a hidden defect. For example, in Bushell v. Faith1169 three parties - Mr. 
Faith (a director), Mrs. Bushell (a director) and Dr. Bayne -  were the sole 
shareholders in a company. They held a hundred shares each with one vote per share. 
Article 9 of the articles of association stipulated that whenever a resolution to remove 
a director arose, the shares held by that director would carry three votes per share. 
The practical effect of this was that the directors were irremoveable. This was 
arguably a defect in the parties’ shares. However, it was not a latent defect, because 
it was mentioned in the company’s articles of association, a document which anyone 
is able to view.  
 Another example of a defect in quality is where a share is bought to secure 
voting rights. It transpires that the share in question does not afford a right to vote; 
instead, it only gives the owner a right to preferential dividends. While this is a 
defect - the thing is unfit for its avowed purpose - it is not a hidden defect. The buyer 
could and should have consulted the articles of association, which would have 
informed him that the share in question did not afford a right to vote. Thus, while 
shares may be susceptible to defects in quality, the fact that the rights pertaining to 
them are set out in a document which is publicly accessible means that such defects 
will be patent rather than latent.  
 
(b) Latent Defects in the Underlying Company 
 
Hidden defects in the underlying company may sometimes manifest themselves as 
latent qualitative defects in the shares bought. In considering such defects, a very 
careful distinction must be made between two types of hidden defects in the 
underlying company: (1) those defects in the underlying company which do not 
affect the quality of the shares bought; and (2) those defects in the underlying 
company which do affect the quality of the shares bought. In a contract of sale for 
                                                
1169 [1970] A.C. 1099. 
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shares, only the latter type of defect would be capable of breaching the implied 
warranty of soundness. This point is best illustrated through two examples.  
 In the first example, Company QWE has issued a total of 30,000 ordinary 
shares of £1 each. A third of these shares belong to M. M sells these shares to Y. 
Based on the company’s annual turnover and assets, each £1 share is valued at £60. 
Y pays £600,000 for 10,000 shares in Company QWE. Shortly after the sale, 
Company QWE is discovered to have been involved in a tax avoidance scheme for 
the past three years. They are liable for an outstanding tax bill of £1,000,000. The 
share price drops as a result, with each share now worth only £20: Y has paid 
£400,000 more than the shares were worth.  
 In the second example, Company GHT has issued a total of 12,000 ordinary 
shares of £1 each. All of these shares are owned by P. P sells all 12,000 shares to F. 
Based on the company’s annual turnover, its assets and liabilities, each £1 share is 
valued at £15. F pays a total of £180,000. Company GHT operates from a factory, 
which it owns outright. Shortly after the sale, the roof of the factory is found to need 
extensive repairs due to structural damages sustained prior to the sale, but previously 
unknown to both P and F. The cost of the repair work leaves the company with an 
extra £50,000 in liabilities; however, the value of the shares is not affected.  
 In the first example, the hidden defect in the underlying company affects the 
quality of the shares sold.1170 In the second example, the defect may result in the 
buyer incurring financial loss because his company has additional liabilities. 
However, in this example, the quality of the shares themselves is unaffected. In a 
contract of sale for shares, only the first example would be capable of breaching the 
implied warranty of soundness. Because shares are the subject of the sale, the 
warranty could only address to those defects in the underlying company which affect 
the quality of the shares. 
 In South African law, there is precedent for a hidden defect in the underlying 
company which affects the value of the shares bought, qualifying as a breach of the 
implied warranty of soundness.  In Phame (Pty.) Ltd. v. Paizes,1171 the plaintiff 
bought the entire shareholding in, and the claims against, a company from the 
                                                
1170 How the quality of the shares is affected is discussed at page 237ff. 
1171 1973 (3) SA 397 (A). 
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defendant. At the time of the sale, the defendant’s agent represented the company’s 
annual liability as being R 4,656. The parties were aware that this was material and 
that the plaintiff would believe and act on the representation. The figure turned out to 
be an innocent misrepresentation: the company’s true annual liability was R. 14,736. 
The plaintiff had paid a purchase price of R 846,000, most of which was for the 
shareholding. Upon discovering the actual sum of the company’s liabilities, the 
plaintiff brought a case against the defendant, requesting that the purchase price be 
reduced by R 31,000. The court granted this. 
 With the distinction detailed above in mind, the author will now consider two 
questions. First, can such a hidden defect in a company produce a latent qualitative 
defect in the shares bought which would fall within the scope of the implied warranty 
of soundness? Secondly, should such defects be recognised as breaching the implied 
warranty of soundness in a contract of sale for shares?  
 
 (i) Defects in the Company and Their Impact on the 
 Quality of the Shares Bought 
 
The underlying company in respect of which the shares are issued is susceptible to 
different types of hidden qualitative defects. It can be found to be liable for an 
outstanding tax payment it has thus far avoided; be less profitable than it appeared to 
be due to accounting irregularities; be liable for a large sum of money in respect of 
some duty it has breached; or be found to be less asset-rich than it was believed to 
be. The question is, in respect of a contract of sale for shares, could such defects 
affect the quality of the shares bought in a manner which falls within the scope of the 
implied warranty of soundness? The theoretical answer is yes.  
 The implied warranty of soundness recognises several categories of latent 
defects: (1) defects which render the subject unfit for its ordinary or avowed 
purposes; (2) defects which render the thing “not marketable”; (3) defects which 
result in the subject being of a quality incommensurate with the price; and (4) 
(possibly) where the product delivered of a different type to what was contracted for.  
 A hidden defect in the company is unlikely to render the shares bought 
unmarketable, or of a different type to what was contracted for. Such a defect is also 
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unlikely to render the shares bought unfit for their ordinary purposes. The rights 
derived from shares vary according to the class of shares in question; however, the 
most common are: the right to attend and vote at general meetings; the right to 
receive a dividend from distributed profits; and the right to partake in the proceeds of 
the company’s assets upon winding-up. Where a company is found to have a hidden 
defect of the kind detailed above, that defect is unlikely to affect these rights. The 
rights themselves will remain intact, though their value may lessen. As such, the 
shares will be fit for their ordinary purposes.  
 It may be possible for a hidden defect in the company to render the shares 
bought unfit for their avowed purpose. For example, this could occur where the 
buyer lets the seller know that he is purchasing the shares because the company has 
made a certain amount in annual turnover in the past few years, or has assets up to a 
certain value. This could be important to a purchaser because the amount of profit 
made and the assets owned will affect the dividend paid and the proceeds received 
upon winding up. Where it later transpires that at the time of the sale, the company 
made/had less than the prescribed amount in either turnover or the value of their 
assets, the shares in question may be deemed unfit for their avowed purposes.  
 A hidden defect in the underlying company, emerging post-sale but relating 
to the period pre-sale, may affect the quality of the shares purchased by reducing 
their value. Take the example of Q, who is negotiating to buy 20 shares from M. The 
shares are issued by Company V. Company V appears to be doing well: it has had 
annual profits upwards of £25,000,000 for the last three years, and owns assets worth 
£500,000. The price is accordingly set at £60 per share. However, immediately after 
Q purchases the shares, accounting irregularities previously unknown to the 
shareholders and the public are discovered. Company V is found to have additional 
liabilities amounting to £200,000. Its annual profits are also significantly lower than 
they were represented to be. As a result, each of the shares bought is worth only £20.  
 This is a latent defect that renders the thing sold of a quality incommensurate 
with the price paid for it. In the case law from which this rule arises, “quality” related 
to a purpose or physical aspect. For example, in Whealler v. Methuen,1172 the price 
                                                
1172 (1843) 5 D. 402. 
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paid meant that the buyer could expect “well-cured red herring for exportation”, 
rather than the ill-cured, unexportable red herring he received. In Hill v. Pringle,1173 
it meant that the seed delivered should be good, rather than “of bad and insufficient 
quality”. The circumstances are different when it comes to shares. The shares in the 
example above are worth a third of what the buyer paid for them; but, there is no 
physical defect and there is no unfitness for purpose. However, there is still a 
depreciation in quality. By their nature, neither shares, nor the underlying company 
to which they are attached, can suffer physical defects. However, the price paid was 
for shares in a successful company, with assets worth £500,000 and profits exceeding 
£25,000,000 per annum. What the buyer received, was shares in a company which 
made significantly lower profits and had additional liabilities of £200,000. The 
shares are of a lower quality than a buyer who paid £60 per share was entitled to 
expect. The fact that this lower quality is reflected only in a fall of the price per 
share, is due to the nature of the property in question and its lack of a tangible 
presence. 
 
 (ii) Should the Implied Warranty of Soundness Apply to 
 Hidden Defects in the Underlying Company Which 
 Affect the  Quality of the Shares Sold?  
 
Hidden defects in the underlying company can result in the shares bought being 
latently defective within the meaning of the implied warranty of soundness. The 
resulting defect in the shares will most commonly be a diminution in their value. 
However, should this type of defect be considered to breach the implied warranty of 
soundness in a contract of sale for shares? There are several concerns in taking such 
a stance. The first is that shares tend to rise and fall in value. The fluctuation in value 
is an inherent risk in this type of investment. The second concern is that the subject 
of the sale is the shares rather than the company. The company is ancillary to the 
sale. The third concern is that unless he is part of the company’s management, the 
                                                
1173 (1827) 6 S 229. 
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seller will not normally know of hidden defects in the company. These concerns will 
be considered point by point.  
 Fluctuation in value is an inherent risk when investing in shares. However, a 
distinction should arguably be made between a normal fall in value and one caused 
by a latent qualitative defect. The buyer should assume the risk of the first, but not 
necessarily the second. An analogy from a sale of corporeal moveable property 
illustrates this distinction. When purchasing a horse, the buyer takes on the risk that 
the horse may in future suffer an illness that incapacitates it or depreciates its value. 
However, he does not absorb the risk of the horse already having an undetected 
illness that will render it useless or of less value in due course. The same is true of 
shares. The buyer is rightly expected to undertake the risk of future fluctuations in 
value. However, he should not necessarily be expected to absorb diminutions in 
value caused by a latent defect relating to the pre-sale period.  
 Additionally, buyers are allowed to recover the diminution in the value of 
shares where there is an express warranty of quality in the share acquisition 
agreement. In Lion Nathan Ltd. and Others v. CC Bottlers Ltd and Others,1174 the 
share capital of a soft drinks company was sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs, 
with the purchase price determined in reference to the forecast profits. An express 
warranty regarding the forecast profits for that year was included in the agreement.  
It transpired that the actual profits for that year were significantly lower than the 
forecast profits. In determining the amount of damages available to the plaintiff, the 
court had to consider whether the warranty was one of quality, or one of reasonable 
care. While the decision favoured the latter interpretation, there was no indication 
that damages would not have been available had the warranty been one of quality:  
only that the manner in which the amount of damages was determined would have 
been different.1175 In light of this, the argument that fluctuation in value is an 
inherent risk in shares should not necessarily prevent the implied warranty of 
soundness being applied to latent qualitative defects which affect the value of the 
shares bought.  
                                                
1174 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1438. 
1175 Ibid at 1441f (Lord Hoffman). 
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 The fact that the underlying company is ancillary to the sale should not 
necessarily prevent hidden defects in the company that affect the quality of the shares 
bought, from falling within the scope of the implied warranty of soundness. This is 
because shares are inextricably linked to the company that issues them. They are not 
an independent entity: their whole existence, worth and function arises exclusively 
from their association with the company. Shares are bought because of the benefits 
they give the owner in respect of the underlying company: whether that is a right to 
vote, to manage, or to share in profits. The relationship is such that a hidden defect in 
the underlying company can affect the quality of the shares bought. The inextricable 
link between the underlying company and the plight of the shares would make it 
appropriate for defects relating to the underlying company, but which affect the 
quality of the shares bought, to be addressed under the implied warranty of 
soundness.   
 In some cases, shares are also the method by which someone acquires 
ownership of the underlying company. A buyer may buy a company by purchasing 
all shares issued by that company. In such cases, the object of the purchase is the 
company itself. The shares are merely the medium through which the company is 
bought. Here, the buyer is likely to be more concerned about hidden defects in the 
company, than in the shares themselves.  
 Neither the fact that fluctuation in value is inherent in the nature of shares, 
nor the fact that the company is not the subject of the contract of sale, should 
necessarily prevent hidden defects in the underlying company which affect the 
quality of the shares bought from falling within the scope of the implied warranty of 
soundness. However, the same is not true of the fact that the seller will not normally 
be aware of hidden defects in the company. 
 The implied warranty of soundness has its roots in the Roman law aedilitian 
edict. This edict was propounded as a means to combat the notoriously underhanded 
dealings of slave traders in the market place.1176 Under the edict, the seller’s 
knowledge was immaterial to his liability.1177 Ulpian defended this position in the 
following way:  
                                                
1176 See: D.21.1.44.1; D.21.1.1.2. 
1177 D.21.1.1.2. 
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  There is nothing inequitable about this; the vendor could have made   
 himself conversant with these matter; and in any case, it is no concern of the 
 purchaser whether his deception derives from the ignorance or the sharp  
 practice of his vendor.1178 
 
In Scots law, as in Roman law, the seller’s knowledge is immaterial to his liability 
under the implied warranty of soundness. This makes sense because prior to the sale, 
the seller is in a better position to discover any defects. The buyer, in comparison, 
has less chance of discovering a latent defect prior to the sale: to a certain extent, he 
has to rely on the seller’s judgement, vigilance and honesty. The seller takes a 
smaller risk than the buyer; and for that reason, liability for latent qualitative defects 
is placed on his shoulders.  
 However, unless the seller is involved in the company’s management, this 
argument will not apply to hidden defects in the underlying company that affect the 
quality of the shares sold. The seller will neither know, nor have any means of 
discovering, hidden defects in the underlying company. The risk taken by both the 
seller and the buyer is equal. 
 As with the debtor’s solvency in the sale of a claim, holding the seller 
impliedly liable for hidden defects in the underlying company that affect the quality 
of the shares sold, would place an onerous burden on the seller. It may also harm 
commerce by making people reluctant to either invest in, or sell, shares. Thus, such a 
course of action is neither economically nor morally justifiable. 
 
 3. Goodwill 
 
(a) What is Goodwill? 
 
Goodwill is an incorporeal right capable of transfer. It is: 
 
  ...that element in an existing and well-established business which warrants a 
 reasonable expectation that it will be able to attract to itself and retain  
                                                
1178 Ibid. 
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 customers to a greater degree than could a newly started but otherwise  
 precisely similar business.1179 
 
Goodwill relates to three elements of a business. It can be connected to the business 
premises.1180 This is:  
 
 the advantage which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the value of the  
 capital and fixtures employed therein, in consequence of the general public 
 patronage which it receives from habitual customers on account of its local 
 position or reputation of celebrity and comfort, or even from ancient  
 partialities.1181 
 
It can be connected to “the personality of the party who has built up the 
business”.1182 Most commonly however, goodwill relates to the “connection of a 
going business”.1183  
 Goodwill, comprised of one or several of these elements, can be the subject of 
a sale.1184 A buyer of goodwill receives: 
 
 ...the right (1) to carry on the old business, (2) under the old name...(3) to 
 represent himself to customers as the successor to the old business, (4) to use 
 and have registered in his name the trade marks thereof, and (5) - in the case 
 of a voluntary alienation only - to restrain the vendor by interdict [from  
 inducing away his former customers].1185 
 
Goodwill can be incorporeal moveable, incorporeal immoveable or a mixture of both 
depending on whether it is associated with the business premises or the trader’s 
reputation.1186 As per the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, a contract of 
sale for goodwill does not have to be in writing, unless a real right in land is 
involved.1187 
                                                
1179 Christie, “Goodwill”: 200. See also: Gloag and Henderson (13th ed): 739; Allan, Goodwill: 12;  
Trego v. Hunt [1896] A.C. 7 at 17f (Lord Herschell). 	  
1180 Christie, “Goodwill”: 200f; Allan, Goodwill: 13ff.	  
1181 Drummond and Another v. Assessor for Leith (1886) 13 R. 540 at 541 (Lord Fraser).	  
1182 Christie, “Goodwill”: 201.	  
1183 Ibid: 201; Allan, Goodwill: 16.	  
1184 Allan, Goodwill: 80ff; Gloag and Henderson (13th ed): 739; Christie, “Goodwill”: 202.	  
1185 Christie, “Goodwill”: 210; See also: Allan, Goodwill: 18f.	  
1186 Graham v. Graham’s Trs (1904) 6 F. 1015; Muirhead’s Trs v. Muirhead (1905) 7 F. 496; Gloag 
and Henderson (13th ed): 740. 	  
1187 s 1(1) and (2), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.	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(b) Latent Defects in Goodwill 
 
Goodwill is a type of incorporeal property which is susceptible to latent defects. The 
following three examples demonstrate this.  
 
 (i) Example One: Illegal Earnings 
 
One example presents itself in a French case concerning the sale of a cafe and its 
business.1188 At the time the contract was entered into, the buyer was aware of the 
gross income of the business. However, he was unaware that a significant part of this 
came from illegal gambling activities which took place there in secret. This was 
found to be a latent defect within the remit of Article 1641.1189  
 A similar case occurred in Scots law. Unlike the French case however, the 
implied warranty of soundness was not mentioned. In Bryson and Company Ltd. v. 
Bryson,1190 the pursuers had purchased the goodwill, plant and stock of a pittwood 
importing business from the defender for around £4000. At the time, the defender 
had allowed the pursuers and their accountants to look at the books. The books 
appeared to be genuine and confirmed the defender’s statement as to the annual 
profits made by the business. However, after purchasing the business, the pursuers 
discovered that all the profits of the business were actually derived from illegal or 
fraudulent methods. The pursuers brought an action against the defender, alleging 
that, “the said business had no value whatsoever, that the the goodwill was entirely 
fictitious and depended for its appearance upon the fraudulent and illegal transactions 
manipulated by the defender”,1191 and requesting repayment of the sum of £4000 in 
the name of either the actio quanti minoris or damages.1192 The action was based, 
firstly on the plea that the goodwill, stock and plant had been lesser in value than 
                                                
1188 D. H. 1925. 643. Facts taken from Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 533, Footnote 217.	  
1189 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 533, Footnote 217. 	  
1190 (1916) 1 S.L.T. 362.  
1191 Ibid at 362. 
1192 Note, that the pursuers had built a profitable business; and as a result, they wanted the whole of 
the price paid returned to them without terminating the contract.  
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what had been contracted for; and secondly, on the plea that the pursuers had 
suffered loss and damage due to the defender’s fraudulent misrepresentations.  
 Why was the implied warranty of soundness not used in this case, especially 
since the equivalent was applied to a similar case in France? One possible reason is 
that such a warranty did not exist in a contract of sale for goodwill. Another 
explanation is that the buyer did not know that an implied warranty of soundness 
existed in contracts of sale for incorporeal property. This is possible because: (1) the 
implied warranty was developed in relation to case law involving corporeal 
moveable property and had ceased to be invoked in case law after the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 came into force; and (2) there was very little direct information on the law 
underlying Scots contracts of sale for incorporeal property. 
 
 (ii) Example Two: Contaminated Produce 
 
A is a sole trader who owns a small chain of pie shops. He contracts to sell the 
goodwill of this business to B. Shortly after the sale, it is discovered that the meat in 
the pies supplied have regularly been contaminated in the production line. This 
contamination, which existed before the sale, was unknown to and undetectable by B 
at the time the sale took place. The incident receives much negative publicity. 
Customers shun the business, profits are much lower than they were in the years 
previous to the sale, and B incurs significant additional costs in trying to eliminate 
the contamination.  
 The contamination is a latent defect in the quality of the goodwill bought. It 
renders the goodwill unfit for its ordinary purposes - which in this case is the good 
reputation of the business and its ability to attract and retain customers. Depending 
on the exact circumstances, it may also render the goodwill incommensurate with the 
price paid for it and/or unmarketable. As such, the defect falls within the scope of the 
common law contractual implied warranty of soundness.  
  
 (iii) Example Three: Breach of Trust in Relation to a 
 Notarial Office 
 
 
  225 
Another example of latent defects in the sale of goodwill can be taken from French 
law. The French version of the warranty (embodied in Article 1641 of the Code 
Napoléon) has been used to address qualitative defects in contracts of sale for 
notarial offices.1193 In several cases the seller had, unbeknownst to the buyer, 
committed a breach of trust “while acting in his notarial capacity”.1194 The buyers in 
these cases successfully argued that the notarial offices were latently defective, 
“since the innocent transferee would be linked with the fraud in the minds of the 
[seller’s] clients, and…the office would consequently not be suitable for its intended 
use”.1195  
  
(c) Establishing a Causal Link 
 
Goodwill can be susceptible to latent defects in quality. However, establishing a 
causal link between the latent defect and the qualitative deterioration of the goodwill 
may pose a challenge in some cases. For example, in the second scenario, it could be 
difficult for B to demonstrate that the fall in profits and customers is the result of the 
contaminated meat. A might argue that other factors - such as the change in 
ownership - are to blame.  In such situations, it is debatable whether the buyer could 
bring a successful action based on the implied warranty of soundness. In other cases, 
establishing a causal link will not be a problem. For example, in the first scenario,  
it would be relatively straightforward to demonstrate that the price paid was not 
commensurate with the quality of the the goodwill bought once the profits earned 




                                                
1193 Referred to as “d’offices ministériels”	  in Baudry-Lacantinerie, G. and Others, Traité	  Théorique et 
Pratique de Droit Civil, 3rd ed: 443.	  
1194 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 533, Footnote 217. Cites: cass.-req., 6 février 1894, S. 95.1.177; 
18 janvier 1898, D.98.1.409. See also: Baudry-Lacantinerie, G. and Others, Traité	  Théorique et 
Pratique de Droit Civil, 3rd ed: 444.	  
1195 Morrow, “Warranty of Quality”: 533, Footnote 217; See also: Baudry-Lacantinerie, G. and 
Others, Traité	  Théorique et Pratique de Droit Civil, 3rd ed: 444.	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The implied warranty of soundness only offers one remedy. This is the actio 
redhibitoria, by which the contract is terminated, with the price being returned to the 
buyer and the subject being returned to the seller. This remedy will not always be 
desirable to buyers of latently defective goodwill.  
 The buyer’s motive in purchasing the goodwill of a business, is that business’ 
reputation and ability to attract and retain customers. In the example of the pie 
business, where the meat in the pies are found to have been contaminated, much 
depends on the effects of this discovery. The desirable remedy depends on the value 
of the goodwill as it now stands, whether the business reputation can be restored and 
at what cost, and whether there are any reasons to compel the buyer to continue in 
ownership of the business. If the goodwill remains valuable, the buyer may prefer the 
actio quanti minoris plus damages for loss incurred in curing the defect and 
regaining the reputation of the business. Where the goodwill is no longer valuable, 
the actio redhibitoria will be more appropriate.  
 In the example of the notarial office which had been tainted by the previous 
owner’s breach of trust, and is unsuitable for its intended use, the actio redhibitoria 
is likely to be the desired remedy. Sometimes however, the buyer may want to avoid 
terminating the contract even when the goodwill is worth little or nothing. This was 
demonstrated in Bryson and Company Ltd. v. Bryson.1196 There, the buyers argued 
that the goodwill they had bought was worthless, as the company’s profits had been 
made through fraudulent and illegal means. However, they did not want to terminate 




Goodwill can be affected by latent qualitative defects. However, there are several 
possible impediments to the use of the implied warranty of soundness in such 
instances. The first is that it could be difficult to establish a causal link between the 
defect and the qualitative deterioration. The second is that the actio redhibitoria may 
not be a desirable remedy to buyers of latently defective goodwill. The third, is that it 
                                                
1196 (1916) 1 S.L.T. 362.  
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is unclear whether the warranty of soundness was implied in such contracts of sale. 
This question arises because it was not invoked in Bryson, a Scottish case which was 
very similar to a case in which the French implied warranty of soundness was found 
to have been breached.   
 
 4. Computer Software 
 
The supply of computer software is a transaction fraught with legal confusion. There 
is controversy as to whether computer software is a form of corporeal moveable 
property or incorporeal moveable property. It is equally unclear whether software 
supply transactions can be categorised as sales. For the purposes of this chapter, 
these are preliminary questions which must be explored before we can look at the 
implied warranty of soundness in the context of computer software.  
 
(a) Is Computer Software a Type of Incorporeal Property? 
 
The debate as to whether computer software is corporeal moveable property or 
incorporeal moveable property, exists largely due to policy reasons. The Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 state that “in 
Scotland [goods are] all corporeal moveables except money”1197. Thus, if computer 
software is classified as corporeal moveable property, any supply or sale relating to it 
would be governed by these two Acts. On the other hand, if computer software is 
deemed to be incorporeal moveable property, then its supply or sale is governed by a 
somewhat unclear common law. 
 In the English case of St Albans City and District Council v. International 
Computers Ltd.,1198 Sir Iain Glidewell stated, in obiter, that a computer program is 
not corporeal moveable property; but, any physical medium (such as a disk, a USB 
stick or a CD) on which the program is delivered is corporeal moveable property.1199 
                                                
1197 S 61(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979; s 18, Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. Note: the quote is 
taken from the 1979 Act. The wording in the 1982 Act is slightly different. 	  
1198 [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
1199 Ibid at 493 (Sir Iain Glidewell). 
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In light of this, he argued that where the computer program is delivered on a physical 
medium, it constitutes corporeal moveable property; but where it is not delivered on 
a physical medium, it is incorporeal moveable property.1200  
 In Scotland, this analysis has been criticised by Lord Penrose: 
 
 This reasoning [is] unattractive….It appears to emphasise the role of the  
 physical medium, and to relate the transaction in the medium to sale or hire of 
 goods. It would have the somewhat odd result that the dominant characteristic 
 of the complex product, in terms of value or of the significant interests of  
 parties, would be subordinated to the medium by which it was transmitted to 
 the user in analysing the true nature and effect of the contract. If  one  
 obtained computer programs by telephone, they might be introduced into  
 one’s own hardware and used as effectively as if the medium were a disk or 
 CD or magnetic tape. One could not describe the supply of information over 
 the telephone system for a price as a sale of goods. Once copied into the  
 hardware, the differences relating to the medium would be irrelevant.1201   
 
The writer is in agreement with this view. The medium on which the program is 
delivered is of secondary importance: the transferee’s interest is in the software 
program itself. As such, the medium should not determine whether the computer 
software is corporeal moveable property or incorporeal moveable property. 
Computer software is clearly a type of incorporeal moveable property, regardless of 
the whether or not it is delivered on a physical medium. It is worth noting however, 
that Sir Iain’s distinction is becoming irrelevant. This is because while software can 
still be delivered on physical mediums, it is increasingly more common to download 
it electronically.  
 The St Albans and Beta Computers cases occurred almost two decades ago. 
However, it is still not clear whether, legally, computer software is a corporeal 
moveable or an incorporeal moveable.1202 Personally, the writer tends to the view 
that computer software is clearly a type of incorporeal moveable property.  
 
                                                
1200 Ibid at 482 (Sir Iain Glidewell). 
1201 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd. v. Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd., 1996 S.L.T. 604 at 608f (Lord 
Penrose).	  
1202 Reed, C., (ed) Computer Law, 7th ed: 73.	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(b) Can a Software Supply Transaction Be Categorised as a 
Sale? 
 
The question of whether a software supply transaction can be categorised as a sale is 
not adequately addressed in most sources. In St Albans, Sir Iain Glidewell considers 
whether software falls within the definition of ‘goods’ without first establishing that 
software can be the subject of a sale.1203 The question is also not addressed in key 
texts on computer law.1204 
 In Scotland however, the legal position on this matter was clarified in Beta 
Computers (Europe) Ltd. v. Adobe Systems Ltd.1205 Lord Penrose, in the Outer House 
of the Court of Session, argued: 
 
 …the only acceptable view is that the supply of proprietary software for a  
 price is a contract sui generis which may involve elements of nominate  
 contracts such as sale, but would be inadequately understood if expressed  
 wholly in terms of any of the nominate contracts.1206 
 
It is submitted that Lord Penrose’s analysis is correct. Most software supply 
transactions cannot be classified as sales. The reasoning behind this position is 
explained below.  
 The transfer of ownership from seller to buyer is a central component of sale 
transactions.1207 According to Erskine, ‘ownership’ is:  
 
 …the right of using and disposing of a subject as our own, except in so far as 
 we are  restrained by law or paction. This right necessarily excludes every  
 other person but the proprietor; for if another had a right to dispose of the  
 subject, or so much as to use it, without his consent, it would not be his  
 property, but common to him with that other. Property therefore implies a  
 prohibition, that no person shall incroach [sic] the right of the proprietor.1208  
 
                                                
1203 [1996] 4 All ER 481 at 492ff (Sir Iain Glidewell). 
1204 For example: Lloyd, I. J., Information Technology Law, 5th ed; Reed, C., (ed) Computer Law, 7th 
ed. 
1205 1996 S.L.T. 604. 
1206 Ibid at 609 (Lord Penrose). 
1207 Hume, Lectures: II.3; Brown, Treatise: xii, 8-9; s 2(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
1208 Erskine, Institute (1st ed.): II.1.1.	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A typical software supply transaction is accompanied by features which prevent the 
recipient from acquiring ownership of the software. The first, is that computer 
programs are subject to copyright.1209 The copyright holder has the exclusive rights 
to copying the work; issuing copies of the work to the public; renting or lending the 
work to the public; performing, showing or playing the work in public; 
communicating the work to the public; making an adaptation of the work or doing 
any of the above in relation to an adaptation.1210  
 The second, is that off-the-shelf software is generally supplied with an end 
user license agreement (EULA) which limits the acquirer’s exploitation of the 
product. EULAs extend protections to those matters not covered by copyright law. 
They can, for example, limit liability extensively. EULAs also commonly stipulate 
that ownership of the software copy remains with the software publisher. For 
example, the EULA for OS X Mountain Lion specifies: “[t]he Apple software [and 
any additional software] are licensed, not sold, to you by Apple Inc”.1211 The EULA 
can also restrict the way in which the program is used. Thus, the EULA prohibits the 
Microsoft Office Home and Student software from being used for “commercial, non-
profit, or revenue-generating activities”.1212  
 Where software is supplied without the copyright being assigned, or where 
the supplied software is accompanied by a EULA, no transfer of ownership occurs. 
Say A acquires some photography software from B for a price of £100. The 
photography software is not accompanied by a EULA; however, the copyright for it 
is held by Y. A does not acquire the copyright in the transaction. Erskine defines 
ownership as the exclusive right to use or dispose of something as one’s own. In this 
case, A does not derive either of these rights through the transaction. He may be able 
to sell his copy of the software on or lend it out; however, without further permission 
from Y, he cannot create copies of the software and issue, rent or sell these copies. 
Nor does the transfer allow him exclusive use of the software. Y, as the copyright 
holder, will be able to license the software to other parties.  
                                                
1209 s 3(1)(b), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
1210 s 16(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 	  
1211 Software License Agreement for OS X Mountain Lion, Clause 1A; Niranjan, V. “A Software 
Transfer Agreement and Its Implications for Contract, Sale of Goods and Taxation” (2009) 8 Journal 
of Business Law 801f points out that a similar clause exists in the Microsoft Windows XP EULA.  
1212 Software License Agreement for Microsoft Office 2013 Desktop Application Software, Clause 8. 
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 EULAs, which exert proprietary controls extending far beyond copyright law, 
also prevent the transferee acquiring ownership. If, in the above example, the 
software acquired by A is accompanied by a EULA, A’s rights of usage are further 
restricted. For example, the EULA may stipulate that the software can only be 
installed or run on a limited number of stations; that A is only allowed to use the 
software for non-commercial purposes; and that A cannot resell or lend his copy of 
the software. Like in the first example, A does not acquire ownership of the software, 
because he does not acquire the exclusive right to use or dispose of the software. The 
difference between the first and second examples is that Y exercises even tighter 
proprietorial controls in the latter example. 
 Using this analysis as a basis, we can now consider if and when software 
supply transactions can be categorised as sales. The writer suggests that computer 
software is only capable of being sold where: 1) there is no accompanying EULA; 
and 2) the copyright in the software is assigned to the transferee. A software supply 
transaction featuring off-the-shelf software1213 will usually be accompanied by a 
EULA; and even where this is not so, the software developer will retain the 
copyright. Thus, the supply of off-the-shelf software could not be categorised as a 
sale transaction.  
 Bespoke software is more likely to be the subject of a sale. This type of 
software is commissioned by, and written for, a specific client. The software 
developer will be asked by the client to create software which suits that client’s 
particular needs. Even once the software is given to the client, the manufacturer may 
continue working with that client to identify and repair bugs on the program.1214  
Because it is commissioned and paid for by a specific client, bespoke software is 
unlikely to be accompanied by a EULA.  
 There are two possible impediments in categorising the supply of bespoke 
software as a sale transaction. The first impediment is that copyright in the software  
does not vest in the person who commissioned the work, unless that person is the 
employer of the software developer and the software was developed in the course of 
                                                
1213 Software written “to meet the requirements of a large number of users”. See: Reed, C., (ed) 
Computer Law, 7th ed: 47. 
1214 Saphena Computing v. Allied Collection Agencies [1995] FSR 616 at 652. 
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employment.1215 Where the developer is simply contracted to write the software 
under a contract of services, the copyright vests in him rather than the client who 
commissioned the software.1216 In that case, the client can only acquire the copyright 
if it is assigned to him by the developer. As our analysis demonstrated, ownership of 
a computer program is only transferred with the copyright. This means that, unless 
the developer and client have an employment contract, the supply of bespoke 
software can only be deemed a sale where the copyright in the software is assigned. 
 The second impediment is in whether bespoke software transaction should be 
classified as a supply of services, or a sale. The exact dividing line between a supply 
of services and a sale is unclear. In Scots law, academic opinion suggests that where 
a seller exercises his skill or art to make something specifically commissioned by the 
buyer, and the finished product is subsequently transferred to the buyer for a price, 
there is a contract of sale coupled with a contract of hire.1217  
 Thus, there is some limited scope for software supply transactions to be 
classified as sales. This generally occurs where the copyright in the software is 
assigned to the transferee. Therefore, the subject of such a sale is not the computer 
software itself, but rather, the copyright in the computer software. As a result, the 
question of whether latent defects can arise in sales of computer software will be 
discussed in the section on copyright.1218 
 
 5. Copyright 
 
Copyright is a form of incorporeal moveable property1219 which can be the subject of 
a sale.1220 A contract for the sale of copyright does not have to be in writing.1221 
                                                
1215 s 11(2), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998.  
1216 s 11(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998.  
1217 Brown, Treatise: 574f; Brown, R., Treatise on the Sale of Goods: With Special Reference to the 
Law of Scotland, 2nd ed: xiii; McBryde, Contract (3rd ed): 251. Alternatively, McBryde suggests that 
there is just the one contract of sale.  	  
1218 Readers should note that if the Consumer Rights Bill receives Royal Assent, the law will offer 
more statutory protection to certain acquirers of digital content (including computer software). Under 
the Bill, terms relating to satisfactory quality (s 34(1)) and fitness for a specified purpose (s 35(1)) will 
be implied into contracts for the supply of digital content by a trader, to a consumer for a price (s 
33(1)). 
1219 s 90(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1220 MacQueen, H. L., ‘Copyright’ in S.M.E, Volume 18: Property: §978. 
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Copyright is transferred by assignation,1222 which must be in writing and signed by 
or on behalf of the cedent.1223 Copyright can be transferred in part (i.e. limited to 
only some of the exclusive rights) or in whole.1224  
 Copyright can exist in original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, 
sound recordings, films, and the typographical arrangement of published editions.1225 
The owner of the copyright in a work holds the exclusive rights to: copying the work; 
issuing copies of the work to the public; renting or lending the work to the public; 
performing, showing or playing the work in public; communicating the work to the 
public; making an adaptation of the work or doing any of the above in relation to an 
adaptation.1226  
 The chief motive in acquiring copyright is to exploit the right for financial 
profit when a third party wants to use the work.1227 This can be done through selling 
the copyright in part or in whole; or through licensing, “where ownership is retained 
but the third party is permitted to carry out acts which would otherwise be 
infringements”.1228 
 
(a) Latent Defects in Copyright 
 
The intangible, statute-derived nature of copyright means that the copyright itself 
cannot be affected by qualitative defects. However, the subject of that copyright can 
sometimes be afflicted with a defect which affects the quality of the copyright itself. 
Thus, copyright is another type of incorporeal property which is only affected by 
qualitative defects through ancillary property closely related to it. As in the other 
instances, the writer argues that the close nature of the primary and ancillary property 
should be recognised insofar as issues in the subject of the copyright which affect the 
                                                                                                                                     
1221 s 1(1) and (2), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 
1222 s 90(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1223 s 90(3), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1224 s 90(2), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1225 s 1(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1226 s 16(1), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 	  
1227 MacQueen, H. L., Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design, Hume Papers on Public Policy, 
Vol 3, No 2, 2nd ed: 2; MacQueen, H. L., ‘Copyright’ in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §1005. 
1228 MacQueen, H. L., ‘Copyright’ in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §1005; See also: MacQueen, H. 
L., Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design, Hume Papers on Public Policy, Vol 3, No 2, 2nd 
ed: 2f. 
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quality of the copyright itself, should come within scope of the implied warranty of 
soundness.  
 The potential of qualitative latent defects occurring varies between different 
types of copyright. Some types of copyright are prone to such defects, while others 
are not. This disjuncture is demonstrated through a study of copyrights in computer 
programs and books.  
 
 (i) Computer Programs 
 
As a literary work within the meaning of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988, computer programs are subject to copyright.1229 Ordinarily, computer 
programs themselves cannot be the subject of a sale.1230 The writer believes that 
computer programs are only sold where the copyright in them is transferred under a 
sale agreement.  
 Computer programs are one of the few types of incorporeal property that are 
easily susceptible to latent defects of quality. For example, a computer program can 
have an undetected software vulnerability that is exploited by hackers, leading to the 
computer being damaged and sensitive information being stolen or lost. Another 
example is found in the St Albans case, where the software contained an undetected 
glitch which resulted in the outputting of incorrect information. As a consequence, 
charge payers were invoiced a sum which was significantly lower than what it should 
have been.1231 Another example of a qualitative defect is where the computer 
program contains an undetected bug which causes it to crash frequently and results in 
the user having to redo already completed work. Each of these defects can exist 
unknown to and undetectable by the buyer, at the time the contract of sale is entered 
into.  
 These faults in the program can result in the subject of the sale - the copyright 
in the computer program - suffering latent defects within the warranty’s scope. 
Copyright in a computer program is bought because: 1) the buyer wants to secure 
                                                
1229 s 3(1)(b), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
1230 See analysis at page 229ff. 
1231 St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
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sole use of the program for himself, most probably because it will give his business 
an advantage; or 2) he wants to exploit the copyright for profit, either by licensing 
the program to third parties, or selling the copyright on. Where the program which is 
the subject of the copyright being sold has a security vulnerability, a glitch of the 
kind described or a propensity to crash and lose work, it: 1) is unlikely to satisfy the 
ordinary uses of either giving the buyer a business advantage or being profitable; 2) 
may not be of a quality commensurate with the price paid for the copyright, since the 
program has a severe latent defect; and 3) is likely to be unmarketable, particularly in 
relation to the buyer’s plans to exploit the copyright for a profit. 
 However, readers should note that the only remedy available for breach of the 
implied warranty of soundness would produce unsatisfactory results in cases where 
the copyright to computer software is deemed to be latently defective. Two things 
must be remembered when considering what remedy is appropriate here. First, it is 
normal for computer software to suffer undetected defects. This is discussed by 
Staughton L. J. in Saphena Computing Ltd v. Allied Collection Agencies Ltd: 
 
…software is not necessarily a commodity which is handed over or 
delivered once and for all at one time. It may well have to be tested 
and modified as necessary. It would not be a breach of contract at all 
to deliver software in the first instance with a defect in it.1232 
 
However, this it not a defence where the software, “cannot perform the function 
expected of it”.1233 Secondly, defects such as those described can usually be patched. 
As such, where curing the defect is not disproportional in terms of time and expense, 
the best solution for both buyer and seller is a remedy of repair and (where 
appropriate) damages for loss suffered. 
 
 (ii) Books 
 
                                                
1232 [1995] FSR 616 at 652. 
1233 St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481 at 487 
(Nourse L. J.). 
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Books are another type of literary work in which copyright subsists.1234 Unlike with 
computer programs however, latent defects within the remit of the implied warranty 
of soundness are much less likely to manifest themselves in contracts of sale for 
copyright in books. The warranty addresses those hidden defects which affect the 
commercial value and utility of the thing bought. A defect within scope of the 
warranty must: 1) have existed, unknown to the buyer at the time the contract was 
entered into; and 2) fall into a category recognised under the warranty.1235 Only 
faults in the actual body of the work can render the copyright defective. Misprinted 
pages or texts omitted due to printing errors do not impact the quality of the 
copyright.  
 Fictional books are not prone to issues that result in the copyright being 
latently defective. This is partly because it is difficult for works of fiction to be 
qualitatively defective within the meaning of the implied warranty of soundness; and 
partly because the buyer is likely to know of any defects. Take the example of a book 
which contains controversial material preventing its publication in certain countries. 
This potentially renders the copyright bought unfit for its ordinary uses. However, 
publishers know or should know the content of a book before they buy the copyright 
to it. Indeed, controversial content can be the reason they buy a particular book. The 
“defect” is unlikely to be latent. 
 Nevertheless, there is some limited scope for a latent defect to arise. Take, for 
example, a book described by the author as a memoir. The copyright in this book is 
sold by A (the author) to B (a publisher). The book proves popular, generating 
considerable profits due in no small part to the fact that it is said to detail true events. 
However, it soon becomes general knowledge that large portions of the book are 
fictional.1236 Sale numbers plummet and negotiations to license the rights for a film 
adaptation fall through. In this case, the copyright sold contained a defect within the 
scope of the warranty in that the product delivered (a fictional work) was not the 
product contracted for (a memoir). However, even here there is an issue in that it is 
                                                
1234 s 3, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
1235 See page 25 onwards. 
1236 This scenario is based on the circumstances surrounding the publication of James Frey’s A Million 
Little Pieces. 	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unclear if the warranty is breached where the thing delivered is not also inferior in 
quality to what had been contracted for.1237  
 In terms of desirable remedies, much will depend on the value the copyright 
now has to the buyer. If the buyer deems the purchase useless or of extremely low 
value, he may want to use the actio redhibitoria. Alternatively however, the 
copyright may still be of value to him, though less than it was previously. In this 
latter case, the actio quanti minoris may be preferable.1238 
 Copyright in instructional books are more likely to suffer latent defects. 
Lloyd argues that an instructional book containing erroneous directions breaches the 
guarantee of quality implied by section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, if: 1) the 
inaccuracy is an error in fact; 2) the erroneous information was “intended to form the 
basis of action by the reader"; 3) compliance with the instructions would likely result 
in injury or damage; and 4) the error results in the purchaser losing confidence in the 
book to such an extent that they are unwilling “to take any action on the basis of the 
book’s instruction”, rendering the book unusable.1239 
 This analysis can be extended to the use of the implied warranty of soundness 
in a contract of sale for the copyright in an instructional book, in the following 
circumstances. Firstly, at the time of purchase, the buyer (generally a publisher) must 
not and could not have known of the error(s) in the book. Secondly, the quadripartite 
rule detailed by Lloyd must be satisfied. Generally, the purpose in purchasing the 
copyright for a book is to allow the buyer to distribute the material contained in it for 
profit. Where errors in the book result in the target audience opting not to buy the 
book because they do not trust its instructions, the defect has arguably rendered the 
copyright unfit for its ordinary uses. In such circumstances, the actio redhibitoria 
will be a desirable remedy. 
 The probability of such a situation occurring is another matter. The errors in 
the book would have to be significantly severe and quite widely known before they 
result in a large enough portion of the public boycotting the book to render the 
                                                
1237 See discussion at page 45ff.  
1238 In practical terms, this would be achievable if the seller’s payment was in the form of a percentage 
of the profits. In such cases, the price paid would be determined by the commercial success of the 
book. 
1239 Lloyd, I.	  “A Rose By Any Other Name”	  (1993) Journal of Business Law: 53. 	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copyright unfit for its ordinary uses. Furthermore, it may be difficult to establish a 




Some forms of copyright are more susceptible to latent qualitative defects than other 
types. Much of the content of the warranty is applicable to sales of copyright in 
computer programs. In contrast, we do not see the full content of the warranty at 
work in sales of copyright in books. Thus, the warranty is more relevant to some 
types of copyright than to others.  
 
 6. Patents 
 
Patents are a form of incorporeal moveable property1240 which can be wholly or 
partly assigned.1241 The contract of sale does not have to be in writing.1242 The 
assignation however, must be in writing and subscribed as per the Requirements of 
Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.1243 The assignation need not be registered in the 
register of patents in order to be valid; however, doing so will give the assignee 




Patents are not widely discussed in the historical texts on Scots law. This is 
understandable: patents were first legally recognised in Scotland as a result of Article 
                                                
1240 s 31(2), Patents Act 1977; The Advocate-General v. Oswald 1848 10 D. 969; Valentine, “Letters 
Patent”: 153; Lloyd, I. J., ‘Patents’	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  811.	  
1241 s 31(3), Patents Act 1977; Dunnicliff and Bagley v. Mallet. Dunnicliff and Bagley v. Birkin and 
Another, (1859) 141 English Reports (Common Pleas) 795; Walton v. Lavater, (1860) 141 English 
Reports (Common Pleas) 1127; Bell, Commentaries, Vol 1 (4th ed): 68; Valentine, “Letters Patent”: 
153-154; Lloyd, I. J., ‘Patents’	  in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  811.	  
1242 s 1(1), Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act. 	  
1243 s 31(6), Patents Act 1977.	  
1244 s 33(1)(a) and (3), Patents Act 1977; Lloyd, I. J., ‘Patents’	  in in S.M.E., Volume 18: Property: §	  
812. 	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VI of the Articles of Union 1707.1245  Thus, the topic is touched on briefly by 
Bankton.1246 Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, delivered in 1762-64,1247 
provides the first real discussion on patents. Patents are also discussed in Hume’s 
Lectures,1248 which were delivered in 1821-22 academic session.1249 However, only 
Bell provides a substantive analysis on the subject.1250  
 The eighth edition of Bell’s Principles (1885), published almost four decades 
after Bell’s death, states that: “in an assignment or license there is no implied 
warranty of the validity of the patent”.1251 This statement is an addition made by 
William Guthrie, who edited this edition.1252 The statement is an English import, 
rather than a product of the Scots common law. The only authorities cited are a series 
of English cases from the late 1850s.1253 The rule itself is a paradigm of the English 
sentiment of caveat emptor, and at odds with the Scots common law approach of 
implying guarantees of title and quality. Nevertheless, the rule’s inclusion in a 
textbook on Scots law, when the rule itself is inconsistent with the native common 
law, is unsurprising: 
 
 In Scotland prior to the Union we had no special Statute legalising patents….
 But it was soon found that the validity of these rights was incontestable, not 
 only under the King’s prerogative, but under [Article VI of the Articles of  
 Union]. In virtue of that compact the Statue of Monopolies legalising  
 patents…became law in Scotland. The result is that, so far as the principles 
 of law are concerned, the Scottish and English law of patents is the same;  
 and in order to secure uniformity, English authorities and…rules are  
 followed, except in questions of procedure, even when at variance with the 
 principles generally applied in Scots law.1254  
 
                                                
1245 Valentine, “Letters Patent”: 130-131. 
1246 Bankton, Institute: I.19.11.	  
1247 For more information, see - Meek, R. L., Raphel, D. D. and Stein, P. G., ‘Introduction’ in Smith, 
A., Lectures on Jurisprudence, (ed) R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein: 5ff. 
1248 Hume, Lectures: IV.60-62.	  
1249 Paton, G. C. H. (1939) ‘Preface’	  in G.C.H. Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822: 
Vol I: v.	  
1250 Bell, Principles (4th ed.): § 1348ff. 
1251 Bell, Principles (8th ed.): § 1355. 
1252 Intriguingly, it does not appear in the 6th (1872) and 7th (1876) editions, which were also edited 
by Guthrie. 
1253 Hall v. Conder and Another (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 318; Smith v. Neale 
(1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 337; Smith v. Scott (1859) 141 English Reports 
(Common Pleas) 654. 
1254 Valentine, “Letters Patent”: 130f (emphasis own). 
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  What does validity denote in this context? A key aspect appears to be that the 
patentee “was not the true and first inventor of the manufacture”.1255 Other elements 
are that the invention “was wholly worthless and of no public utility”;1256 and “was 
not new as to the public use thereof”.1257 There is at least some confusion as to 
whether these elements refer to defects in quality or title. In Hall v. Conder, 
Williams J., states that “[t]he case seems…to fall within the class of cases in which it 
has been held that there is no implied warranty of title or quality, on the sale of an 
ascertained chattel”;1258 and Cockburn, C. J. states that the plea of invalidity is not 
competent because “…there is no warranty as to the quality of the thing contracted 
for”.1259  
 Notwithstanding these confusions, "validity" in this context alludes to issues 
of title. The elements described above refer to criteria which were vital to the 
granting of a patent. These are that the “subject-matter of a patent must be a new 
manufacture”;1260 cannot have “been anticipated and disclosed by prior publication 
or prior use within the United Kingdom”;1261 and that the new invention must be 
useful.1262 Where these criteria are found to be unsatisfied, a patent could be 
challenged and struck down.  
 The pivotal point in the authorities cited in the eighth edition of the 
Principles, was that the original patent holder had a subsisting patent1263 which he 
could legitimately license or assign to the acquirer. As long as this was the case, the 
lack of an implied warranty of validity meant that the buyer contracted to take the 
                                                
1255 Smith v. Neale (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 337 at 338; See also: Smith v. Scott 
(1859) 141 English Reports (Common Pleas) 654 at 654, 656; Hall v. Conder and Another (1857) 140 
English Reports (Common Pleas) 318 at 319. 
1256 Hall v. Conder and Another (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 318 at 319; See also: 
Smith v. Scott (1859) 141 English Reports (Common Pleas) 654 at 654, 656. 
1257 Hall v. Conder and Another (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 318 at 319; Smith v. 
Scott (1859) 141 English Reports (Common Pleas) 654 at 654, 656. 
1258 Hall v. Conder and Another (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 318 at 322. 
1259 Ibid at 331. 
1260 Valentine, “Letters Patent”: 134. 
1261 Ibid: 137. 
1262 Ibid: 140. 
1263 Smith v. Neale (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 337; Hall v. Conder and Another 
(1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 318 at 332 (Cockburn, C.J.); Smith v. Scott (1859) 141 
English Reports (Common Pleas) 654. 
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patent “such as it was, without regard to whether it could be sustained upon litigation 
or not”.1264 Thus, “validity” in this context, refers to a defect in title.  
 Bell’s Principles does not comment on whether or not the implied warranty 
of soundness applied to the sale of a patent. However, if the practice in relation to 
patents was to follow English law even where it conflicted with Scots law principles, 
it is unlikely that contracts of sale for patents would have contained an implied 
warranty of soundness. 
 
(b) Latent Defects and Patents in Biotechnology 
 
Issues of quality do not feature in the case law on sales of patents. Theoretically 
however, patents can be susceptible to such latent defects. This possibility is 
discussed below.  
 Patents can span a wide breadth of fields, such as industry, manufacturing 
processes, and medicine. A full consideration of qualitative defects in different types 
of patents is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the section below focuses on 
qualitative defects in biotechnological patents. Such patents are both commercially 
important, and susceptible to qualitative defects.  
 
 (i) Sales of Patents in Biotechnology 
 
The general practice in relation to patents for drugs or a biotechnological 
manufacturing process, is to license rather than sell them. However, such patents are 
sometimes the subject of a sale. In such sales, the consideration is usually in the form 
of a percentage of royalties which will be due to the seller once the drug or process is 
approved.1265 Thus, the price is determined by the commercial success of the 
biotechnological patent.  
 
                                                
1264 Smith v. Neale (1857) 140 English Reports (Common Pleas) 337 at 346. See also: Smith v. Scott 
(1859) 141 English Reports (Common Pleas) 654 at 658 (Willes J.). This is the case unless there is 
either an element of fraud or an express warranty of validity.  
1265 Interview with Dr. Martyn Breeze, Director of Borders Technology Management, Offices of 
Borders Technology Management (November 15, 2014). 
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 (ii) Example One: Drug Patents 
 
Patents for drugs are a type of incorporeal property susceptible to latent defects. The 
most prevalent example of this is side effects. Side effects can be discovered at any 
stage of the process: at the clinical trials before the drug goes on the market; or once 
the drug has been approved for sale. They range from mild (such as headaches or 
nausea) to serious (such as causing severe health problems or even death). Serious 
side effects can result in the drug being withdrawn from, or never being approved 
for, the market, ending its commercial viability and rendering the patent bought unfit 
for its ordinary uses.1266  
 
 (iii) Example Two: Patents for Biotechnological   
 Manufacturing Processes 
 
Latent defects can also exist in a patented biotechnological manufacturing process. 
For example, Company G invents a process to engineer bacteria to produce a 
particular protein which is valuable in treating a common disease. Once the process 
has been tested and fine tuned, they agree to sell the patent to a pharmaceutical firm, 
Company T. Company T intends to use the process at an industrial scale. However, it 
transpires that the growth method cannot be upscaled to a level where it is actually 
useful. As a result, Company T has bought a patent which is not commercially viable 
or fit for its avowed purpose. Neither buyer nor seller could have known, of or 
predicted, this defect.  
 Another example is where a process is developed to manufacture a medically 
valuable protein via insertion of a gene coding that protein into a bacteria or other 
micro-organism. However, upon insertion, the organism performs its own 
modifications on the protein. Clinical trials are run and the protein is approved for 
treatment. It later transpires that the protein treatment causes severe longterm side 
effects which could not have been predicted or discovered by the clinical trials. 
                                                
1266 The way in which consideration is made - through a percentage of the royalties once the drug goes 
on the market - makes it difficult for a defect to render the patent incommensurate with the price paid 
for it.	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These side effects are caused by the modifications performed by the organism. As a 
result, the manufacturing process is not commercially viable.  
 
 (iv) The Extent of Loss Suffered 
 
The financial loss caused by the defects in a drug or a manufacturing process is 
dependant on the stage at which the defect is discovered. If it is discovered at the 
clinical trial stage, then the drug or process will never have been commercially 
viable. The loss there is likely to be the amount of money spent on the clinical tests. 
If, as is likely with longterm side effects, the defect arises after the drug or process 
has been put to commercial use, then those affected may have to be financially 
compensated. In that case, the loss will be greater.  
 
 (v) Liability for Defects 
 
Patents in biotechnology are susceptible to latent qualitative defects. Although 
applicable, the implied warranty of soundness will not be relevant to such sales. 
There are two reasons for this: the remedy available under the implied warranty; and 
the lack of information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller.  
 In sales of patents in biotechnology, the price paid is a percentage of the 
royalties once the drug or process is approved for the market. This means that the 
actio redhibitoria, by which the contract is terminated and the price paid returned to 
the buyer, is not relevant here. The system by which price is determined in such sales 
already accounts for the product’s commercial failure. As a result, the buyer will pay 
only what the product is worth.  
 There is also no asymmetry of information in the sale of a patent in 
biotechnology. The implied warranty of soundness is based on the principle that, 
prior to the sale, the seller is in a better position to discover defects in the thing than 
the buyer is. The seller’s risk in the matter is less than the buyer’s, and for that 
reason, he bears liability for latent defects. However, this is not the case when it 
comes to patents in biotechnology. The innovation of a new drug or process is a 
gamble, a forage into the unknown. There is a significant probability that the 
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drug/process might not work as planned and that this may only be discovered over a 
significant period of time. The seller cannot be expected to know of or discover 
defects in the drug or process in question in the same way as he would were some 
other type of property involved. Thus, both the seller and the buyer are in a similar 
position in regard to knowledge of latent defects in a biotechnological patent.  
 Judges can exercise their discretion in awarding the buyer a remedy for 
breach of the implied warranty of soundness. This is seen in case law, where the 
buyer’s conduct was a factor which influenced whether or not a claim based on the  
the implied warranty was successful.1267 In an action for breach of the implied 
warranty of soundness in the sale of a patent in biotechnology, the irrelevance of the 
actio redhibitoria and the fact that there is no asymmetry of information between the 
buyer and the seller, are factors which should be considered by the Bench.  
 
F. Concluding Thoughts 
 
Significant gaps in the case law and surrounding literature render it impossible to 
determine whether the implied warranty of soundness extended to contracts of sale 
for incorporeal property. Excepting the passage in Bankton’s Institute and the fact 
that the warranty was not invoked in Bryson,1268 there is nothing to suggest that the 
warranty did not apply to incorporeal property. However, there is also no case law or 
literature which expressly confirms the warranty’s application to this type of 
property.  
 Two factors are likely to have contributed to this silence. The first, is that in 
past centuries, the volume of sale transactions involving incorporeal property is 
likely to have been significantly smaller than that involving corporeal moveables and 
- to a lesser extent - even corporeal immoveables. The second, is that the 
development of the contract of sale in relation to incorporeal property is likely to 
have been hindered by the fact that the transfer of incorporeal property places a 
heavy focus on the assignation. 
                                                
1267 See discussion at page 57ff.  
1268 Bryson and Company Ltd. v. Bryson (1916) 1 S.L.T. 362.  
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 The existing law on implied guarantees in a sale of incorporeal property 
relates to claims. In examining this law, we determined that the debtor’s solvency 
was an issue of quality. However, the author cautioned against viewing the exclusion 
of an implied guarantee of the debtor’s solvency as an exclusion of the implied 
warranty of soundness as a whole. The debtor’s solvency is only one aspect of 
quality, and there are excellent justifications for excluding an implied guarantee in 
relation to it. We also noted that the law is unclear as to whether the rule regarding 
the debtor’s solvency relates to the contract stage; and whether it extends to other 
types of incorporeal property.  
 We turned then to the question of whether the implied warranty of soundness 
could be of practical use to contracts of sale for incorporeal property. This question 
was examined in the context of five different types of incorporeal property. Here, the 
analysis demonstrated that the implied warranty of soundness is not as applicable to 
contracts of sale for incorporeal property, as it is to contracts of sale for corporeal 
moveable property. Due to the nature of this type of property, there is less scope for 
latent qualitative defects to arise. This scope also varies across different types of 
incorporeal property: the warranty is more relevant to some types than to others. In 
several cases, the warranty was also irrelevant because there was no asymmetry of 
information between the buyer and the seller. 
 In terms of remedies, the actio redhibitoria was found to be an unsuitable 
remedy in several of the examples we considered. Thus, the remedies available under 
the warranty should be expanded if the warranty is to be of practical use to buyers of 
this type of property. Damages, repair and abatement of the price are desirable 
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Chapter VI - Concluding Thoughts 
 
 
The central question in this thesis was whether the Scots common law underlying 
contracts of sale was unified. If it was, then this meant that one set of principles 
applied regardless of whether the type of property involved was corporeal 
immoveable, corporeal moveable or incorporeal.  
 The thesis examined this central question through the prism of the implied 
warranty of soundness. This warranty was developed exclusively through case law 
featuring corporeal moveable property. However, if the law in this area was unified, 
then the warranty should have been equally applicable to contracts of sale for 
corporeal immoveable and incorporeal property.  
 We began by exploring whether discussions on the Scots contract of sale 
treated the common law as being unified, with one set of principles applying 
regardless of the type of property involved. With the exception of the conveyancing 
texts and Bell’s Commentaries and Inquiries, we found that they generally did. 
However, it was also noted that there were a few exceptions to this rule. Some 
principles did vary in their application to different types of property. A notable 
example was the rule that contracts of sale for immoveable property had to be in 
writing. Another was that the implied warrandice of title had different implications 
for corporeal moveable and corporeal immoveable property.1269 These divergences 
arose for practical or policy reasons.  
 Reid describes a unified common law underlying Scots contracts of sale as 
one in which, “principles developed in connection with one type of property were 
generally assumed to be of equal application to the other”.1270 The implied warranty 
of soundness arguably fails this test in relation to its application to corporeal 
immoveable property.  
 There were no policy reasons to justify excluding the application of the 
implied warranty of soundness from contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable 
property. Neither is there a clear indication that the warranty was excluded in relation 
                                                
1269 See discussion in Chapter Two.  
1270 Reid, “Warrandice in the Sale of Land”: 164. 
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to this type of property. On the strength of the available sources, it is likely that 
several factors meant that the warranty simply was not used by buyers of latently 
defective corporeal immoveable property.   
 Following the logic of Reid’s argument, most writers should have taken 
Hume’s position on the matter in these circumstances. That is, they should have 
indicated that while such cases did not generally arise in practice, the warranty was 
applicable to corporeal immoveable property. However, they did not do so. Instead, 
several reacted by expressing doubts as to whether the warranty did apply to 
contracts of sale for corporeal immoveable property.  
 This tell us something about the common law underlying Scots contracts of 
sale. It suggests that there was not necessarily an assumption that principles 
developed in relation to one type of property were equally applicable to the other 
types. The application to other types of property may have been discretionary rather 
than automatic.  
 In many ways, this would be a desirable approach. It takes into account the 
inherent differences in corporeal moveable, corporeal immoveable and incorporeal 
property. It means policy and practical reasons can be considered before a principle 
developed in relation to one type of property is deemed to apply to other types. 
 Such an approach would be beneficial in developing the law underlying 
contracts of sale for incorporeal property. The examination in chapter five concluded 
that there were too many gaps in knowledge to determine how strictly the principles 
developed in the context of corporeal moveable and corporeal immoveable property 
were applied to contracts of sale for incorporeal property. However, in examining the 
possible application of the implied warranty of soundness to different types of 
incorporeal property, we determined that the warranty was less relevant in this 
context. Furthermore, the warranty’s limitation in remedies is problematic in the 
context of incorporeal property. For the warranty to be useful here, remedies such as 
the actio quanti minoris and damages will need to be developed.  
 The author is keen to stress however, that these observations are gleaned 
solely from studying one common law principle. To truly answer the question of 
whether or not the Scots common law underlying contracts of sale was unified, 
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further principles - such as the implied warrandice of title and the rule on the passing 
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